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ABSTRACT
BENJAMIN DANFORTH: The Development of Education Systems
in Advanced Capitalist Societies.
(Under the direction of John D. Stephens)
Although mass education has become a common feature of all advanced capitalist so-
cieties, it has not developed uniformly across these societies. Significant divergences have
arisen in the types of education that these societies emphasize and in the levels of effort that
they devote to promoting and improving education for all. To understand these divergences
and their causes better, this dissertation comparatively analyzes two important phases in
the development of mass education in more affluent societies: the pre-World War II ex-
pansion in secondary education and the postwar growth in tertiary education. For both of
these phases, the dissertation argues that notable institutional differences in these societies’
education systems arose from political struggles that were largely driven by distributional
concerns.
To evaluate this general argument and its more specific parts, this dissertation employs a
mixed-method approach combining broad statistical analysis with focused case-study anal-
ysis. For the statistical component of this approach, two new sets of cross-national data
on political economy and education systems covering 17 advanced capitalist societies for
the years from 1880 to 1985 are examined. In the case-study component, historical analy-
ses of educational development in Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United
States during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are carried out. The combined
results of these analyses show that prewar struggles over secondary education were heavily
shaped by two factors: the structure of state authority over education and the strength of
coordination legacies in training. It is found that variation in these two variables mostly
iii
accounts for the emergence of different mixes of general education and vocational train-
ing at the secondary level. For the postwar phase of educational development, the results
show that partisan government incumbency and constitutional veto points were key deter-
minants of cross-national differences in the generosity, distribution, and coverage of public
education systems. Among other things, it is found that right government involvement and
pervasive veto points are associated with distributional arrangements in education that are
skewed toward tertiary education. On the whole, these findings underscore the importance
of political institutions and partisan politics in spurring the rise of distinct models of mass
education.
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1 INTRODUCTION, THEORY, AND APPROACH
After it was first made compulsory in eighteenth-century Prussia by Frederick the Great,
education has grown to become one of the most essential functions performed by modern
states. Although it only applied to elementary schooling in one country and was loosely
enforced at first, this seminal decision set in motion a process of expansion in public edu-
cation that still has not reached its zenith. Across the more affluent regions of Europe and
North America (and later Oceania), Prussia’s educational model inspired actors of many
different ideological stripes to launch their own public education initiatives, and, conse-
quently, systems of mass education gradually appeared in these societies as well. Once
mass education at the primary level had taken hold in these parts of the world by the late
nineteenth century – the United Kingdom was a surprisingly late adopter – it subsequently
spread to other educational levels, particularly the secondary and tertiary levels.1 Now,
at the beginning of the twenty-first century, many of these societies provide their citizens
with educational opportunities across the entire life course, ranging from early childhood
education to continuing adulthood education. And as knowledge becomes a more central
part of modern economies, the pervasiveness of state-sponsored mass education is likely to
continue to increase.
While this long upward trend in the development of mass education is remarkable,
it has not impacted all advanced capitalist societies to the same degree or in the same
manner. From a broad perspective, it is clear that some of these societies now devote
significantly more of their total resources to education than their peers do. Moreover, a
1 This dissertation is primarily concerned with educational institutions. Therefore, terms like “educational
levels” and “educational outcomes” are used in reference to institutions rather than individuals.
1
closer look at the composition of education in these societies reveals that some societies
offer their members both general education and vocational training while other societies
focus almost exclusively on the provision of general education. Likewise, a comparison of
public investments in education by level (i.e. primary, secondary, tertiary, etc.) shows that
some societies prioritize higher levels of education over lower levels while other societies
adhere to a more balanced distribution of public resources. When these three patterns are
considered together, it is evident that affluent societies have followed several different paths
in developing their education systems, and yet little is known about key aspects of these
long-run divergences. Why have the education systems in affluent societies evolved so
differently? How have political factors influenced the trajectories of these systems?
This dissertation contends that these broad variations in education systems can mostly
be attributed to cross-national differences in collective political engagement tied to class-
based politics, constitutional structures, and coordination legacies. A central theme of the
arguments made in this dissertation is that education has been the object of struggles in-
fused with class tensions ever since it became a state function and was deemed a national
priority. Although the origins of these struggles over education predate the rise of social-
ism, they have long been waged by actors representing different socioeconomic strata. In
the earlier phases of these struggles, liberal reformers and conservative elites fought over
the development of mass education at the primary and secondary levels. It is only in more
recent phases that working-class movements and left parties have led the charge for ex-
pansions and improvements in mass education. Another prominent theme found in this
dissertation is that political institutions have strongly shaped these struggles over education
and their impact on education systems. The constitutional structures of modern states and
the enduring legacies of old economic orders have been especially important in determining
the opportunities available to proponents and opponents of educational change. In struggles
over secondary education, these factors have heavily influenced the nature and success of
2
elite strategies to manage pressures for educational expansion. Similarly, in broad conflicts
over educational resources, constitutional structures have strengthened the political posi-
tion of higher education compared to other forms of education. All in all, the arguments
advanced by this dissertation underscore the importance of political factors in explaining
long-term developments in education systems.
To evaluate these arguments, this dissertation uses a mixed-method approach to analyze
a wide range of cross-national data covering 17 economically advanced societies and the
years from the early 1800s to 1985. In its investigation of pre-World War II developments in
secondary education, the dissertation combines broad statistical analysis with focused case-
study analysis to examine the roles of constitutional structures and coordination legacies
in generating different institutional mixes of general education and vocational training.
In its study of post-World War II changes in education systems, the dissertation employs
extensive quantitative analysis to explore the role of political partisanship and constitutional
structures in shaping the distributional arrangements found in these education systems.
Both of these studies make use of new data gathered and assembled for this dissertation.
For the prewar study, the quantitative data come from a new political economy dataset
covering the six decades leading up to World War II, and the qualitative data are drawn
from an array of primary and secondary sources. For the postwar era, several new and
extended data series measuring the size and structure of education systems are analyzed.
Together, these two studies provide a sweeping view of the changing educational landscape
in the more affluent parts of the world.
The purpose of this opening chapter is to lay out the theoretical and analytical frame-
works that guide the rest of the dissertation. With the aim in mind, the chapter proceeds in
four parts. First, it discusses the three theoretical perspectives that have served as sources of
inspirations for this multi-part comparative inquiry. Second, it identifies the core arguments
advanced by this dissertation and discusses their underlying logics. Third, it provides an
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overview of the mixed-method approach used to examine empirical differences in educa-
tion systems and describes the process used in selecting cases for these analyses. Finally,
the chapter concludes with a summary of the dissertation’s main contributions and its re-
maining chapters.
1.1 Theoretical Inspirations
Comparative research on the development of political economies has produced a num-
ber of rich lines of social inquiry, but they have seldom been applied to education. Scholarly
work on social policy in modern political economies has often avoided issues involving ed-
ucation because education policy does not neatly fit the standard mold of social policy.
First of all, the initial establishment of public education occurred long before the creation
of prototypic social policies, such as sickness insurance and old-age pensions, which only
started to appear in the late nineteenth century. Moreover, education serves many different
purposes, some of which fall outside the narrow conceptualization of “welfare” frequently
used to distinguish social policy from other forms of public policy.2 Although these and
other distinctions have led some to deem education policy as something distinct from so-
cial policy (e.g. Wilensky 1975, 3–7), others have argued that there is less cause for this
differentiation (e.g. Castles 1989, 431–432). As T. H. Marshall and others have pointed
out, if one uses the concept of social rights to delineate the bounds of social policy, then
education policy should be considered a form of social policy (Marhsall 1950; see also
Stephens 2010).
In thinking about the emergence of distinct education systems, this dissertation adopts
the view that education policy is a type of social policy and that it has real distributional
consequences for societies. With these points in mind, this dissertation draws on three lines
of inquiry from work on comparative social policy to help elucidate the political origins of
the long-run divergences in education systems observed in advanced capitalist societies.
2 For example, the use of education to increase social cohesion and human capital does not immediately
improve the material wellbeing or “welfare” of students.
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The first is power resources theory, which recognizes that competing class-based interests
have varied capacities to shape policy outcomes, particularly when matters related to social
policy are involved. The second, varieties of capitalism, emphasizes the importance of
complementarities between social policy and labor markets in sustaining broad political
economic arrangements. The third, historical institutionalism highlights the many ways in
which political institutions alter and absorb movements in social policy over varying time
horizons.
1.1.1 Power Resources Theory
In explaining cross-national differences in political economies, particularly in their
welfare components, power resources theory has become a widely used approach. This
theoretical perspective holds that social policy largely reflects the distribution of power
among competing forces in the civil and political spheres of society. With its emphasis
on class-based politics, this approach frames competition over economic and social policy
as a struggle between lower-class groups, particularly organized labor and left parties, and
their upper-class counterparts, namely employer organizations and center and right parties
(Esping-Andersen 1990; Huber and Stephens 2001; Korpi 1980, 1983; Stephens 1979).
The relative power of these two sides are derived from different sources: the power of
the left forces is based on their capacity to organize the working and lower-middle classes
while the power of the center and right forces is tied to their ability to amass physical and
financial resources from the upper-middle and upper classes. In the end, the side that ac-
cumulates and maintains the larger share of power resources is expected to exert principal
control over the direction of social policy in a given society.
A focus on the allocation of power among class-based groups can shed some light on
the origins of modern education systems and their differences. During the nineteenth cen-
tury, when political rights remained highly restricted in most societies, right forces enjoyed
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significant advantages in the competition for political power and retained substantial con-
trol over the formulation of public policy. Given their strong ties to the upper echelons
of society, these forces had a vested interest in preserving institutions, like those in ed-
ucation, that supported and reproduced existing systems of social stratification (Lindert
2004, 100–101; Ringer 1979, 12–22). With the progression of industrialization, however,
new economic and social conditions undermined the conservative order endorsed by right
forces, particularly as an increasingly large and radical working class made its entrance on
to the political scene. Education reform was not initially a top priority for left movements
that arose with the working class, but the movements’ strengthening presence elevated is-
sues of democratic citizenship, human capital, and social control, all of which related to
education. Eventually, by the mid-twentieth century, these left forces did assume a more
prominent role in educational politics, and the balance of power between the left and right
became an important factor in the development of education policy.
While class struggles have impacted many aspects of educational reform, they alone
cannot explain the divergent paths taken by affluent societies in developing their educa-
tion systems. For instance, despite initially having similar education systems and facing
similar reform pressures, the conservative-led governments of late-nineteenth-century Ger-
many and Sweden took very different approaches in developing their secondary educa-
tion systems. Whereas German conservatives chose to revive old institutions of vocational
training, the Swedish conservatives were slow to implement any major policy changes.
Furthermore, in this period of history, liberal forces were often the main challengers to
conservative elites, particularly on matters concerning education. Although liberal groups
were not firmly associated with the lower classes, moderate liberals were usually quite
sympathetic to the basic needs of the impoverished masses. Viewing universal education
as an anecdote to many social ills and a requirement for robust democratic participation,
these progressive liberals often became leaders or supporters of movements to expand and
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desegregate public education. Therefore, in defending a restrictive, class-based education
system, conservative elites had to deal with challenges from both radical liberal forces and
budding leftist forces.
1.1.2 Varieties of Capitalism
The varieties of capitalism (VoC) approach offers a more functionalist logic for explain-
ing the development of cross-national differences in the organization of modern political
economies. According to this theoretical perspective, social policy can serve as an im-
portant tool for developing and maintaining long-term commitments between economic
actors in the labor market, particularly industrial firms and skilled labor. A central premise
of this approach is that businesses and labor face a number of coordination risks that fa-
vor the development of institutions and policies, including social policies, that facilitate
and support informational exchange and economic collaboration (Hall and Soskice 2001).
The need for coordination is especially strong when industrial firms pursue production
strategies requiring large pools of labor endowed with very specific skills. Evidence of
this coordinative logic is most visible in the German economy and other coordinated mar-
ket economies (CMEs), where firms and labor, backed by generous social policies, have
established durable communication and training networks that facilitate intensive skill de-
velopment among workers. By contrast, in liberal market economies (LMEs), such as the
American economy, meager social policies have encouraged firms and labor to rely on
market forces to regulate the labor market. In these environments, the persistence of co-
ordination risks supports the extensive development of highly transferable general skills
rather than firm-based specific skills. In outlining these distinctions between LMEs and
CMEs, the VoC approach draws attention to how the interplay of political and economic
arrangements, such as social policies and production strategies, can foster the development
of complementary institutions and practices across different spheres of society.
Although the VoC perspective is generally used to understand contemporary patterns in
7
skill production, its underlying logic has relevance for explaining the emergence and en-
durance of different institutional configurations in education. In the preindustrial economies
of Europe, state-sanctioned guilds played a central role in managing labor markets through
the supply of skills. Even after governments, under the sway of market liberalism, abol-
ished most of their privileges and monopolies during early phases of industrialization,
guilds continued to have lasting effects on labor markets, particularly in the coordination
of training (Iversen and Soskice 2009; Thelen 2004). When public and private actors later
sought to establish modern institutions of vocational training, these lingering arrangements
proved to be a critical asset in making durable systems. In the United Kingdom and the
Anglo-settler countries, the weakness or absence of guild legacies posed a continual ob-
stacle to governments seeking to impose training arrangements that required substantial
cooperation from market actors. On the whole, the presence or absence of existing comple-
mentarities in the labor market strongly bounded the potential paths of education systems,
particularly in the development of training institutions.
The simple logic of the VoC approach may offer some insight into the ultimate con-
solidation of distinct education models, but it is less capable of elucidating the political
origins of these models. The theoretical emphasis on skill specificity in managing relations
between businesses, workers, and state actors leaves little space for politically motivated
change and innovation, yet history shows that these relations and the institutions that sup-
port them have been strongly shaped by factors other than functional needs. Although the
production of skills has been an important driver of education policy (Boix 1997, 1998;
Iversen and Stephens 2008), concerns about social order and status have also broadly im-
pacted the course of this policy area (Meyer 1977; Ringer 1979). The initial establishment
of mass education was, for instance, as much about reinforcing social control as it was
about edifying the peasantry. Conflicts over the roles and objectives of education have been
a prominent feature of modern politics, so it is not unreasonable to assume that political
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forces have been instrumental in guiding the development of education systems.
1.1.3 Historical Institutionalism
As an approach to understanding the origins and evolution of political economies,
historical institutionalism is concerned with both institutional structures and instituitonal
change. In examining institutional structures, this theoretical perspective stresses that the
design and makeup of states and markets can dramatically shape outcomes in social pol-
icy (Immergut 1992; Skocpol 1992; Weir, Orloff, and Skocpol 1988; Iversen and Soskice
2006). In this vein, historical institutionalism has called attention to the role of constitu-
tional structures in creating veto points that heavily skew the power of different political
actors and interest groups and thus alter the potential for broad policy change (Hicks and
Swank 1992; Huber, Ragin, and Stephens 1993; Huber and Stephens 2001; Immergut 1990,
1992). Recognizing that institutions themselves are products of social forces, historical in-
stitutionalism has also looked closely at the catalysts and processes of institutional change.
The notions of timing and sequencing figure prominently in this line of research, and signif-
icant attention is paid to concepts like historical contingency and path dependence (Pierson
2000, 2004). One important insight from this historical institutionalist work is the idea
of punctuated equilibrium, which emphasizes the importance of political agency at critical
junctures in producing dramatic and enduring changes in institutions. This logic has often
been used to explain long-term developments in political economy and social policy.
The notion that institutions powerfully influence political opportunities and policy out-
comes is fully applicable to educational politics. At various times in the nineteenth century,
Germany, France, and the United States each held the mantel of educational leader at one
point, and much of their success probably lies with the specific layout of their constitutional
structures (Goldin 1999, 2001; Goldin and Katz 2009; Lindert 2004, 104–127). In all three
of these countries, constitutional clauses or legal statutes guaranteed (temporarily in the
case of France) a significant degree of local control over general education at the primary
9
level, giving proponents of educational expansion many opportunities to move their cause
forward.3 Under such decentralized systems of educational control, barriers to reform and
growth in one area did not inhibit, but perhaps encouraged, expansionary efforts in other
areas. Decentralized authority is often seen as barrier to the development and implemen-
tation of top-down social policies, but it can have a protective effect in situations where
social policy is cultivated from the bottom up.The notable divergence in the education and
training profiles of education systems around the beginning of the twentieth century is also
consistent with the concept of punctuated equilibrium. Prior to this point in history, public
efforts in mass education were largely limited to primary education in common schools.
As a consequence, despite some differences in their quality and coverage, early systems of
mass education exhibited low variation in their institutional profiles. In the decades leading
up to the onset of the twentieth century, however, the economic and social arrangements un-
derpinning these early systems started to fracture, creating opportunities for profound and
broad educational change. At this critical juncture, the choices made by political actors on
education policy had long-lasting effects on the paths of education systems.
1.2 Theoretical Framework
Incorporating elements of these three theoretical perspectives, this section presents the
two-part theoretical framework employed in this dissertation. Each part of this framework
deals with a different historical phase in the evolution of education systems in advanced
capitalist societies: the first part focuses on the rise of different models of secondary ed-
ucations during the prewar period from 1880 to 1939 while the second part addresses the
development of distinct distributional arrangements in education during the postwar period
3 Although France is often viewed as the epitome of a centralized state, the French national government did
loosen its control over primary education for a time in the nineteenth century. With the passage of the Guizot
Law of 1833, responsibility for the organization and financing of elementary schools was transferred from the
national government to local communes. This transfer of authority was further enhanced through the law of
10 April 1867, which granted communes complete freedom in raising taxes for their schools. As a result of
these legal changes, there was substantial yet uneven growth in the public provision of primary education in
France, particularly during the 1870s. Yet, this moderate level of local control did not last long, as the central
state reasserted much of its authority over primary education during the 1880s (see Lindert 2004, 110–113).
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from 1950 to 1985. The explanations developed in each part are evaluated in later chapters
of the dissertation.
1.2.1 Prewar Period: 1880–1939
Existing accounts for the emergence of modern education systems have largely dis-
counted the high degree to which the histories of general education and vocational training
are intertwined. In examining the evolution of education systems in advanced capitalist
societies, it has become common practice in political analyses to focus on either general
education or vocational training without paying much regard to the other. For the most
part, comparative analyses of educational expansion have restricted their attention to as-
pects of the former, general education. Older contributions to this research program, for
instance, focus almost exclusively on early patterns of institutional growth in general ed-
ucation (e.g., Archer 1984; Green 1990; Heidenheimer 1974, 1981; Ringer 1979). This
tendency is also seen in a more recent batch of comparative studies looking at the develop-
ment of postwar education systems (e.g., Ansell 2008a,b; Busemeyer 2007, 2009; Castles
1989, 1998), though some small efforts have been made to incorporate vocational educa-
tion (e.g., Ansell 2010). Separate inquiries into the origins and evolution of vocational
training have only appeared fairly recently (e.g., Busemeyer and Trampusch 2012; Thelen
2004; Trampusch 2010), and they have limited their attention to small subset of affluent
societies. While these studies have succeeded in raising the profile of vocational training
in scholarly discussions of education systems, they have not challenged the strong division
made between these two basic forms of education. In fact, in emphasizing the distinct skills
produced by general education and vocational training, these studies have helped to rein-
force the perception that general education and vocation training are fundamentally distinct
and share few if any connections.
One of the central aims of this dissertation is to challenge this perception by analyz-
ing the early rise of modern education and training systems together. Breaking with prior
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research on educational development, this dissertation contends that these systems have
overlapping roots and that these roots lie in class-based politics. If the core institutions
of general education and vocational training have shared origins, then tracing the rise of
one set of institutions requires examining the genesis of the other set. In looking at both
forms of education, this dissertation argue that cross-national differences in the institu-
tional mixes of general education and vocational training originated in nineteenth-century
political struggles heavily infused with class tensions and strongly shaped by constitutional
structures and coordination legacies. As economic and social changes brought by high
industrialization accentuated the need for richer forms of mass education beyond basic
schooling, conservative elites across the economically advanced world faced a common
dilemma: how could the overall standard of mass education be raised without undermining
the privileged position of elite education? Although this dilemma was primarily centered
on general education, vocational training emerged as a promising instrument for reconcil-
ing the two competing demands captured by the dilemma. As will be elaborated below
in a theoretical manner, promoting vocational training on a mass scale constitutes one ap-
proach to addressing the need for more extensive education while preserving the integrity
of existing social structures. This dissertation claims that the desirability and viability of
this strategy as an elite response to the pressures for educational expansion hinged on two
essential factors: the degree to which state authority over general education was decen-
tralized and the extent to which traditions of coordinated vocational training existed. The
interaction of these two factors ultimately determined the trajectories that affluent societies
followed in developing their secondary education institutions.
Before discussing the logic of this argument in more detail, it is first necessary to specify
a few key assumptions.
First, it is assumed in this argument that conservative elites have the capacity to stall
or block policy changes initiated at the central level of government. Conservative elites
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have this power because limited democracy and divided power (e.g., bicameralism) at the
national level ensures that they are overrepresented in central government.
Second, it is assumed that divisions in authority over education and training are, for
the most part, constitutionally defined. As elites and reformers compete for control over
education policy, the authority structures established by constitutions heavily shapes the
strategies each side pursues. In particular, these authority structures determine whether
conservative elites, with their significant power at the political center, can easily intervene
in decision-making at the political periphery.
Third, it is assumed that policy developments in secondary education unfolds in two
stages. In the first stage, conservative elites choose a policy response to exogenous pres-
sures for educational expansions at the secondary level. Then, in the second stage, institu-
tional circumstances determine whether the selected policy response succeeds and whether
it generates untended consequences. Constitutionally defined authority structures for gen-
eral education play a central role in the first stage while legacies of non-market coordination
in vocational training figure prominently in the second stage.
When conservative elites are confronted with mounting pressures for educational ex-
pansion, the level of dispersion in educational governance plays a central role in shaping
their political responses. To begin with, the amount of dispersion strongly conditions the
threat of change to existing institutions of general education if conservative forces do not
react to rising popular demands for extended mass education. With conservative elites well
entrenched in central governments, the extensive decentralization of authority over educa-
tion creates openings for reform that may run counter to the conservative elites’ educational
agenda. In this decentralized authority environment, more democratic and progressive re-
gions and localities can move forward on their own with changes to general education that
open and expand it for the lower strata of society. By contrast, if authority over education
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is strongly centralized, then political actors at lower levels have few opportunities to imple-
ment reforms that undercut the educational objectives of conservative elites at the top level.
In other words, there is less room in this centralized authority environment for regions and
localities to expand and reform general education. On the whole, decentralized authority
over education policy is more conducive to democratizing expansion and reform efforts
than centralized authority is.
Besides affecting the potential for bottom-up innovation and expansion, the extent to
which educational governance is dispersed also powerfully shapes the capacity of conser-
vative elites to exert top-down control over institutions of general education. The thorough
decentralization of authority hinders conservative representatives from using direct inter-
ventions in education policy-making as a reliable means to advance and protect their edu-
cational agenda. Where authority over education policy is highly decentralized, top-down
operations are likely to be ineffective in both interrupting progressive reforms and propa-
gating conservative reforms among subnational units. Conversely, the firm consolidation
of authority over education policy gives conservative elites meaningful powers to guard
and enhance social restrictions and segregation in general education. When conservative
elites have direct control or serious sway over national policy-making, they can cripple,
block, and delay policy reforms that challenged their educational vision when the central
government has eminent authority over education policy. At the same time, under these
conditions, conservative actors can draw on a wide range of state powers to implement
their own reforms and compel others to respect them. All in all, education systems based
on dispersed governance limit the capacity of conservative elites to set the course and pace
of educational expansion and thus maintain their educational advantages.
With extensive decentralization in educational authority making it both imperative and
difficult for conservative forces to assert control over education policy, the promotion of
vocational training becomes an important tool in steering the development of education
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systems. In contrast to general education, vocational training regularly falls under the ju-
risdiction of central governments because of its prevailing ties to industry and commerce.
This centralized authority provides conservative elites with meaningful opportunities to es-
tablish and direct institutions of vocational training while keeping political resistance to
these reforms to a minimum. As alluded to above, conservative actors are likely to ex-
ploit these opportunities when decentralized authority makes the risks of inaction and the
barriers to action in the area of general education high. From the elites’ perspective, the
expansion of vocational training is preferable to the extension of general training because
training imparts less status than education. A broad shift toward vocational training also
satisfies the twin conservative objectives of improving the economic productivity of the
lower classes while keeping down the costs of such improvements to the state. With its em-
phasis on applied learning and practical skills, vocational training provides obvious benefits
in terms of labor productivity. At the same time, the expenses associated with such training
can often be shifted to participating non-state actors, particularly when the training takes
the form of firm-based apprenticeships.
Although conservative forces use it as a strategy to maintain social barriers in education,
the advancement of vocational training might also be pursued by mass-oriented reformers
as a means to compensate for these social barriers. If the centralization of authority gives
conservative elites unassailable control over public education, then competing forces have
few opportunities to effect change in this policy area via the state. Consequently, to meet
growing demands for additional education, these actors are compelled to seek educational
solutions outside of the state. The solutions they devise are typically centered on vocational
training because this form of education can generate immediate returns through higher pro-
ductivity and its costs can be dispersed among students, firms, and other involved parties.
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Yet, given their remedial objectives, these solutions also tended to incorporate many ele-
ments of general education, causing some of the distinctions between training and educa-
tion to blur. Moreover, the responses are likely to appear as school-based programs unless
economic and legal conditions are particularly favorable for the expansion of apprentice-
ships. As these independent initiatives develop a record of success, they are eventually
appropriated by states and become important elements of public education. This process
of increased state involvement is likely to coincide with the weakening of the conservative
elites’ grip on centralized authority.
Regardless of their origins, modern institutions of vocational training are only likely to
take hold in settings where traditions of non-market coordination in training are strong. Vo-
cational training is only attractive to workers and firms if there are clear and positive expec-
tations about the benefits and standards of such training. More specifically, workers need
to know that the completion of training will lead to gainful employment in their selected
vocations and firms require assurances that the provision of training will endow workers
with genuine and relevant skills. Moreover, when firms and workers are asked to help fi-
nance and manage institutions of vocational training, even stronger guarantees are needed
because there will be heightened concerns about cheating – workers fear being exploited
by their employers and firms fear having their trained labor be poached. Overcoming these
suspicions and fostering positive expectations about training requires extensive coordina-
tion, both in the sharing of information and the policing of actions, between workers and
firms and between firms themselves. Building these coordinative mechanisms requires sub-
stantial investments of time and energy from many actors, most of which reside outside of
the state. On the one hand, this means that the barriers to establishing new coordinative
mechanisms are high and that the adoption of vocational training cannot easily be imposed
in uncoordinated environments. On the other hand, this implies that new institutions of
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vocational training face fewer issues of acceptance when coordinative practices already ex-
ist. These traditions of coordination can come from past systems of guild-based vocational
training or prior experiences with state-sponsored vocational education.
Joining these lines of reasoning on the dispersion of authority over education and the
prevalence of coordination in training leads to a rather simple way of parsing out discrete
education-training regimes (see Table 1). A high dispersion of educational authority and
a strong legacy of coordinated training tends to produce education systems with dualized
programs of general education and apprenticeship-focused programs of vocational train-
ing at the secondary level. The combination of high dispersion and weak legacies tends
to engender education systems that feature extensive general programs and failed voca-
tional programs in secondary education. A low dispersion of educational authority and
strong legacies of coordinated training typically leads to education systems with dualized
programs of general education and school-based programs of vocational training at the
secondary level. Low dispersion coupled with weak legacies tends to produce education
systems with dualized programs of general education and failed programs of vocational
training. In terms of expansion, decentralized systems usually exhibit more growth in their
areas of educational emphasis than centralized systems do.
1.2.2 Postwar Period: 1950–1985
Besides overlooking the important linkages between general education and vocational
training in the development of education systems, existing research has also fallen short
in elucidating the distributional politics that underpin these systems. Although education
systems have increasingly been studied as components of welfare states, it remains un-
clear whether the political logics used to explain the development of most forms of social
policy also apply to education. Whereas some studies of the effects of partisanship on pub-
lic expenditures on education have found that conventional theories of left-right politics
do explain cross-national differences in the generosity of education, others have reached
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opposite conclusions
(e.g., Castles 1998; Busemeyer 2007; Iversen and Stephens 2008; Huber and Stephens
2014). Similarly, it remains an unsettled question as to how political institutions fit into this
theoretical context and whether they account for some of the distinct distributional patterns
observed among modern education systems. Although there is good reason to believe that
institutional factors like territorial decentralization and veto points do matter, the few stud-
ies to consider them have produced mixed findings (e.g., Cameron and Hofferbert 1974;
Castles 1998; Busemeyer 2007). On the whole, it is clear that many gaps remain in the
limited research that has been done on the distributional aspects of education politics.
With the aim of filling in these lacunas, this dissertation reexamines the roles of partisan
politics and constitutional structures in shaping the development of education systems in the
postwar era. To help untangle the complex relationships between these political factors and
institutional outcomes, this dissertation considers three dimensions of education systems:
generosity, distribution, and coverage. In looking at these dimensions, this dissertation
does not simply focus on institutional changes in the aggregate, but also explores how
education has evolved at different levels. Using this more comprehensive approach, this
dissertation contends that certain elements of partisan politics and constitutional structures
matter more depending on which dimension and which level are considered. In particular, it
is argued that left government incumbency is the main political determinant of an education
system’s generosity and coverage while right government incumbency and constitutional
veto points are the key determinants of an education system’s distributional features. Before
this argument is further elaborated, however, it is first necessary to define the objects and
scope of the dissertation in greater detail.
Recognizing that education systems develop in complex ways, this dissertation ap-
proaches these systems from several different angles. In particular, the analyses compare
education systems along three different dimensions – generosity, distribution, and coverage
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– and at two different levels – an aggregate of the preprimary, primary, and secondary (PPS)
levels and the tertiary level. Generosity and coverage are two dimensions that regularly ap-
pear in cross-national comparisons of social policy and are straightforward to understand:
the former represents the quality of a given social benefit or service and coverage captures
the degree to which this benefit or service reaches a relevant population. Distribution is
more ambiguous as a dimension for comparison, but in this dissertation it refers to the way
in which resources are shared among different parts of an education system – in this case,
the lower and higher levels of formal education. Given that access to these levels has var-
ied significantly throughout history – with the higher levels being less accessible and more
elite oriented than the lower levels – an examination of resource allocations across lower
and higher education can shed light on the distributional aspects of education systems and
highlight differences between them. The boundary between secondary and tertiary educa-
tion is deemed important in this dissertation because the drive for mass education started to
shift its focus from the secondary level to the tertiary level in all rich countries during the
postwar era.
This dissertation closely examines the initial four decades after the conclusion of World
War II because they constitute a critical period in the formation of modern education sys-
tems. Although this period of educational development has not been extensively studied
using comparative approaches, existing research and data do suggest that this period fea-
tured significant growth and change in the education systems of affluent countries (Ansell
2010; Castles 1989; Huber and Stephens 2014). It is also well established that this early
postwar period was a formative phase in the development of advanced welfare states and
states in general (Castles 1998; Huber and Stephens 2001), of which education systems are
important parts. Moreover, prior research has shown that the welfare state politics of this
expansionary period were markedly different from those of the retrenchment and recalibra-
tion period that followed (Pierson 1996, 2001; Huber and Stephens 2014). Taken together,
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these points make it clear that the early postwar period represents an important stage in the
evolution of education systems and that it should be examined on its own.
To explain cross-national difference in educational generosity, distribution, and cov-
erage for this early postwar period, this dissertation emphasizes the role of class-based
partisan competition over education policy. Drawing heavily on power resources theory,
this dissertation argues that the partisan coloring of national governments over the long run
has a strong effect on the development of each of these three educational dimensions. The
partisan forces that matter most in this context are those that have dominated postwar pol-
itics in most affluent countries, namely left parties, Christian democratic parties, and right
parties.4 Each of these broad party families draws its power from a different set of classes:
left parties are rooted in working and lower-middles classes, right parties are based in the
upper-middle and upper classes, and Christian democratic parties are tied to elements of all
classes.5 Besides serving as the main sources of partisan power, these classes, with their
distinct interests, influence the ideologies and positions of the three party families. Assum-
ing that these class-party ties are firm, political competition over the nature and scope of
public education should exhibit a powerful class dynamic.
Using this partisan framework, this dissertation contends that left parties are the strongest
proponents of generous education systems while right parties are the weakest.
Left parties seek to improve the socioeconomic standing of their working- and middle-
class constituents, and they view education as an important instrument in achieving this
goal. To maximize the number and quality of educational opportunities available to the
4 Left parties have regularly been identified as key drivers of social policy development (Brady, Beckfield,
and Seeleib-Kaiser 2005; Hicks 1999; Huber and Stephens 2001; Korpi 2003). Christian democratic parties
are also frequently considered in historical analyses of social policy because they have been shown to play
a distinctive role in shaping social policy (Huber, Ragin, and Stephens 1993; Kalyvas 1996; Van Kersbergen
1995). Right parties have not been examined as much as the other two party families, but recent research
suggests that right parties impact the development of social policy in distinctive ways (e.g., Allan and Scruggs
2004; Brady and Lee 2014; Brady, Beckfield, and Seeleib-Kaiser 2005; Castles 2004).
5 For a more detailed discussion of the class bases of these party families, see Huber and Stephens 2001:
17-19.
20
lower classes, left parties favor high levels of public investment on all levels of education
– from preprimary education up to tertiary education and beyond. Right parties, however,
are generally opposed to broad increases in public spending on education, particularly at
the lower levels of education. Although right parties do not wish to see publicly financed
education for the masses entirely eliminated, they do support the wide use of targeted fund-
ing schemes and private funding sources in education. Christian democratic parties, with
their cross-class bases of support, have a position that lies in between these two extremes.
While they do not support, as left parties do, the use of education to break down existing
social orders, Christian democratic parties are sympathetic to the notion that a good basic
education is essential for sustained self-sufficiency. Consequently, Christian democratic
parties favor modest levels of public spending on education and oppose efforts to undercut
mass education at the lower levels.
In terms of the relative distribution of public resources across different levels of edu-
cation, this dissertation argues that left parties maintain a mostly balanced approach while
right parties prioritize the tertiary level over lower levels. With the aim of eliminating
class-based disparities in educational attainment, left parties push for highly generous and
accessible educational opportunities across the entire life course – from early childhood
preschool) to late adulthood (continuing education). In this all-encompassing arrangement
advocated by left parties, public resources are spread across all levels of education to help
facilitate the progression of more students to higher levels. By contrast, right parties, with
their strong ties to the upper classes, promote distributional arrangements in education that
enhances the position of elites relative to the masses. Given the historically elite nature of
higher education, right-supported arrangements shift public resources away from the lower
levels toward the tertiary level. This tertiary skew not only makes higher education more
generous, but also more exclusive, as there are fewer public resources available to help
students progress through the lower levels. Christian democratic parties are also inclined to
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support an arrangement that gives relatively more resources to higher education than lower
education, but to a lesser degree than their right counterparts. Although they accept social
stratification in education as a natural feature of human society, Christian democratic par-
ties are reluctant to back actions that substantially exacerbate social disparities or hurt the
lower classes.
Turning to the final dimension, this dissertation contends that left parties strongly sup-
port expansions in the coverage of education at all levels while right and Christian demo-
cratic parties generally do not. As part of their efforts to improve educational outcomes
for the working- and middle-class masses, left parties strive to increase the number of ed-
ucational opportunities available to these masses. In their push to broaden the coverage of
education systems, left parties do not limit their attention to any one level. Instead, they
seek to transform all levels of education, including tertiary education, into mass institutions
that are basically open to all. Right and Christian democratic parties, on the other hand,
are much less enthusiastic about further increasing the coverage of education systems, par-
ticularly at higher levels. Neither of these party families contests the idea that the masses
have a right to public education, but they do not agree with the notion that this right extends
to all levels of education. Instead, right and Christian democratic parties favor restricting
mass education to the two forms that are typically compulsory now, namely primary and
secondary education.
In addition to partisan factors, this dissertation considers constitutional structures to be
an important determinant of educational change. In taking this position, the dissertation
adopts the historical institutionalist view that constitutional structures play a decisive role
in deciding whether efforts to expand and reform social policy ultimately succeed. Ap-
plying this view to the area of education in a postwar setting, this dissertation posits that
constitutional features that disperse authority, such as bicameralism and federalism, create
veto points that aid efforts to enhance elite-oriented education and hinder efforts to improve
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mass-oriented education. These differences in policy success rates, in turn, skew the distri-
bution of public resources within education systems away from mass-oriented lower levels
of education toward the elite-oriented tertiary level of education. Three different mecha-
nisms associated with veto points contribute to these disparities in outcomes, and they are
discussed below.
First, given the ways in which education systems are typically organized, veto points
have more potential to hinder the advancement of existing forms of mass education. While
tertiary education is usually administered on a national or regional basis, primary and sec-
ondary education – the two prominent forms of mass education – are generally handled
to some degree at the local level. Since the number of jurisdictions increases with each
move down the territorial ladder, this organizational structure implies that there are more
institutions involved in the policy-making process for lower levels of education than the
policy-making process for tertiary education. When constitutional arrangements, such as
federalism, formalize and strength this dispersion of authority across different levels, ju-
risdictions, and institutions, they provide minority interests, including elite educational
interests, with more opportunities to block education reforms, especially those that broadly
improve educational opportunities for the masses.
Second, by creating barriers to policy reform, veto points help protect existing policy
advantages for elite-oriented tertiary education. For much of its history, tertiary education
has been an elite enterprise, and it has often received preferential treatment in the allocation
of public funds for education and other aspect of education policy. Efforts to end this policy
bias and transform tertiary education into a mass public good are least likely to succeed
when there are significant numbers of veto points in the policy process. These veto points
allow small but influential minority groups to block policy changes that they oppose, and
this has the effect of maintaining the status quo in public policy. In the case of education
policy, this obstructive process helps preserve distributional arrangements that favor tertiary
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education over lower education.
Third, when educational interests compete for public resources and policy changes, veto
points strengthen the influence of elite-oriented interest groups and weaken the influence
of mass-oriented interest groups. With the development of multiple levels within education
systems, separate sets of interest groups – school associations, labor organizations, and
parent/student organizations – have formed to represent and promote these different levels.
As part of their advocacy efforts, all of these groups seek to increase the allocation of
public resources made to the educational levels they represent. Although the distribution of
funds is not inherently a zero-sum game, there are nonetheless instances when the desires
of these groups clash. In these situations, elite-oriented interest groups should have the
advantage because veto points give better funded and organized groups more direct access
to the policy process and more bargaining power over policy decisions. In early phases
of educational development, elite-oriented groups tend to have more established resource
bases and be less territorially fragmented. To some extent, this mechanism is a derivative
of the prior two.
Operating through these three mechanisms, veto points essentially help produce edu-
cation policy outcomes that mirror existing social disparities. Veto points permit relatively
small groups of elites and their allies to intervene in the policy-making process to protect
their existing advantages and secure new ones. Interest groups representing the underpriv-
ileged masses are, for the most part, unable to challenge this elite dominance because veto
points cause significant fragmentation in their support bases and thus weaken their capac-
ities to organize. Under these conditions, public education resources should increasingly
flow to the form of education most closely associated with elites, namely tertiary educa-
tion. Conversely, if there are few or no critical veto points in the policy-making process,
then education policy and public allocations should generally reflect the interests of the
masses. In this type of environment, the policy-making process tends to be more rational
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and balanced, as a wider array of societal interests are typically consulted and financial
resources usually carry less political sway. In the end, this type of process should lead to a
more proportional distribution of public resources within education system.
Although it might appear that the above logic contradicts the argument made earlier
about the protective effects of dispersed authority on the development of general educa-
tion, it is important to remember that there are a few key differences between the pre- and
postwar environments that inform these arguments. First, and most importantly, democracy
was much more limited in the prewar period, particularly before the onset of the twentieth
century. This gave conservative elites a significant built-in advantage in the policy-making
process, particularly in countries with unitary systems of government. Once democracy be-
came more developed, these advantages were weakened and disappeared entirely in some
cases. With the advancement of democracy, centralized authority became favorable for the
development of policies that benefited the underprivileged majorities. Second, the nature
of educational demands and expectations were markedly different in the two periods of
history. In the prewar period, low demands and expectations made it relatively easy for
regions and localities to expand public education systems with minimal public investment.
However, once the emphasis in education reform moved away from expanding coverage
and toward improving quality, educational development became more resource intensive.
This change created strains on many subnational units responsible for public education,
especially if dispersed authority inhibited the redistribution of resources among these sub-
national units. In sum, broad changes in politics and society between the late nineteenth
and mid-twentieth centuries are responsible for the reversal in the relationship between
authority structures and educational outcomes.
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1.3 Analytical Approach
To evaluate the validity of this two-part theoretical framework, this dissertation employs
a nested analytical approach. This mixed-method approach combines broad statistical anal-
ysis with intensive case-study analysis to maximize both the generalizability and validity
of new theories (Fearon and Laitin 2008; Lieberman 2005; Seawright and Gerring 2008;
Goertz 2008). The main role of the broad, or large-N, analysis in this approach is to es-
tablish that there is indeed an empirical basis for a set of theoretical claims. With this
type of analysis, it is possible to evaluate this set of claims against a host of alternative
explanations in an efficient manner and to estimate the levels of confidence one can have
in these claims in a systematic way. Once the theoretical claims have been vetted through
this process, they are further scrutinized in the focused, or small-N, analysis. With its em-
phasis on finer grain details and patterns, this form of analysis allows one to verify the
existence of relationships between key variables and substantiate the causal mechanisms
that link them. Seeing how they can complement each other in this integrated approach,
both large-N statistical analysis and small-N case-study analysis are incorporated into this
dissertation.6
For the broad statistical component of this nested approach, this dissertation applies
regression techniques to two sets of time-series cross-section data. In these regression
analyses, the core political factors highlighted above – partisan politics and constitutional
structures – are examined to determine whether they are correlated with key patterns of
institutional development in education. As part of these analyses, a number of competing
political, economic, and demographic explanations are also tested to ensure that the main
relationships of interest are valid and robust. These analyses make use of two datasets
that have been assembled for this dissertation, both of which contain new and extended
6 The nested analytical approach has been successfully used in many other studies dealing with political
economy and social policy. Some examples include: Swank 2002, Martin and Swank 2012, and Huber and
Stephens 2012.
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measures of education systems. More specifically, the two datasets cover 17 advanced
capitalist countries for the prewar period of 1880-1939 and the postwar period of 1950-
1985. The geographical and historical breadth of these data enable this dissertation to carry
out a sweeping analysis of the development of education system in affluent countries.
After these statistical analyses confirm that theorized relationships between key vari-
ables do in fact exist, the dissertation turns to a number of case studies for additional in-
sights into these relationships. These case studies, which cover four countries, have been
produced using a variety of primary and secondary sources, most of which deal with the
politics of educational expansion and reform. With their richer details on the motivations
of actors and sequencing of events, these case studies are primarily used to trace the causal
linkages between the main political determinants and educational outcomes highlighted
before, though they also serve to rule out a number of competing explanations. For the
purposes of this dissertation, a set of case studies is only provided for the prewar period,
with their historical focus being the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.7
The cases for this nested design have been selected on the basis of several theoretical
and methodological considerations. To maximize the generalizability of its theoretical con-
tributions, this dissertation examines the universe of advanced capitalist societies that are
relatively large and have long histories of democratic government in the twentieth century.8
These two conditions are needed to ensure that cases have possessed sufficient autonomy
and dynamism to develop their education systems in meaningful ways. For the case-study
analysis, four cases have been selected from this broader population of affluent democra-
cies, and they are: Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These
7 A set of cases studies for the postwar period (1950-1985) are being developed for a future version of this
manuscript.
8 To satisfy the second condition, a country must have at least some experience with democracy in the prewar
period. The 17 countries that are ultimately included in this selection include: Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
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cases have been chosen because they vary significantly on the key explanatory variables –
constitutional structures, coordination legacies, and partisan politics – and they best fit the
explanatory models constructed and tested in the broad statistical analyses. This approach
of selecting cases that fall “on the line,” so to speak, is not without controversy, but it has
been employed here in order to enhance the assessment of causal processes. As Lieberman
(2005, 444) emphasizes, nested designs should, in most circumstances, include cases that
help assess “the strengths of a particular model” and do not add “unexplained noise” to the
model.
1.4 Conclusion
In contemporary debates about economic and social policy, education is regularly cited
as the best solution to many of the most challenging problems facing affluent societies.
As these societies grapple with the consequences of heightened global competition and
extensive demographic change, it is often argued that they should look to their education
systems to boost economic productivity and improve social outcomes (Esping-Andersen
2002). Consequently, with the rise of this “social investment” approach, there has been a
renewed interest in the education systems of advanced capitalist societies and the strategies
that can be employed to reform and expand them (Morel, Palier, and Palme 2011; see also
Nelson and Stephens 2011). Yet, despite all this interest in developing education for the
future, much is still not known about it developed in the past.
The purpose of this dissertation is to highlight and explain several of these past develop-
ments that still have pertinence for present debates. With the shift toward more knowledge-
intensive production in modern economies, interest in the relative merits of different edu-
cation systems has grown, but much remains unknown about why these separate models
came into existence (see Busemeyer and Trampusch 2011). By studying the origins of dif-
ferent education-training regimes found in secondary education, this study sheds new light
on an important feature used to distinguish between these educational models. Given that
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education is often described as the “great equalizer” in political discourse, this disserta-
tion’s analysis of the distributional characteristics of different education systems and their
historical determinants is also apposite. Overall, this dissertation addresses several impor-
tant questions and, in doing so, makes a number of important contributions to the body of
research on education policy and social policy more generally. A few of these contributions
are discussed below.
First, this dissertation draws attention to several important yet complex distributional
aspects of education systems and their origins. Given its ubiquity in affluent societies and
its place in the welfare state, public education is typically thought of as a state function that
promotes egalitarianism. Consequently, the overall size of an education system is often
assumed to be a good indicator of its equalizing effects on social outcomes. As this disser-
tation stresses, however, education systems that appear to be similar on the aggregate can
be built on very different distributional models. The multilevel nature of education systems
makes it possible for states to allocate educational resources to some social groups and
deny them to other groups. This distributional element of education systems has, in turn,
profoundly influenced the political strategies used to expand and reform public education at
all stages of development. In particular, this dissertation shows how efforts to increase the
provision of vocational training and the relative generosity of tertiary education have been
driven by conservative forces seeking to preserve elite advantages in education. There-
fore, to understand fully the social consequences of long-run educational developments
and the political motivations behind them, one needs to recognize that education systems
have many distributional dimensions and that these systems are not inherently structured in
an egalitarian way.
Second, in explaining the long-run trajectories of education systems, this dissertation
emphasizes the role of constitutional structures. Although much scholarly attention has
been devoted to analyzing the relationships between constitutional structures and social
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policy, few studies have thoroughly examined the effects of these state features on broad
elements of education policy. With its extensive historical scope, this dissertation high-
lights the ways in which two forms of constitutional structures – federalism and veto points
– have deeply impacted the development of education systems in affluent societies over
the long run. In determining how authority over education is dispersed, constitutional
structures strongly shape the education policy process and the potential for far-reaching
educational reforms. Whether constitutional structures ultimately aid or hinder the devel-
opment of more extensive and generous education systems depends on the political and
economic context. Dispersed authority can encourage bottom-up educational expansion
when conservative elites dominate the top in a multilevel polity, but it can also hamper
broad educational reform by fragmenting the underprivileged masses. This notion that the
effect of constitutional structures on social policy is conditional has not been thoroughly
explored in prior research.
Third, this dissertation offers a more nuanced interpretation of the connections between
partisan politics and educational development. Although partisan politics are assigned a
minor role in the prewar narrative of institutional development in secondary education,
they figure much more prominently in the postwar story of distributional change in pub-
lic education. This dissertation departs from prior research by focusing exclusively on the
initial four decades of the postwar era. By focusing on these early decades, it offers better
insights into how partisan politics shaped education systems during this critical period in
welfare state development. Moreover, by looking deeper into the allocation of public edu-
cational resources, this dissertation identifies several partisan-based patterns that have not
been theorized before. In particular, it highlights the important role that right parties play in
determining the distribution of resources across the different levels of education. In partic-
ular, when right parties are in government, they tend to push for distributional arrangements
that favor tertiary education at the expense of lower levels of education. This relationship
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suggests that the politics of education policy are not entirely analogous to those for other
types of social policy.
Fourth, in its investigation of the long-term evolution of education systems, this disser-
tation makes uses of many new and overlooked data sources. A surprising dearth of com-
parable cross-national data has long hampered comparative research on education system
(Danforth 2013), especially for periods of history predating the most recent four decades.
For this dissertation, efforts have been made to overcome some of these obstacles by devis-
ing new measures and assembling new dataset. The quantitative analyses of prewar devel-
opments in secondary education are based on a new dataset containing cross-national indi-
cators of political economy and social policy for the period from 1870 to 1940. This dataset
includes several original measures of education systems, three of which serve as outcome
variables for the prewar analyses. Likewise, the quantitative analyses of postwar changes
in the distributional aspects of education systems examines new data on educational gen-
erosity, distribution, and coverage. As these prewar and postwar datasets continue to be
expanded and improved, they should be useful in further research on early developments
in education and social policy in general.
These contributions have culminated from research that is presented and discussed more
thoroughly in the remaining four chapters of this dissertation. The first three of these four
chapters contain the bulk of the analytical work done for the dissertation – the statistical
analyses and cases studies. The final chapter makes connections between the findings of
these investigations and elaborates on their significance for future research. Below is a brief
summary of each chapter.
Chapter 2 contains the first of two statistical studies included in the dissertation. In an
effort to explain why countries have developed different mixes of general education and
vocational training at the secondary level, this study examines cross-national data covering
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries – an important period in the formation
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of mass education at the lower levels. The study shows that different institutional mixes
in secondary education arose from political struggles that were strongly shaped by two
factors: the dispersion of authority over general education and the legacies of non-market
coordination in vocational training. The interaction of these two factors largely account for
why the United States and other Anglo-settler countries surpassed Europe in the provision
of general education in the decades leading up to World War II, and countries like Germany
and Sweden developed extensive systems of vocational training.
Chapter 3 is comprised of four cases studies used to validate the key relationships es-
tablished in the preceding chapter and identify the causal processes at work in these rela-
tionships. Covering Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States, these
case studies demonstrate how constitutional structures and coordination legacies shaped the
strategies of reformer and elites in the development of mass secondary education. In ad-
dition to tracing these causal connections, these case studies also illustrate the contentious
nature of education politics in the prewar years.
Chapter 4 presents the remaining statistical study, with this one focusing on postwar
developments in education systems. The distinguishing feature of this study is its multidi-
mensional approach to examining educational change, particularly across different levels
of education. The study finds that differences in class-based political competition and
constitutional veto points account for the rise of distinct distributional arrangements in
public education during the early postwar period. More specifically, these factors help ex-
plain the emergence of highly generous, mass-oriented education systems in places like the
Nordic countries and weakly generous, elite-oriented systems in places like Australia and
the United Kingdom.
Chapter 5 pulls all of the findings from the statistical and case-based analyses together
and makes some final conclusions about the politics of education in advanced capitalist
societies. It also discusses some of the broader implications of these findings for research
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on comparative political economy and social policy.
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1.5 Tables and Figures
Table 1.1: Historical Underpinnings of Education-Training Regimes, circa 1900
Dispersion of Authority
Centralized Decentralized
Strong Coordinative
Legacies
Sweden
general education: dualistic, modest
expansion
vocational training: mostly school
based, modest expansion
Germany
general education: dualistic, little
expansion
vocational training: mostly
apprenticeship based, robust
expansion
Weak or No
Coordinative
Legacies
United Kingdom
general education: dualistic, modest
expansion
vocational training: failed
independent efforts, little expansion
United States
general education: unified, robust
expansion
vocational training: failed state-led
efforts, little expansion
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2 THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF EDUCATION-TRAINING REGIMES
The impressive gains made in educational effort and attainment over the past century
have overshadowed the strong institutional continuities found in many education systems.
In the more advanced countries of Europe, North America, and Oceania, public spending
on education and average years of schooling have increased fourfold during this time, yet
the institutional frameworks for education in these countries have mostly been slow to
change. This institutional stability is plainly visible in how these countries’ education
systems approach general education and vocational training, particularly at the secondary
level. In some education systems, like those found in Germany and Sweden, both types
of instruction are formally offered, but they are attached to programs with varying degrees
of separation. As seen in the United Kingdom and United States, other education systems
focus almost entirely on the provision of general education, so programmatic divisions
between the two forms of instruction are largely nonexistent.
While it is tempting to conclude that these educational mixes reflect unshakable differ-
ences in national attitudes toward education and training, these distinct arrangements were
much less recognizable at the end of the nineteenth century. As the expansion of primary
education started to approach a natural limit in many industrializing societies around this
time, it was unclear how post-primary education would evolve to accommodate a rapidly
growing stream of students. Conservative elites across these societies shared a common
interest in maintaining their restrictive hold over upper levels of formal education and took
steps to guard this position and the privileges it bestowed. The use of centralized state
power to delay and divert these mounting pressures for educational expansion and reform
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figured prominently in this conservative reaction. Even as new waves of democracy, capi-
talism, and socialism intensified this reaction, conservative elites were not uniformly suc-
cessful in protecting the old order in education. In the Anglo-settler countries, for instance,
concerted attempts to develop coordinated systems of vocational training largely failed,
even as similar efforts saw striking success in most parts of Western Europe.1
This chapter examines the origins of these divergent trajectories in education and train-
ing at the secondary level to understand why some countries developed extensive systems
of firm-based and school-based vocational training and others were largely left with vary-
ing degrees of general education. The extensive quantitative and qualitative work contained
in this chapter and the next point to a somewhat surprising finding: the rise of these dis-
tinct arrangements, or regimes, in education and training was driven more by variation in
authority structures in education and coordination traditions in training than differences in
educational ideologies. This is not to say that competing ideas and interests were absent
in the political struggles over the direction of education and training, but rather that these
two institutional factors played a central role in mediating these struggles and shaping their
outcomes.
To begin evaluating this argument, this chapter provides a high-level overview and anal-
ysis of the trends that led to the formation of distinct education-training regimes. Drawing
on a rich database of historical indicators related to political economy, a series of quanti-
tative analyses involving 17 countries and covering the years from 1880 to 1939 are used
to test the importance of authority structures and coordination legacies in explaining the
rise of these regimes. In the next chapter, cases studies of Germany, Sweden, the United
Kingdom, and United States are used to identify the causal linkages between these two
explanatory variables and the institutional outcomes observed prior to World War II.
1 For this study, the Anglo-settler countries include Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States.
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2.1 The Historical Emergence of Education-Training Regimes
When, at the end of the nineteenth century, the broad impulse for educational expansion
in economically advanced societies moved on from the primary level to the secondary level,
a number of critical decisions had to be made about the structuring of education systems.
While some of these decisions referred to issues like the level of religious involvement
and the division of financial responsibility, a central decision concerned the appropriate
mix between general education and vocational training. At the primary level of education,
all of these societies were converging on a basic design of mass education that stressed
general education, but it was unclear at this moment in history whether this trend would
extend into the upper levels of education. For one thing, the extension of mass education
of the general sort to post-primary levels would upset a longstanding social order that was
propagated through a segmented education system – with primary schools educating the
poorer masses and secondary and tertiary institutions serving the wealthier elites. At the
same time, the quickening pace of capitalist development, spurred on by intensive indus-
trialization and economic liberalization, was generating new yet conflicting demands for
educational change, particularly when it came to the choice between expanding general
education or developing vocational training.
Indicators of institutional development in secondary education show that these soci-
eties adopted several different approaches to reconciling these competing demands (see
Table 2.1). In the years leading up to World War I, Austria, Germany, and Switzerland had
begun to develop mass systems of firm-based vocational training (i.e. apprenticeships),
distinguishing them from other industrializing countries. As these systems became more
developed, the growth of general education slowed markedly in these countries, especially
in Germany and Switzerland. This shift is particularly remarkable because Germany and
Switzerland had, for much of the nineteenth century, been at the forefront of educational
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development at the secondary level. By the early twentieth century, the Anglo-settler coun-
tries had supplanted their Germanic peers as the international leaders in the provision of
general education. Although secondary education in the Anglo-settler countries had lagged
behind secondary education in most of Europe during the nineteenth century, it experienced
a tremendous expansionary boom in the first half of the twentieth century (see Figure 2.1).
Meanwhile, in the countries of Northwestern Europe – excluding the British Isles – an-
other form of education was taking hold. While general education at the secondary level
did expand modestly in these countries, school-based vocational training grew to become a
large component of their education systems. In contrast to all of these countries, the United
Kingdom, and later Ireland, saw much less expansion in their institutions of secondary ed-
ucation. General education did grow, to some extent, in these two countries, but neither
form of vocational training – firmed-based or school-based – deeply took hold. As a result,
the United Kingdom and Ireland remained notable laggards in the provision of secondary
education into the twentieth century.
By the onset of World War II, these divergences in education and training had crys-
tallized, forming several distinct groupings or regimes. The Germanic countries in Cen-
tral Europe all had highly organized, national systems of vocational training that were
largely directed by business interests. Modestly developed systems of school-based train-
ing and education were also present in these countries. By contrast, the other advanced
capitalist societies had very little in the way of firm-based vocational training, though Den-
mark is a partial exception. Instead, the remaining continental European countries and the
Nordic countries exhibited extensive systems of school-based vocational training, whereas
the Anglo-settler counties had large systems focusing almost exclusively on the provision
of general education. Despite experiencing several decades of modest growth, secondary
education was still relatively underdeveloped in the United Kingdom and Ireland at the end
of the interwar period.
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2.2 Hypotheses
How, then, does one account for the cross-national variation in the institutional mixes
of general education and vocational training? One set of arguments posits that this variation
simply reflects differences in capitalist development, while another set points to divergent
patterns in political mobilization. The third set, which constitutes the main theoretical con-
tribution of the study in this chapter, suggests that the broader institutional context mattered
most in setting the long-run trajectories of secondary education and training around the be-
ginning of the twentieth century. The logic of these arguments and the specific hypotheses
derived from them are elaborated below (see Table 2.2 as well).
2.2.1 Economic Development
In theorizing the evolvement of distinct education-training regimes, factors related to
industrial growth and capitalist development represent one set of potential determinants.
Economic theory has long recognized that educational improvement and economic ad-
vancement go hand and hand (see e.g., Becker 1964; Goldin and Katz 2009), and this
association has frequently been used to explain historical and cross-national variations in
the institutions providing education and training (e.g., Gellner 1964, 1983). In these ex-
planations, the level of affluence is regularly identified as a core factor, but the levels of
industrialization, openness, and diversity found in an economy also play significant roles.
It is not unreasonable to think then that these four elements have been similarly important
in shaping the provision of general education and vocational training in modern societies.
National Affluence. Given that wealthier countries tend to have more generous social
programs, one might expect higher national affluence to produce a greater emphasis on
school-based forms of education. Schools require significant resources to establish and
operate on a permanent basis, so they are only likely to appear and grow in societies with
significant wealth. Demand for schools might also be higher in these societies because
they generally exhibit a strong preference for collective, often public, institutions in the
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provision of welfare goods and services, like education (Wagner’s Law). Societies develop
these preferences because economic development often engenders dramatic social change
that undermines existing systems of social protection and support (Kerr et al. 1960; Wilen-
sky 1975; Wilensky and Lebeaux 1958). By increasing the provision of education, states
can both facilitate this economic transition and address its social consequences (Kerr et al.
1960). While firm-based training can meet some of these new demands, it should be a
more attractive to poorer societies than wealthier ones. This is due to the fact that firm-
based training generally requires little public investment, as most of the costs associated
with this form of training can be passed on to trainees and their employers.
Industrial Activity. Despite the close historical association between increasing indus-
trialization and rising affluence, a greater emphasis on industrial activity in a capitalist
economy should favor the rise of vocational training over the expansion of general educa-
tion. Building and maintaining a robust industrial sector requires a substantial number of
workers trained in increasingly advanced and specialized forms of production. In an in-
dustrializing economy, these labor demands can most directly be satisfied on a mass scale
through the extension of vocational training – both firm-based and school-based – as this
form of education encourages early integration into the labor force and focuses on the ac-
quisition of more technical and specific skills (Finegold and Soskice 1988; Iversen and
Stephens 2008; Streeck 1992). Assuming that its internal interests and actions are suffi-
ciently aligned, a large industrial sector is likely to be a strong and influential proponent
for this approach given its labor needs and economic clout (Hall and Soskice 2001). Of
course, the emergence of a robust service sector could reverse some of these incentives and
make general education more desirable for workers and firms (Goldin and Katz 2009).
Trade Openness. A higher level of trade openness might further strengthen the de-
mand and preference for technical-oriented education because it exposes many economic
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sectors to more direct competition and technological change. To withstand these ampli-
fied competitive pressures and exploit new growth opportunities, affected firms and their
workers must continually improve their productivity through new investments in innova-
tive processes and specific skills, thus making specialized education a central priority for
these actors (Katzenstein 1986). When it comes to selecting the delivery method for this
education, however, there are competing logics for firm- and school-based systems. On the
one hand, the firm-based approach, with its emphasis on in-plant training and capital-labor
oversight, can be quite efficient in transmitting relevant skills and giving those most im-
pacted by increased trade a dominant say in its design and operation. On the other hand,
the school-based approach, with its greater access to state financing, can serve as a mecha-
nism for compensating certain segments of the economy for the heightened risks they face
with greater trade liberalization (Cameron 1978; Garrett 1998; Katzenstein 1986; Rodrik
1997).
Economic Diversity. Variations in economic diversity at the subnational level should
also impact the direction of educational reform and expansion, with greater diversity across
geographical regions decreasing the likelihood of a viable firm-based training system emerg-
ing. Creating and sustaining a scheme for firm-based training on a mass scale requires a
high degree of coordination among employers and employees, and such a level of coor-
dination can only emerge when internal divisions within these economic groups are mini-
mal (Tolliday and Zeitlin 1991). Sharp divergences in the makeup of regional economies
should work against broad non-market coordination, as there is a strong potential for dis-
cord among key stakeholders (Mares 2003). One point of disagreement may well be the
direction of education because some firms and workers are likely to find the transferable
skills provided by general education very attractive in an economic environment that is
highly fragmented.
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2.2.2 Political Engagement
Another set of explanations for the different institutional blends of general education
and vocational training stresses the importance of political involvement. It has frequently
been argued that the design and generosity of social policy largely reflects the distribu-
tion of power among competing political forces (Huber and Stephens 2001; Korpi 1983;
Stephens 1979), and there is good reason to believe that this theoretical account applies
specifically to education and training too. Given their well-established roles in shaping
the distribution of economic opportunities and life chances within societies, education and
training systems are regularly the objects of political contestation. In the early instances
of these battles, the level of democracy should be a key determinant of the evolving insti-
tutional trajectories of education and training. At the same time, left-liberal government,
union mobilization, and cleavage structures are likely to figure prominently in these politi-
cal struggles and their policy outcomes.
Democracy. The firm establishment of democracy as the basis for policy-making should
favor the broadening of general education over the rise of vocational training. As the right
to full and equal participation in the political process is extended to more and more people,
public policies, including those involving education and training, will increasingly reflect
the preferences and aspirations of the entire population instead of a select few (Ansell
2008a, 2010; Lindert 2004). These popular inclinations are likely to include a strong desire
for universal access to the benefits and opportunities enjoyed by established elites, espe-
cially in the area of education (Lindert 2004; Go and Lindert 2010, 105–107). When this
ambition leads to action, much of the resulting activity should be centered on expanding
general rather than vocational education because the general form has historically been
more important in regulating the levels of social mobility and economic fluidity found in
a society. For those looking to augment and maximize their new political rights in an
evolving democratic system, general education is also likely to have more salience than its
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vocational counterpart.
Left-Liberal Government. When one considers the political competition over education
between specific groups, a stronger prevalence of left-liberal government should lead to a
greater emphasis on the extension of general education instead of the development of vo-
cational training. Liberal politicians and activists played a central role in the push for mass
general education at the primary level during the nineteenth century, and they remained
strong proponents of educational expansion at the upper levels into the twentieth century.
With the emergence of socialist movements and parties in the later half of the nineteenth
century, this push to open and expand education to the masses received a marked boost
and developed a more conflictual tone. Although education reform was not initially a top
priority for these socialist forces, the issue received more attention as these political ele-
ments became increasingly committed to pragmatism and democracy in the early twentieth
century. In their overlapping roles as education reformers, liberals and socialists saw the
creation of a uniform and inclusive education system as an essential step in dismantling
the old social order and consolidating major democratic breakthroughs (Ansell and Lind-
vall 2013). The development of general education at the secondary level came to figure
prominently in this liberal-socialist reform agenda, though these reformers were not al-
ways opposed to school-based forms of vocational education.
Union Mobilization. A higher rate of union mobilization might aid the development of
school-based education, but it could also encourage the rise of firm-based training. When
it comes to improving the socioeconomic position of workers through education, early
labor unions were often suspicious of firm-based solutions because they viewed them as
potential instruments for oppression and control. For this reason, the growth of organized
labor probably favors the development of school-based education and training. Yet, as
union membership grows, businesses and their allies have stronger incentives to develop
firm-based programs in vocational training (Thelen 2004).
43
Cleavage Structures. Dissimilar cleavage structures should also contribute to the rise of
institutionally distinct education-training systems, with the presence of more social, non-
class cleavages hindering the development of firm-based programs. The rationale behind
this expected relationships is similar to that laid out for economic diversity: deep ethno-
linguistic, religious, and urban-rural splits within a society usually make it more difficult
to establish the broad political coalitions needed for the successful implementation of new
and uniform social institutions on a national scale (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Stephens
1979), especially when these institutions involve education and training. Moreover, the
development of general education is often essential for early nation building (Green 1990),
and this should be particularly true in societies where there is significant social diversity.
2.2.3 Authority Structures and Coordination Legacies
The similarities in political ambitions and differences in institutional outcomes that
characterize the broad struggles over secondary education suggest that other factors might
have been at work in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This study con-
tends that these long-term divergences can mostly be attributed to differences in authority
structures and coordination legacies. When there are political struggles over secondary ed-
ucation, these two factors strongly shape the progression of these struggles and the nature
of their outcomes. In particular, authority structures are decisive in determining the balance
of power between conservative elites and progressive reformers as they compete for control
over general education at the secondary level. Once this struggle is settled and education
policy is set, the strength of coordination legacies in vocational training determines whether
the selected path will be viable in the long run.
Before elaborating on the logic of this argument, it is perhaps helpful to reiterate the
core assumptions upon which it is constructed. First, it is assumed that conservative elites
hold a dominant position in policy-making at the national level. In political struggles over
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secondary education, this elite dominance greatly limits the prospects of educational re-
form at the center of government. Second, it is assumed that authority structures only mat-
ter in these political struggles over secondary education if they are constitutionally defined.
When elites and reformers are vying for control over education policy from different levels
of a multilevel polity, the constitutional basis of this multilevel system is crucial in deter-
mining the opportunities for policy intervention available to each side. Third, it assumed
that political struggles over secondary education involve two stages. In the first stage, con-
servative elites must decide how to respond to mounting pressures for the development of
mass education at the secondary level. In the next stage, broader circumstances determine
how a response is received by the masses and thus whether it has it desired effect.
In the first stage of a political struggle over secondary education, authority structures
over general education are expected to shape the responses of conservative elites to in-
creasing pressures for educational reforms that benefit the masses. If state authority over
general education is highly dispersed, then there are many potential openings for bottom-up
reforms in general education that may undermine the elites’ hold on secondary education.
Yet, under these circumstance, elites are prevented by constitutional barriers from using
their substantial power at the national level to block and delay policy changes instituted at
the subnational levels. Given their inability to influence education policy directly, elites
are likely to turn to training policy as an alternative means of regulating subnational de-
velopments in general education. By establishing a mass system of vocational training at
the secondary level, elites hope to draw pressures for educational expansion away from
general education at the secondary level. Conversely, if state authority over general educa-
tion is highly centralized, there is less impetus for elites to react to growing pressures for
educational change because they can more readily stop and delay educational reforms with
democratizing effects. Therefore, in this situation, elites have little need to use training
policy as instrument for redirecting popular demands for educational expansion.
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In the second stage of the political struggle, legacies of non-market coordination in vo-
cational training should be a strong determinant of whether an elite response has its desired
effect and whether it has unforeseen consequences. As mentioned above, the expansion of
vocational training can serve as an alternative strategy to extending general education. Ef-
forts to create a mass system of vocational training are, however, not likely to be viable in
the long run unless serious collective action problems involving workers and firms are over-
come. For workers to embrace a system of vocational training, they must be certain that
the provided training will markedly improve their employment prospects. Firms are only
likely to support a system of vocational training if it offers them a reliable supply of skilled
workers. These obstacles to collective action will be even more pronounced if workers and
firms are heavily involved in the financing and provision of vocational training – as is the
case in apprenticeship-based systems – because there are the added risks that workers will
be exploited by firms and that firms will cheat each other. These problems are most likely
to be solved if there are already well-established traditions of non-market coordination in
vocational training, which can be left behind by prior guild systems or state programs that
provided vocational training.
Combining the possible elite responses in the first stage and the logic outlined above,
the second stage can ultimately produce four different outcomes in terms of the institutional
makeup of secondary education.
First, the combination of high authority dispersion and strong coordination legacies
should lead to the development of an extensive system of firm-based vocational training,
which exists alongside a limited system of general education. To co-opt and divert mass
pressures for educational expansion, elites actively promote vocational training, partic-
ularly the firm-based form, using the powers of the central government. These efforts
ultimately succeed because prior guild and state arrangements have left behind strong tra-
ditions of coordination among firms and workers.
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Second, the combination of high authority dispersion and weak coordination legacies
should encourage the rise of a mass system of general education. As before, elites make
efforts to construct a national system of vocational training to pull pressures for educa-
tional expansion away from general education. Not having strong traditions of coordinated
training, however, firms, workers, and the masses ultimately reject this system. As a result,
efforts to expand general education continue on unabated, producing significant growth in
this area at the secondary level.
Third, the combination of low authority dispersion and strong coordination legacies
should lead to the formation of an extensive system of school-based vocational training,
which exists alongside a restricted system of general education. Using the eminent au-
thority of the central government, elites can rebuff and delay most reforms that challenge
their strong hold on general education at the secondary level. Faced with this obstacle to
reform within the state, reformer attempt to develop educational opportunities outside the
state, with school-based vocational training being the model of choice in most settings.
These efforts succeed because the non-state actors pushing for educational expansion can
draw on long-established traditions of coordinated training. Although it is initially a private
project, the resulting system of school-based training is gradually integrated into the public
education system as elite power wanes.
Fourth, the combination of low authority dispersion and weak coordination legacies
should result in the development of limited system of general education. Like in the prior
scenario, elites use centralized government power to stop and stall efforts to open up general
education at the secondary level to the masses. In response, reformers make attempts to
establish an extensive system of vocational training outside of the state, but their efforts
ultimately fail due to the lack of strong traditions of coordinated training. In the end, the
masses largely remain excluded from secondary education despite the mounting pressures
for broad change.
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2.3 Methodology
To test the above hypotheses on the origins of education-training regimes, this inquiry
first employs quantitative analysis of cross-national data for 17 industrializing societies for
the period from 1880 to 1939. In considering a broad range of history across a large slice
of geography, this examination offers a far-reaching assessment of this chapter’s thesis and
competing explanations. The quantitative indicators and statistical techniques employed
are outlined below.
2.3.1 Data
To operationalize the variables at hand, this study makes use of an original cross-
national dataset covering the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Building on
the pioneering data-gathering efforts of Flora et al. (1983; 1987), this dataset contains a
range of new and updated indicators relevant for comparative work on political economy
and social policy. For this analysis, a subset of this dataset is used, with the selected data
encompassing 17 relatively advanced countries: Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Den-
mark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. For most of these cases,
the data span from 1880 to 1939, with the three main exceptions being Australia (1901–
1939), Finland (1919–1939), and Ireland (1922–1939). Although Austria was technically
in a monarchic union with Hungary before 1919, it is treated as a separate entity in the data
due to the pronounced weakness of this political tie-up. A list of the specific measures used
and their summary statistics can be found in Table 2.3, and more specific details about the
construction of these measures and their sources can be found in Appendix A (outcome
variables) and Appendix B (explanatory variables).
As presented earlier, a pair of composite indexes is used to gauge the institutional devel-
opment of firm- and school-based systems, which are two of the three outcome variables in
this inquiry. Each index is comprised of three equally weighted components representing
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the levels of coverage, formality, and intensity found in each educational arrangement. The
coverage component captures the extent to which a system is present in all geographical
areas and is linked to multiple economic sectors. A system is not deemed to have high
coverage if it is confined to a few regions or urban areas or if it is limited to a small set
of economic activities, such as the construction trades. Next, the formality component as-
sesses the degree to which the system has incorporated common standards and oversight
mechanisms to uphold these standards. A set technical-oriented curriculum, a universal
certification process, and a regulated teaching corps are all elements of the ideal type used
in coding this dimension. Lastly, the intensity component measures the level of involve-
ment (e.g., administration and resources) that the principal player has in the system. For
a firm-based system, businesses are considered to be the main player, while the state is
assigned this role in a school-based system. Adding these components together produces
an index of institutional development for each form of vocational training that ranges from
0 to 6 with half-point increments.
To measure the institutional scope of general education, the third outcome variable,
the secondary enrollment rate is used as a proxy. As mentioned earlier, this indicator is
calculated by dividing the number of student enrolled in schools at the secondary level by
the total number of persons aged 10 through 19. As the definition of secondary schools
varies from country to country, efforts have been made to harmonize these data to make
them reasonably comparable between countries.
Turning to the explanatory variables, the hypothesized economic predictors of education-
training regimes are operationalized using a set of conventional measures. Following stan-
dard practice, real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (in 1990 US dollars, logged) is
used to capture the level of affluence. To gauge the relative prevalence of industrial activity,
the percentage share of nominal GDP originating in industrial sectors is used. Similarly,
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the trade openness predictor is measured using the sum of exports and imports as a percent-
age of GDP, all at current prices. The land area of a given country (in square kilometers,
logged) is employed as a proxy for internal economic diversity.
For the hypothesized determinants tied to political engagement, another collection of
familiar measures is put to use. The indicator for democracy is a slightly modified version
of the oft-used Polity index for regime type, with the scale ranging between firm autocracy
and strong democracy. As the measure for left-liberal government, a binary variable classi-
fying the head of government is used, with one category indicating the presence of a liberal
or socialist in the chief executive position. Labor mobilization is operationalized as union
density, which is defined as the percentage share of a labor force belonging to trade unions.
To capture the dispersion of public authority in general education – a key explanatory
variable – a three-point ordinal scale for the level of federalism is used; the possible values
are none (unitary state), weak, and strong. In all countries with strong federalism included
in this study, the power to craft education policy was reserved for subnational units (e.g.,
states, provinces, etc.). In Austria, which had weak federalism from 1919 onward, the cen-
tral government could alter education policy, but any such action required the approval of a
two-thirds majority in the lower house of parliament (Nationalsrat). As a consequence, the
Austrian states enjoyed significant influence over the setting of education policy (Schratz
2012, 97). For countries with unitary systems, the ultimate authority over education sys-
tems rested with the central government. Even if some of this authority was delegated to
lower levels of the state in practice, there was always the potential for direct intervention
by the central government.
The final explanatory variable of interest, coordination legacies, is quantified using a
four-point ordinal index. The index is comprised of two elements: the first represents the
degree to which coordination systems established by guilds continued to persist up until
1900 and the second captures the degree to which central governments had been involved
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in the establishment and support of vocational training at post-secondary levels of education
prior to 1870. The guild component consists of a three-item scale, with the possible values
being none, weak, and strong, whereas the state component is a simple binary measure
indicating the presence or absence of a meaningful history of state involvement in other
areas of training.
Given that demographic change can also influence education policy, a control variable
is included to capture this effect. In particular, the share of the population aged 10 to 19
is used as a basic measure of the school-aged population for secondary education. This
measure should capture any demand effects produced by rises and falls in the population
of potential students for secondary education.
Despite the great efforts made to assemble complete data series for the explanatory vari-
ables employed in this analysis, missingness remains an issue for some variables. As Table
?? indicates, five variables have incomplete series, with the level of missingness for these
variables ranging from 0.22 percent to 12.84 percent. To avoid dropping observations with
missing data, which can severely bias regression estimates, multiple imputation is applied
to the working dataset. Drawing on practices and techniques first devised by Rubin (1987)
and later extended by Honaker and King (2010), 10 sets of imputed data are generated prior
to each individual analysis. Each estimation procedure described in the next section is then
applied to these datasets, and the 10 sets of results are subsequently pooled together using
formulas developed by Rubin (1987).
2.3.2 Estimation
Although time-series cross-section (TSCS) data have long been used in comparative
analyses of political economic phenomena, there are still many unsettled questions and
conflicting recommendations concerning the choice of methods for analyzing this class of
data. The statistical shortcomings of the standard ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator
in analyzing TSCS data have been known for some time, and yet significant disagreement
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remains over when and how to deal with them (see, e.g., Achen 2000; Beck and Katz 1995,
2011).2 By and large, much of this debate has been centered on efforts to reduce estima-
tion errors and address unit effects, though some recent attention has been devoted to the
causal implications of different estimators. Based on these evolving ideas and for reasons
elaborated below, the OLS estimator with a time trend, the Prais-Winsten transformation,
and panel-corrected standard errors is used as the main technique for statistical estimation
in this inquiry.
The OLS estimator has been selected over other estimators as the base approach partly
because it is better suited for examining differences between countries. Although it is self-
evident that variables in TSCS data vary across both time and space, the theoretical signif-
icance of this two-way variation is often underappreciated in cross-national analyses using
this class of data (Bartels 2011; Kropko 2010; Zorn 2001). In particular, in considering the
theoretical effects of an explanatory variable on an outcome variable, this two-dimensional
structure implies that there can be one effect within a typical country and another effect
between all countries. For those seeking to explain differences between countries – as is
the aim in this study – the between effect is likely to be of greater theoretical relevance,
but many existing estimators have primarily been designed to detect the within effect. The
fixed-effects estimator offers the clearest example of this within-effect bias – by controlling
for unit effects, it intentionally discards all information about between effects to obtain pure
estimates of within effects.3 While the OLS estimator is far from perfect in its handling of
the two type of effects, it is the most capable of the conventional estimators in capturing
between effects.
2 When applied to TSCS data, the OLS estimator tends to produce errors that: conceal unit and period effects;
are temporally autoregressive, cross-sectionally heteroskedastic, and cross-sectionally correlated; and reflect
inconsistent causal processes (Hicks 1994, 172; Stimson 1985
3 Given that the fixed-effects estimator only estimates within effects, it is sometimes referred to as the within
estimator.
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Another feature that makes the OLS estimator attractive compared to alternative ap-
proaches is its ability to handle time-invariant and rarely changing explanatory variables
in a statistically consistent manner. Several of the predictors in this study, including those
representing the core hypotheses, exhibit little or no variation over time, making this a cru-
cial consideration in the selection of an estimator. Given that the fixed-effects estimator
removes all between variance from TSCS data, it is incapable of estimating the effects of
variables with little or no temporal variation. The random-effects estimator, which also con-
trols for unit effects, is more capable of dealing with sluggish variables, but its use entails
the controversial assumption that unit effects are uncorrelated with all regressors (Beck
and Katz 2001; ?; Wilson and Butler 2007). To deal with these drawbacks of the fixed-
and random-effects estimators, Plu¨mper and Troeger (2007) have proposed an alternative
procedure, referred to as fixed-effects vector decomposition (FEVD), but this three-step
approach is not consistent in its handling of between and within effects for explanatory
variables.4 In contrast with these three alternative approaches, the OLS estimator does not
have any major deficiencies when it comes to modeling the effects of time-invariant and
rarely changing explanatory variables, making it fitting for this study.
Besides dictating the choice of estimator, the theoretical emphasis on cross-national
differences and long-run effects in this study argues against the use of a dynamic specifi-
cation in the modeling process. While it has been pointed out that dynamic models can
have many statistical advantages (Beck and Katz 1995, 2011), they are often not appro-
priate when the aim is explain long-term movements in an outcome variable. It has been
shown, for instance, that the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable (LDV) to capture
short-term dynamics tends to bias the estimates of substantive predictors toward negligible
values (Achen 2000, 13). This bias is likely to be particularly severe in TSCS analyses in-
volving outcome variables with time trends, like those examined in this inquiry (Plu¨mper,
4 More specifically, the FEVD procedure provides estimates of within effects for most time-variant predictors
and estimates of between effects for time-invariant and rarely changing predictors.
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Troeger, and Manow 2005, 334–343).
Seeing that a dynamic specification is theoretically and practically unsuitable for this
study, a time trend is included to address the issue of non-stationarity. As is the case
in many political economic analyses, several of the measures used in this investigation
appear to be integrated: in addition the outcome measures, polity score and GDP per capita
are non-stationary according to conventional definitions. To deal with potential threat of
spurious correlations, a set of models with a time trend are estimated.5
In addition to including a time trend to help deal with integrated series, further steps
are taken to remedy some common efficiency problems. To mitigate the effects of serial
correlation, the Prais-Winsten procedure is used in conjunction with the OLS estimator. On
top of this modification, panel-corrected standard errors are also employed to improve the
estimates in the presence of contemporaneously correlated and panel heteroskedastic error
structures (Beck and Katz 1995).
2.4 Results
The main results of the regression analyses are presented in Table 2.4. For each out-
come variable, estimates are provided for two models: one excluding a time trend (i.e.
variable year) and the other including it. In situations where there are few notable differ-
ences in the results generated by these two approaches, the discussion below focuses on
the estimates produced by the models including a time trend (Models II, IV, and VI). To
provide meaningful and accurate representations of the interaction terms in these models,
three plots of marginal effects are included (see Figures 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4).
Beginning with the results for firm-based vocational training, the estimates confirm
that the dispersion of authority and coordination legacies are interactively related to the
development of this system type. As Figure 2.2 shows, the marginal effect of federalism on
5 As Beck and Katz (2011) have highlighted, many data series used to compare political economies can
appear to be non-stationary in the short run even though they are actually stationary in the long run. With the
exception of GDP per capita, all of the measures included in this study have upper bounds – mathematical or
conceptual. This means that they have to be stationary in the long run.
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firm-based training increases strongly as the intensity of coordination legacies moves from
weak to strong. With regard to substantive effects, a change in the coordination measure
from 0 (e.g., the United States) to 3 (e.g., Germany) for a country with strong federalism
is associated with a 1.482 point increase in the scale of firm-based training (ranges from 0
to 6), holding all else equal.6 Though not presented graphically here, the marginal effect
of coordination legacies follows a similar pattern, as it increases as federalism shifts from
non-existent to strong. For a country with robust coordination legacies, a shift from a
unitary structure (e.g., Sweden) to a federal structure (e.g., Germany) is also associated
with a 1.482 point increase in the scale of firm-based training. The confidence bounds for
both sets of marginal effects never include zero, which indicates that they consistently meet
the conventional threshold (p-value < 0.05) for statistical significance.
Looking at the political variables, three of the four estimated effects are statistically sig-
nificant. Two of these three variables, democracy and social cleavages, are negatively asso-
ciated with firm-based training, which is consistent with what was expected. In substantive
terms, a two standard deviation increase in the level of democracy (11.50 points) would,
all else being equal, result in a 0.587 point decrease in the scale of firm-based training.
A comparable shift in the cleavage variable (1.18 point increase) would produce a -0.695
point change in the same scale. The other significant variable, union density, exhibits a pos-
itive relationship with firm-based training; a two standard deviation jump in union density
(26.74 points) would increase the index of firm-based training by 1.043 points. While the
estimated coefficient for liberal-socialist government has a positive sign, it does not meet
the standard cut-off for statistical significance.
None of the economic factors included in this set of analyses have effects that are the-
oretically consistent and statistically significant. Contrary to what was predicted, GDP per
6 For the purposes of interpreting substantive effects, the 10th-and 90th-percentile values are used for the
federalism and coordination variables because of their ordinal nature.
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capita is positively related to firm-based training, with a 1 percent increase in affluence be-
ing associated with a 0.012 increase in the scale of firm-based training.7 Therefore, a two
standard deviation increase from the mean GDP per capita (a 73.7 percent increase) would
add 0.884 points to the firm-based training score. The estimate for trade openness also
contradicts existing theory, as it is negatively signed and relatively weak – a two standard
deviation jump in this predictor would only result in a 0.258 point increase in the index
of firm-based training. The proxies for the remaining two variables, industrial activity and
economic diversity, have substantively and statistically insignificant effects.
In the models for school-based vocational training, the federalism and coordination
regressors have meaningful and significant effects. Figure 2.3 presents a graphic represen-
tation of the marginal effect of federalism on school-based training, which confirms that
the negative effect of authority dispersion (i.e. positive effect of authority centralization)
increases as coordination legacies shift from weak to strong. The substantive impact of a
change in the coordination measure from 0 to 3 for a country with strong federalism is a
-0.900 point change in the scale of school-based training. To make this finding more intu-
itive for this study, the federalism measure has been inverted (thus creating a measure of
centralization) and the marginal-effect plot reconstructed. The end result, which is found
in Figure 2.4, is a new plot that simply mirrors the federalism plot, with the x-axis being
the line of reflection. Therefore, in this inverted specification, a 0-to-3 jump in the coordi-
nation index in a country with centralized authority (e.g., a shift from the UK to Sweden)
generates a 0.900 increase in the scale of school-based training.
Among the estimates for the political variables in the models for school-based training,
only the two representing democracy and cleavages exhibit consistent statistical signifi-
cance. In this case, the level of democracy is positivity associated with the development of
7 In a level-log relationship, the effect of the logged explanatory variable (log(x)) on the level outcome
variable (y) can be interpreted in the following manner: a 1 percent change in x is expected to produce a
Beta/100 unit increase in y.
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training, with a two standard deviation rise in the polity score producing a modest 0.219
gain in the index of school-based training. Similarly, the number of non-class cleavages
is positively related to the expansion of school-based training; a two standard deviation
increase in this variable results in a 0.485 increase in the training scale. Both of these rela-
tionships contradict what had been hypothesized. Although liberal-socialist government is
positively signed in both models, its coefficient is only significant in one model and not the
other. The union density variable also fails to reach statistical significance in both models
for school-based training.
Similar to the prior set of results, none of the of the economic regressors have con-
sistently significant and meaningful effects on the index of school-based training. The
estimates for GDP per capita and industry’s share of GDP flip in sign when a time trend is
introduced into the model, and the latter estimate loses its statistical significance. In both
models, the coefficient for trade openness hovers around zero and thus has no statistically
distinguishable relationship with school-based training. Of these factors, territorial area
comes the closest to having a strong and consistent association with the outcome variable.
Drawing on the results from Model IV, a two standard deviation increase in this measure
(around 377 percent of the mean value) would lead to a 0.604 decline the score of school-
based training. The direction of this effect matches that which was hypothesized, but it is
not statistically significant in both sets of results for school-based training.
Turning to the final set of regression estimates, the effects of federalism and coordina-
tion and their interaction match the anticipated pattern, with an increase in one negatively
affecting the effect of the other on the development of general education. Figure 2.5 shows
the impact of this relationship on the marginal effect of federalism: the positive effect of
federalism on the scope of general education wanes markedly as coordination legacies be-
come more salient. In substantive terms, a change in the coordination measure from 0 to
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3 for a country with strong federalism is associated with a 51.2 point decline in the enroll-
ment rate for general-education schools at the secondary level. This interactive effect is
statistically distinguishable from zero except when the value for the coordination variable
is equal to 3 (i.e. strong legacies). Likewise, the marginal effect of coordination legacies
on the outcome variable is not statistically significant when the authority structure is highly
centralized.
The political and economic variables have surprisingly little statistical relevance in ex-
plaining the variation in general education enrollment rates. GDP per capita and union
density are estimated to have positive and significant effects on the expansion of general
education in Model V, but these effects do not hold after a time trend is introduced. This
lost of significance is not entirely unexpected for GDP per capita given that it is a measures
with a strong upward trends, but controlling for this trend has no meaningful impact on the
statistical significance of other variables.
2.5 Discussion
The end of the nineteenth century marked an important turning point in the develop-
ment of education and training systems in the more developed societies of the world. As
social and economic pressures to open and expand mass education beyond the primary level
started to mount, conservative elites across these societies sought to defend the class-based
split in general education situated between the primary and secondary levels. Despite hav-
ing this common aim, however, these elites pursued a number of different strategies with
varying levels of success. While some elites remained relatively passive in the face of pres-
sures for change, others became active in pushing for the establishment of vocational train-
ing as a form of mass education at the secondary level. These passive and active strategies
did not always have their intended effects, as some countries developed extensive systems
of school-based training and others experienced significant growth in general education.
The end result of these institutional divergences was the emergence of four distinct mixes
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of general education and vocational training in secondary education.
The quantitative analysis contained in this chapter confirms the core hypothesis that
differences in structures of authority over general education and legacies of non-market co-
ordination in vocational training largely account for these varied institutional arrangements.
As predicted, these two factors have an interactive effect on the development of secondary
education. When high dispersion of educational authority – as is generally found in fed-
eral systems – is combined with strong legacies of coordinated training, then firm-based
vocational training is expected to emerge as a strong component of secondary education.
If coordination legacies happen to be weak or absent, however, no meaningful vocational
training system should develop, and general education at the secondary level is likely to
undergo rapid expansion. When low dispersion of educational authority is combined with
strong legacies of coordinated training, then school-based vocational training is expected
to grow significantly and become a core element of secondary education. But if there are
no substantial coordination legacies, then neither vocational training nor general education
should experience much growth.
Only a few of the alternative explanations are shown to have relevance in explaining the
emergence of these different education-training mixes in secondary education. Higher lev-
els of democracy and greater numbers of cleavages are found to undermine the formation of
vocational training systems based in firms but promote the development of vocational train-
ing systems based in schools. A positive relationship is also been detected between union
density and firm-based training, which supports the claim that the expansion of training
partly arose as a conservative reaction to labor activism. Contrary to expectations, greater
national affluence is shown to support the rise of firm-based training, while high trade
openness is found to work against the expansion of this particular system. Otherwise, the
variables for economic development have little statistical significance in explaining the for-
mation of different institutional varieties of secondary education.
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Overall, these broad statistical findings show that political institutions have a decisive
impact on the early development of education systems. The way in which educational
authority is structured deeply influences the political strategies employed by competing
educational interests, while the degree to which legacies of coordinated training are present
largely determines which of these competing strategies succeed and which fail. In the
period around the beginning of the twentieth century, variation in these core institutions
placed affluent societies on distinct paths in the development of modern education systems.
The strong effects of these political institutions on the formation of early education pol-
icy have important implications for the broader study of social policy and welfare states.
Although collective action ultimately lies at the heart of political struggles over social pol-
icy, these findings imply that partisanship is not always the main driver of these political
struggles and their varied outcomes. This is not entirely surprising knowing that demo-
cratic rule remained limited in most affluent societies at the beginning of the twentieth
century, but it still goes to show that partisan-based theories of welfare state development
devised for the postwar era are less relevant for the prewar era. Moreover, these findings
reveal that the effects of political institutions on welfare state development are not always
consistent across different policy areas and historical periods. While federalism and other
authority-dispersing structures are often found to hinder the development of progressive
social policy in the decades after World War II, this study identifies an important instance
in the prewar period where the opposite is true – that dispersed authority has a substantial
protective effect on progressive policy innovation.
The following chapter presents a case-study analysis that delves deeper into these po-
litical institutions and the underlying processes that link them to prewar developments in
education and training. As discussed in Chapter 1, the four cases that have been selected
for this case-study analysis include Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. Each of these cases exemplifies one of the four education-training regimes described
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in this chapter, and they vary significantly in terms of how state authority over general ed-
ucation is structured and whether coordination legacies in vocational training exist. His-
torical analysis of these four cases will not only add richer detail to some of the abstract
relationships identified in this chapter, but also shed light on the causal mechanisms that
underpin them.
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2.6 Tables and Figures
Figure 2.1: Comparative Development of General Education at the Secondary Level, 1880–
1939
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Table 2.2: Hypothesized Effects of Explanatory Variables on Secondary Education
Type of Secondary Education
Firm-Based
Vocational
School-Based
Vocational
General
Education
Economic Development
National Affluence 0/- + +
Industrial Activity + + 0/-
Trade Openness + + 0/-
Economic Diversity - 0/- 0/+
Political Mobilization
Democracy - 0/- +
Liberal-Socialist Government - 0/+ +
Union Mobilization 0/+ 0/+ 0/+
Social Cleavages - 0/- 0/+
Authority Structures
Dispersion of Authority
High dispersion and
- no/weak coord. legacies 0/- - +
- strong coord. legacies + 0/- 0/-
Traditions of Coordination
Coordination Legacies
Strong legacies and
- low dispersion of authority 0/- + -
- high dispersion of authority + 0/- 0/-
Note: [+] positive effect, [-] negative effect, [0/-] non-positive effect, [0/+] non-negative effect,
and the effects for dispersion of authority and training legacies are interactive.
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Table 2.4: Determinants of Institutional Development of Education and Training, 1880–
1939
Firm-Based
Vocational
School-Based
Vocational
General Education
Variable I II III IV V VI
Federalism 0.142 0.147* −0.174 −0.072 22.413** 28.325**
(0.072) (0.072) (0.092) (0.047) (7.721) (9.205)
Coordination
Legacies
0.615** 0.604** 0.580** 0.374** 4.750 4.542
(0.046) (0.043) (0.058) (0.048) (3.727) (4.258)
Federalism x
Coord. Legacies
0.245** 0.247** −0.173** −0.150** −6.649* −8.528*
(0.039) (0.039) (0.036) (0.029) (3.221) (3.667)
Polity Score −0.050** −0.051** 0.029** 0.019** −0.100− −0.087−
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.404) (0.439)
Liberal-Socialist
Government
−0.143 −0.139 0.184 0.266** −1.247 −2.129−
(0.103) (0.100) (0.152) (0.086) (3.433) (2.988)
Union Density 0.040** 0.039** 0.021** −0.004 0.119* 0.065
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.048) (0.044)
Social Cleavages −0.598** −0.589** 0.236** 0.411** −2.661 −1.768−
(0.054) (0.053) (0.086) (0.073) (4.365) (5.326)
GDP per Capita
(logged)
1.193** 1.132** 0.661** −0.513** 23.952** 5.904
(0.213) (0.210) (0.238) (0.176) (6.743) (5.273)
GDP from Industry −0.003 −0.002 −0.026** 0.003 −0.094 −0.057
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.092) (0.092)
Trade Openness −0.003* −0.003** 0.000 −0.001 −0.032 −0.006
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.025) (0.023)
Territorial Area
(logged)
−0.006 −0.012 −0.027 −0.160** 1.603 −0.431
(0.031) (0.029) (0.046) (0.034) (1.886) (2.951)
Population Aged
5-19
0.048** 0.054** −0.162** −0.046** −4.653** −2.742
(0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (1.369) (1.944)
Year 0.003 0.053** 1.184**
Constant −10.050** −14.962** 0.676 −93.177** −24.216− -2173.1**
Rho 0.905 0.913 0.911 0.926 0.919 0.946
R2 0.666 0.667 0.665 0.801 0.522 0.608
N 918 918 918 918 918 918
Figures in parentheses are standard errors.
Significance levels: * = 0.05, ** = 0.01, based on two-tailed t-test.
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Figure 2.2: Marginal Effect of Federalism on Firm-Based Vocational Training
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Note: Based on results for Model II in Table 2.4. Presented with 95% confidence bounds (gray area).
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Figure 2.3: Marginal Effect of Federalism on School-Based Vocational Training
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Note: Based on results for Model IV in Table 2.4. Presented with 95% confidence bounds (gray area).
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Figure 2.4: Marginal Effect of Unitary System on School-Based Vocational Training
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0 1 2 3
Value of Coordination Legacies
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ffe
ct
 o
f U
ni
ta
ry
 S
ys
te
m
Note: Based on results for Model IV in Table 2.4 Presented with 95% confidence bounds (gray area).
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Figure 2.5: Marginal Effect of Federalism on General Education
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Note: Based on results for Model VI in Table 2.4, Presented with 95% confidence bounds (gray area).
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3 THE COEVOLUTION OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING: HISTORICAL
EVIDENCE
The purpose of this chapter is to show how cross-national differences in authority struc-
tures and coordination legacies can engender the rise of distinct education-training regimes
in secondary education. The statistical analyses contained in the prior chapter have es-
tablished that broad and robust relationships exist between these explanatory and outcome
variables, but they do not provide much information about the nature of these relationships:
how, exactly, did these two political economic factors cause such wide divergences in the
institutional composition of secondary education? Addressing this question requires one
to peer more deeply into the historical records of specific cases and identify the chain of
events that connect the empirical incarnations of these variables. By examining the early
experiences of Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States with mass
education at the secondary level, this chapter confirms that authority structures and coor-
dination legacies have strongly shaped political struggles over education and the impact of
these struggles on the long-term trajectories of secondary education.
As mentioned in prior chapters, these four cases have been selected for historical anal-
ysis because their education systems feature the most distinct mixes of general education
and vocational training at the secondary level. Germany and Sweden are both well known
for their segmented systems of secondary education, with separate tracks for general ed-
ucation and vocational training. Yet, these two countries differ in how they deliver vo-
cational training: Germany pushes firm-based apprenticeships while Sweden emphasizes
school-based programs. Secondary education in the United Kingdom and United States is
also distinctive, but for its lack of meaningful vocational training. Both of these countries
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have developed education systems that stress general education, but the United States has
a much stronger record of educational expansion than the United Kingdom does. Seeing
that these four cases are good representatives of the education-training regimes identified
before, more intensive analysis of these cases and their histories should help elucidate the
causal paths to these different regime types.
These four cases have also been chosen for further examination because their education
systems have developed in very different institutional contexts, particularly when it comes
to authority structures and coordination legacies. From their inception as unified and in-
dependent countries, both Germany and the United States have employed a federal model
of government, with authority divided between different levels of government. As is the
case in most federal states, general education falls primarily under the purview of regional
governments in these two countries. While Germany and the United States best exemplify
strong federalism, Sweden and the United Kingdom both have long histories of unitary
government. Although these countries have more than one level of government, their cen-
tral governments possess the final authority over state matters, including those pertaining
to education. In terms of non-market coordination, a well-developed network of guilds
left strong legacies of organized training in Germany and Sweden. Although the United
Kingdom did have a guild system at one point in history, there were few traces of it in the
late nineteenth century due to its early legal abolishment and the country’s early industrial-
ization. The United States too has no significant legacies of non-market coordination, but
this was largely because it never had a guild system like those once found in Europe. This
analysis exploits this significant cross-national variation to illustrate how the theorized de-
terminants of educational development function in a variety of different political economic
environments.
With these key educational outcomes and explanatory factors in mind, this chapter pro-
ceeds in five parts. It begins by looking at the development of secondary education in
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the German Empire and the decision by Prussian elites to rebuild an apprenticeship-based
system of vocational training. The chapter then examines the failed efforts to emulate the
German approach to vocational training in the United States, which left general education
as the main focus of American educational development. At this point, the chapter analyzes
the sluggish expansion of secondary education in the United Kingdom and the strategies
used by British elites to deny the masses access to this level of education. Afterward, it
traces the rise of school-based vocational training in Sweden as a response to elite attempts
to stymie the growth of mass education. Finally, the chapter concludes with a brief compar-
ative analysis of these cases studies to highlight the key differences in their paths to mass
secondary education.
3.1 Germany
Like all Western European countries at the time, Germany had erected a highly seg-
mented education system by the mid-nineteenth century. In this segmented or parallel
system, secondary and tertiary education was principally reserved for the upper strata of
Germany society and was closely tied to the state governments. Developments in secondary
and tertiary education during this period largely followed efforts to rationalize the German
bureaucracies and cement elite linkages to the states. Beginning with an overhaul of the
exit exam for secondary education (the Abitur) in 1812, a complex arrangement of state
exams and academic privileges was established to reinforce the high selectivity and status
of the secondary and tertiary levels. Besides providing the German bureaucracies with a
pool of qualified candidates, this system strengthened the states’ role in securing the posi-
tions of elites. For those excluded from the upper levels of German education – the masses
– general education consisted of eight years or so in the common school, or Volksschule.
The overwhelming majority of those who attended the Volksschule, which focused on the
rudiments of literacy and the instruction of religion, never advanced beyond this primary
level of education.
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Despite its reputation for centralized authoritarianism in the nineteenth century, Ger-
many developed an education system with dispersed governance. Following Napoleon’s
victories over the German states around the beginning of the century, education had be-
come a core government function in Germany, but jurisdiction over the emerging education
system lied entirely with the individual states. Even as interstate imitation and cooperation
fostered substantial uniformity in the areas of certification and curriculum, especially at
the secondary and tertiary levels, the German states enjoyed independent powers to finance
and manage their schools and universities (Nipperdey 1996, 409–410). In most states, these
powers became even more decentralized during the first half of the nineteenth century as a
tradition of local control over primary schooling – the Volksschule – steadily formed (Ibid).1
By the 1860s, less than half of the funding for primary schools came from state govern-
ments, with the remaining amount largely drawn from local sources (Petersilie 1906, 147).
The Kingdom of Prussia, the dominant force in German politics at the time, was particu-
larly tightfisted when it came to state funding of primary schools, as less than 11 percent
of these monies flowed from the central government (Ibid). With the pervasiveness of local
administration, notable regional disparities in schooling effort materialized, particularly
between more progressive and conservative areas. In the case of Prussia, the rural areas
of the East – dominated by the aristocratic Junkers – devoted markedly less resources to
primary education than rural areas in the West and significantly less than urban areas in
both regions (Lindert 2004, 121–122). Although state governments possessed the final say
in setting and administrating education policies, some were clearly more aggressive and
effective than others in exercising this power.
The formation of the German Empire in 1871 did not fundamentally alter the decentral-
ized arrangement of the education system. The federal constitution adopted with the uni-
fication of Germany affirmed that education would remain a prerogative of the constituent
1 The Prussian Constitution of 1850, for example, codified this tendency: the Prussian central government
was only allowed to intervene in local educational matters in cases of need.
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states. As before, this legal structure allowed significant disparities in the public provision
of general education to persist, both between states and within states. Three decades af-
ter the Empire was founded, public educational expenditures still remained highly variable
among the German states, with some states spending twice as much per pupil as other states
(Lindert 2004, 122). Even as it consolidated its authority over most of the centralized insti-
tutions of the imperial government, like the military, the Prussian state had mixed success in
exerting top-down control over its decentralized education system. When tensions between
the Prussian state and the Catholic community escalated shortly after the rise of the German
Empire, the Bismarck-led Kulturkampf succeeded in strengthening state oversight of edu-
cation at the expense of Church involvement. But the real impact of this political victory
was limited, particularly as further efforts to unify school administration through the pas-
sage of comprehensive school legislation were abandoned in the 1870s (Schleunes 1989,
193–194). The persistence of local control over general education meant that educational
expansion could continue to progress in some localities when it faltered in others. Be-
cause of this multi-speed approach, geographical disparities in educational effort remained
a permanent feature of Prussian education in subsequent decades.
In spite of the formidable barriers to educational reform from above, Prussian officials
still made attempts to promulgate broad changes to education policy, especially as the lower
classes were perceived as a growing threat. At the height of the Kulturkampf in Prussia,
there were open discussions in education circles about establishing a German-wide Volkss-
chule to promote a German national consciousness, but Bismarck’s education minister at
the time, Adalbert Falk, never fully embraced the idea (Schleunes 1989, 173–174). How-
ever, when the number of industrial strikes and socialist sympathizers rapidly increased in
the 1880s, elements of this thinking were incorporated into a new conservative push for
education reform. After William II, the Kaiser, proclaimed that schools at all levels were
to be “employed in combatting the spread of socialistic and communistic ideas in 1889, a
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bill was introduced to the Prussian landstag a year later to strengthen the state’s hand in
the administration of primary education, including the distribution of funding (Schleunes
1989, 210–213). Although the legislation was targeted at the Prussian education system, it
revived a conflict between liberals and Catholics over the educational authority that tran-
scended state lines. Caught in the middle of this far-reaching conflict, the Prussian govern-
ment found it politically unfeasible to pass the reform bill, and alternative legislation with
significant concessions to Catholics was devised. Ultimately unwilling to engage Catholics
and old conservatives in compromise because of questions about their loyalty to the Re-
ich, William II quashed the new legislation, and reform efforts were subsequently halted
(Schleunes 1989, 218). As the Kaiser had discovered, the high dispersion of educational
authority served both liberal and Catholic interests, and altering this arrangement was no
easy feat.
With tensions over authority stifling their broad reform efforts in general education,
conservative elites in started to reexamine old forms of vocational training. Like many
other European countries, the German Empire had a strong tradition of craft-oriented train-
ing that dated back to the High Middle Ages. For centuries, this training, which generally
took the form of apprenticeships, had been provided and overseen by members of craft
guilds. With the eventual spread of liberal thinking and industrial production, however, se-
rious challenges were mounted against the monopolistic roles these guilds had in regulating
crafts and delivering training. For the German territories, these challenges to the guild sys-
tem arrived in the early nineteenth century, and the main consequence was the abolishment
of guild privileges in 1869 with the introduction of freedom of trade (Crouch 1993, 314).2
Yet, despite being severely weakened by this legal shift, guilds and apprenticeships contin-
ued to exist in one form or another.
2 Prior to the explicit introduction of freedom of trade in 1869, many German states wavered between rec-
ognizing and rescinding the privileges of guilds. In Prussia, for example, guild privileges were removed in
1810/11, but then partly reinstated in 1845 and 1849. Through all of these reforms, however, the institutional
status of guilds had never been disputed (Deissinger 1994, 22–23).
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For conservative elites, this lingering system of vocational training offered a new ap-
proach to influencing education policy in the German Empire. Early on, it became clear
that this approach had the advantage of being less prone to political resistance. Unlike
in the case of general education, the imperial government could directly influence the de-
sign and provision of vocational training by setting and altering national industrial poli-
cies. A decade after the German Empire’s formation, a coalition of the Conservatives, the
(Catholic) Center Party, and the National Liberals in the Reichstag used this power to re-
vive and protect the traditions of guild-based vocational training. In 1881, the Reichstag
re-established the legal recognition of craft guilds and granted craftsmen some privileges
in the training of apprentices (Winkler 1976, 2). Three years later, in 1884, the same parlia-
ment passed legislation giving guilds conditional monopolies over relevant apprenticeships
(Ibid). These reforms were part of a concerted effort on the part of conservative elites to
bolster the position of the Mittelstand or petty bourgeoisie against the harsh economic and
social effects of rapid industrialization (Greinert 2007, 50). The rapidly growing strength
of the German working class added urgency to the effort in the late 1880s; supporting the
craft sector and small businesses was viewed as a means to establish a “bulwark against
social democracy” and build the ranks of “forces supporting the state” (Ibid).
In the push to revive the guild-controlled forms of vocational training, the imperial
handicraft law (Handwerkerschutzgesetz) passed in 1897 represents the most significant
reform. The central components of the legislation were provisions establishing craft cham-
bers as institutions of public law and providing for the optional formation of compulsory
guilds (Greinert 2007; Hansen 1997; Thelen 2004). In essence, these two reforms made
guild membership compulsory if a majority of the independent craftsmen in a given branch
in a defined district favored these terms. In addition to strengthening the craft sector’s right
to organize, the legislation gave craft chambers exclusive powers to regulate and supervise
craft apprenticeships. Under the new law, the right to take and train apprentices was limited
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to accredited and experienced tradesmen, and craft chambers received direct control over
the organization and certification of apprenticeships at local firms. On the whole, these
changes secured the foundation of the apprenticeship system, giving it a base from which
to expand.
After they had gained a stronger legal footing, craft apprenticeships experienced signif-
icant growth as lingering guild legacies and new educational innovations reinforced their
utility. As mentioned before, guilds and apprenticeships had never truly disappeared from
German society despite being weakened by liberal reforms targeted at the labor market in
the early part of the nineteenth century. In fact, in the second half of this century, the arti-
sanal sector trained most of the skilled workers who went to work in the burgeoning firms
of German industry (Thelen 2004, 52). With these practices already present, there was lit-
tle resistance to the guild and apprenticeship systems once the 1897 law had restored their
legal footings. Around the same time that apprenticeship-based training was being revived,
efforts were underway to create the continuation school (Fortbildungsschule). The original
motivation behind the creation of this school, which started to appear in the 1870s, was to
fill the gap in mass “socialization” between the end of compulsory schooling and the start
of military service (Greinert 2007, 51). In the early 1890s, however, widespread criticism
of this overt mission of social control convinced some school authorities that their Mittel-
stand strategies would be better served if these schools focused on vocational education.
With this shift in direction, state authorities in Prussia, Bavaria, and several other German
states succeeded in increasing the coverage of continuation schools and making them a
compulsory complement to apprenticeships (Ibid). In steering lower-class children toward
vocational education, these schools helped insure that apprenticeships would remain the
centerpiece of education for most Germans into the twentieth century.
In sum, the decentralized nature of Germany’s education system and the relative strength
of its training traditions were central in facilitating the rise of a secondary education system
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that emphasized apprenticeships and vocational training in general. The significant inde-
pendence given to regions and localities in determining education policy presented progres-
sive reformers with many opportunities to advance mass education. Although conservative
elites opposed this continued expansion of mass education and feared its impact on the
class-based division between primary and secondary education, they were prevented by
constitutional law from using their significant power in the central government to directly
alter subnational education policy. To get around this obstacle, German elites eventually
turned to vocational training, which could meet the masses’ educational needs without be-
stowing them with higher status. As a prerogative of the imperial state, training policy
could also be set directly by conservative elites sitting in the central government. Using
this authority, the elites established a system of apprenticeship-based training that quickly
expanded. The success of this intervention was, in large part, due to the strong legacies of
guild-directed training found in Germany at the time.
3.2 United States
In comparison to its German counterpart, the American education system of the mid-
nineteenth century had much weaker ties to the state and a stronger history of institutional
heterogeneity. State officials had played a relatively minor role in the initial development
of the American education system, and this remained true throughout the nineteenth cen-
tury. Instead, an eclectic assortment of civic groups, religious movements, and business
associations spearheaded the establishment and expansion of educational institutions at all
levels of education. Since these efforts were often organized locally and not broadly coor-
dinated, they resulted in an education system that exhibited significant variation in terms of
curriculum, pedagogy, and resources. The main component of this loosely structured edu-
cation system was the common school, which provided basic education to the masses and
was typically funded through public means.3 Despite being mostly public, however, this
3 Prior to 1821, it was the norm for public schools to charge students fees. Between this year and 1871, all
states eliminated these rate bills, making public primary education free for students.
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system also featured a relatively large number of private institutions, particularly at the sec-
ondary and tertiary levels. These private institutions, which included religious schools and
elite academies, typically catered to the more influential and wealthy segments of society.
This strong division in American education remained present throughout the nineteenth
century; by 1890, primary schooling was nearly universal, yet less than 5 percent of Amer-
ican children continued on to the secondary level (Ravitch 2001, 20). Although it was
not formally structured on the basis of class, the American education system did exhibit
significant social stratification.
The federal structure of the United States contributed greatly to the decentralized and
uneven development of education in the country. Although several of its most prominent
signatories had been vocal supporters of mass education, the United States Constitution
made no explicit mention of education. Once the 10th Amendment was incorporated into
the founding documents, however, it became clearer that education was to remain under
the domain of the states and that the United States would not develop a nationally directed
education system (Manzer 2003, 63–64). As a result, the states took the lead in construct-
ing the legal foundation for public education, though their individual efforts varied sig-
nificantly. While many states in the North constitutionally mandated the establishment of
public schools, most states in the South only made vague promises with regard to public
education. In all American states, however, the actual financing and provision of public ed-
ucation was largely a local affair. In 1890, less than 7 percent of funds for public education
came from the state level of government, and it was mainly in the South where states were
most fiscally involved (US Bureau of the Census 1975). It was not until the last decade
of the nineteenth century that serious efforts were made to rationalize and consolidate the
approximately 125,000 school districts that existed nationwide (Goldin 1998, 350). Al-
though these efforts had some success in forming larger districts and union districts, local
governance of primary and secondary education remained the norm.
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The highly decentralized nature of American public education allowed it to flourish
in many parts of the United States while it faltered in others. As alluded to before, these
disparities in educational expansion were most evident along regional lines, with the North
offering more generous and extensive educational services than the South. Although partic-
ipation in primary education was nearly universal in all areas by the late nineteenth century,
the southern states spent about 40 percent less per student in their public schools. In par-
ticular, by century’s end, the average expenditure per student as share of local per capita
income stood at 3.2 percent in the southern states while it was 5.1 percent in the remaining
states (Lindert 2004, 123–124). To a large extent, these disparities in educational expen-
ditures reflected significant regional differences in the adherence to democratic practices
and norms. Although it had a brief experience with more inclusive democratic rule in the
decade after the Civil War, the South had long used a political model that restricted pub-
lic decision-making to a small group of wealthy white landowners. The region’s strongly
entrenched plantation economy provided these white elites with few incentives to invest in
the education of blacks and poor whites, and thus the southern states actually fell further
behind their northern peers in relative terms during the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury (Margo 1990; Rippa 1988, 128. In many ways, the American South’s experience with
democracy and education resembled that of eastern Prussia, though the American case was
more extreme.
Although public education of the general sort was technically a responsibility of state
and local governments in the United States, it was frequently contested at the central (i.e.
federal) level of government during the later part of the nineteenth century. Prior to the
Civil War, liberal proponents of mass education had enjoyed some success in using federal
powers and resources to support the development of public schools (Lee 1949; Hirsch-
land and Steinmo 2003). The best example of this was the series of federal land grant
acts, beginning with the Northwest Ordinance in 1785 and ending with the Morrill Act of
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1862, that used transfers of federal lands to support subnational units in establishing com-
mon schools and public universities.4 However, once the war had concluded and southern
states had regained representation at the federal level, swift action was taken to end and
rollback federal initiatives designed to encourage the expansion of public expansion. The
Department of Education, which had been established in 1867, was largely defunded and
demoted to Office status in the following year just as most southern states were readmitted
to Congress.5 In 1870 and 1871, there was a fierce battle over a new piece of legislation,
the Hoar Bill, which sought to establish a national system of educational oversight. The bill
was ultimately rejected, but it represented an important turning point in American educa-
tional politics because “state rights” had become the main mantra of opponents to federal
government involvement in education. This “state rights” backlash, which was strongly
supported by Southern Democrats, resulted in further defeats of educational legislation at
the federal level: between 1872 and 1880, none of the 11 bills for direct federal aid to
education that were introduced in Congress passed (Hirschland and Steinmo 2003, 357).
The role of conservative elites, particularly those from the South, in propelling this op-
position to broad educational improvements became most apparent in the 1880s. Over the
course of this decade, a long battle was waged over the so-called Blair Bill, which aimed to
give federal funds, dispensed over 8 years, to those states that met minimum standards in
the provision of elementary education. One of these standards was, however, that common
schools had be made free to all children, regardless of race or class. It was also stipulated
that the funds could not be used to support religious schools or capital improvements (e.g.,
constructing school buildings), as the main intent of the bill was to improve the quality of
the classroom experience for students. Given its goal and requirements, the Blair Bill met
stiff opposition in Congress and had to be submitted again five times between 1882 and
4 Despite not being public or fully public universities, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Cornell
University were also beneficiaries of the land grant program under the Morrill Act.
5 Georgia, Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia were not readmitted until 1870.
82
1890. Although the bill made it through the Senate on many of these occasions, it was
repeatedly killed in the Democratic-controlled House (Going 1957). During this episode,
Speaker John G. Carlisle of Kentucky and other Southern Democrats were publicly identi-
fied as the main instigators of the Blair Bill’s demise (Going 1957; Hirschland and Steinmo
2003, 348). In his assessment of the situation, the southern leader J. L. M. Curry believed
that “fear of the difficulty of controlling more educated Negros and the potential of upset-
ting of the traditional patterns of race relationships was the major cause of the Southern
opposition” (quoted in Lee 1949, 58). The Blair Bill’s defeat had a profound impact on
American educational politics because a bill of its type was not considered again in either
chamber of Congress for almost three decades.
Although conservative forces did not make overt attempts to use federal authority to
intervene in state and local education policy – as happened in Germany – it is reasonable
to suspect that these forces would have taken such action if they were not constitutionally
prohibited from doing so. When a small but increasing number of localities started to
establish public secondary schools (i.e. high schools) after the Civil War, elite-based groups
in nearly every state mobilized to stop these efforts from gaining traction. Given that public
education was constitutionally guaranteed in most states, these challenges often ended up
in state courts. Between 1873 and 1885, the issue of whether local governments could fund
and operate secondary schools was being litigated in every state except two (Burrell and
Eckelberry 1934, 334). These challenges to public secondary education were particularly
vigorous in the Atlantic states and Mid-West region, the areas of the United States where
private schools and colleges were most concentrated. Moreover, in the wake of the Civil
War and Reconstruction, Democrats in the South strongly curtailed public efforts to support
mass education in that region (Rippa 1988, 129). These curtailments included drastic cuts
to public spending and the shortening of school terms. If elites had been able to pursue
these agendas at the national level, it is likely that the overall development of American
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education would have slowed significantly.
In the absence of any broad intervention by conservative elites, many areas of the United
States moved forward with the development of mass education at the secondary level. By
the 1890s, nearly all of the legal challenges to public involvement in secondary educa-
tion had been rejected, so states and localities were free to begin establishing tax-financed
secondary schools (Burrell and Eckelberry 1934, 334). Not coincidentally, this was the
decade when the high school movement started to form. A loosely coordinated effort in-
volving many different social groups, this movement sought to create a system of secondary
education that would provide the masses with all the skills they needed to succeed in an
industrial society. This was a radical idea at the time because secondary education in the
United States, and elsewhere, had long focused on preparing small groups of elites to enter
exclusive colleges and universities.
As the high school movement started to gain momentum over the next two decades,
conservative elites used the federal government’s authority to promote vocational training
as an alternative to general education. The idea of a public vocational training started to
gain more attention in American politics after an array of different groups, including busi-
ness associations, labor movements, and civic organizations, formed a loose coalition to
promote it (Hillison 1995). Although this coalition made many different arguments in fa-
vor of vocational training, it widely emphasized the idea of “social efficiency” – the idea
that the “rank and file” of society should be trained to become efficient “producers,” leav-
ing a select few to become educated “utilizers” (Snedden 1900). Given that this thinking
essentially supported the creation of a parallel education system, it was embraced by in-
dustrial elites in the North as well as agrarian elites in the South (Kantor 1986; Werum
1997). Seeing an opportunity to reinforce class- and racial-divisions, Southern Democrats
led efforts to create a national system of vocational training in the four decades leading up
to World War II (Werum 1997, 1999).
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These efforts eventually produced several pieces of legislation on vocational training at
the federal level, with the Smith-Hughes Act of 1917 being the most prominent.6This piece
of legislation provided federal funding for the establishment of all forms of vocational
training, though it placed a strong emphasis on agricultural training. States were given
a central role in designing and administering the vocational education programs, though
many of their decisions had to be federally approved. To receive funding for vocational
training, state education boards were required to submit plans to a newly formed Federal
Board of Vocational Education and to raise matching funds. A central feature of the Act
was that it required vocational training to be delivered in as a distinct track, as it explicitly
limited the amount of academic education students enrolled in vocational programs could
receive.7 Another important feature was that the Act distributed fund on a demographic
basis: more urban areas, particularly in the North, received more funds earmarked for
industrial training while more rural areas, such as those in the South, were given more funds
designated for agricultural training (Werum 1997, 409). This distributional arrangement
was in close alignment with the social objectives of both northern and southern elites.
While the Smith-Hughes Act did encourage the development of some vocational train-
ing programs, it did not significantly impact the overall development of American public
education. Only eight states ultimately used provisions of the Act to establish vocational
training programs, and these programs never gained wide acceptance among students and
parents. Vocational training did not have a record of proven success in improving employ-
ment prospects in the American context, which made it a weak competitor to the familiar
system of general education (Hansen 1997, 495–498). At the same time, the absence of any
6 The three other notable pieces of legislation, which modified the Smith-Hughes Act, included: the George-
Reed Act (1929–33), the George-Ellzey Act (1934–36), and the George-Deen Act (1937–45).
7 The limit for academic education was initially set at 50 percent of a student’s coursework. The Federal
Board of Vocational Education quickly replaced this with the 50-25-25 rule: 50 percent for vocational train-
ing, 25 percent for instruction in related subjects, and 25 percent for instruction in unrelated subjects.
85
real tradition of coordination between employers and labor in the area of vocational train-
ing meant that these groups never gained much input in the vocational programs that did
actually develop (Martin 2012, 62). This compounded the problems that these programs
had in attracting students. By the end of the 1920s, it was clear that vocational training
did not have the mass appeal that general education had. Consequently, the push for mass
secondary education only continued to gain speed.
All in all, the combination of strongly decentralized educational authority and weak
coordinated training legacies in the United States contributed greatly to the development of
a secondary education system that focused almost exclusively on general education. The
highly local nature of education in the United States allowed more progressive areas of
the country – particularly in the Northeast, Mid-West, and West – to move swiftly in de-
veloping tax-supported public schools. Constitutional limits prevented conservative elites
from using their power in the federal government to obstruct these subnational efforts; at
most, all they could do was block and rollback the federal subsidization of public educa-
tion. As the drive for mass public education moved from the primary to the secondary level,
however, conservative elites adopted a new strategy to hinder its growth and strengthen so-
cial segregation. In this strategy, federal resources and oversight was used to promote a
vocational education system that would divert lower-class students away from established
systems of general education. While this strategy had some success in the short-run, it did
not dramatically alter the United States’ long-run educational trajectory. In the absence of
strong traditions of coordinated training, few students, workers, and firms found the new
vocational system to be an appealing alternative to the United States’s rapidly expanding
set of high schools.
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3.3 United Kingdom (England)
For having been one of the most economically developed societies in the nineteenth
century, the United Kingdom – and England in particular – had a strikingly underdevel-
oped system of public education around the middle of this century.8 In stark contrast to
most of its peers, primary education in England was provided by an array of non-state
entities, including private schools, religious organizations, and philanthropic associations.
Although the state did provide some support for the religious and philanthropic voluntary
schools after 1833, it did not assert much control over primary education until 1870. As a
consequence, the primary education system remained mostly funded and controlled by pri-
vate interests and, like its American counterpart, developed in a highly fragmented manner.
The prevalence of costly fees and lack of legal compulsion in primary education meant,
however, that a large share of the lower classes received little or no formal education (Lin-
dert 2004, 113–114). While public secondary education was non-existent for the entire
nation, there was a system of private schools and universities to serve those with status
and means – the clergy, landed gentry, and other elites.9 A lack of formal connections be-
tween these elite-oriented upper levels and the lower level made it essentially impossible
for members of the masses to progress beyond primary education. With this strong class-
based division, the English education system was highly stratified, much like the parallel
education systems found elsewhere at the time.
Despite maintaining a low profile in education for much of the nineteenth century, the
British state faced mounting pressures to intervene in some areas of education toward the
later part of the century. With the exception of a financial aid bill passed in 1833, con-
servative forces in the British Parliament had successfully blocked a number of proposals
8 Although this case study is ostensibly about the development of education and training in the United King-
dom, it mostly examines the historical experience of England (with Wales). This reflects the fact that Scotland
was, for the most part, allowed to establish and maintain a separate education system.
9 The secondary education system was mainly comprised of independent and religious grammar schools that
were funded through fees and endowments.
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to increase the state’s role in financing and administering education during the first two-
thirds of the nineteenth century. By the middle of the century, however, new societal de-
velopments were starting to make this firm rejection of state involvement in education an
untenable position. In 1858, a state-commissioned report noted that the “prejudice against
an educated labourer was rapidly passing away,” which reinforced the notion that a ba-
sic education was quickly becoming a requirement for even the lowliest of occupations
(British Parliament 1861, 105). In addition to this changing economic reality, a series of
voting reform that significantly increased democratic representation in the Parliament were
implemented between 1868 and 1885. The first of these reforms, the Second Reform Act
(1867/68), extended voting rights from 19 to 31 percent of men, and a follow-up reform,
the Third Reform Act (1884/85), boosted this rate further to around 61 percent (Lindert
2004, 114).10 With these movements toward full male suffrage, the power of conservative
elites over British policy-making started to wane to some degree.
Once these economic and political changes began to take hold, education reform at
the primary level soon followed. Just two years after the Second Reform Act was imple-
mented, Parliament passed the first major piece of education legislation in the nineteenth
century, the Education Act of 1870 (Jones 1977, 48–67). As a result of this legislation,
the British state became, for the first time, directly involved in the provision of education.
While the bill did not establish a uniform education system or make primary education free
for all citizens, it permitted the creation of school boards at the local level to oversee the es-
tablishment and administration of some primary schools.11Consequently, a number of state
schools started to appear alongside the existing set of private and voluntary schools, though
10 The other reform to voting rights was the introduction of the secret ballot in 1872. The right to vote had
first been extended to elements of the middle class in 1832.
11 Around 3,500 schools were established or taken over by school boards in the first decade after the 1870
Education Reform Act was passed.
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the emergence of this state system did little to weaken the class boundaries found in En-
glish education. During the subsequent decade, additional legislation was passed to make
education compulsory for children aged 5 to 10, and attention again turned to the matter of
public financing for education. Not long after the Third Reform Act had extended demo-
cratic representation, legislation designed to reduce the costs of education to individuals
was passed in 1891 (Sutherland 1973, 263–347). In particular, the Elementary Education
of 1891 provided state financing for all children aged 3 to 15 attending public elementary
schools, which effectively made primary education free for the first time (Ibid). As a result
of these legal changes, mass education at the primary level increasingly became a reality
in England, though its development still lagged that of most other affluent societies by a
decade or more.12
Although conservative elites had made some concessions on primary education, they
could still draw on the British state’s centralized authority to block and stall further educa-
tion reform. The education reform acts passed in the final decades of the nineteenth century
might have increased the provision of primary education, but they did not remove many of
the institutional barriers to educational expansion that had quietly been put in place ear-
lier. Despite not having a formal constitution, a strong precedent in British law prevented
public bodies, including local governments and groups, from taking actions that were not
expressly permitted by parliamentary statute (Prest 1990, 3–6). There was a process by
which local bodies could petition the Parliament to make legislative changes, but this pro-
cess involved many challenging steps. Besides having to win approval from both chambers
of Parliament, such a petition had to be supported by a property-weighted majority of a
local electorate (Ibid). Given that conservative forces usually controlled at least one, if not
all, of these decision points, it was nearly impossible for local groups to launch new public
12 For a detailed analysis of the effects of state subsidies and free schooling on enrollment rates in nineteenth-
century England, see Mitch 1986. The voluntary schools have sometimes been referred to as public schools
because they were often established through public charters.
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education initiatives on their own. In 1857, for instance, a large coalition of citizens and
politicians representing the city of Manchester petitioned the Parliament for municipal au-
thority over the financing and administration of elementary education, but their request was
rejected (Gordon, Aldrich, and Dean 1991, 6–7).13 Therefore, unlike in the United State
and elsewhere, local efforts to establish tax-financed public schools never gained much
traction in England.
Using this centralized power over education policy, conservative elites were able to
block and retard the development of public secondary education. After Parliament reluc-
tantly embraced the idea of public education at the primary level in 1870, it was another
thirty years before it took legislative action on public education at the secondary level. The
British state had begun exploring the matter of public secondary education well in advance
of this point, but parliamentary deliberation rarely led to government action. In 1864,
the state-sponsored School Inquiry Commission issued a report recommending the estab-
lishment of a national system of secondary education based on the existing assortment of
endowed grammar and religious schools, but Parliament never seriously took up the Com-
mission’s advice. Once public primary education was in place, opponents of extensive
mass education repeatedly stalled efforts to create a public system of secondary education.
During the 1880s, for instance, Tories sitting in Parliament successfully halted a proposal
to introduce publicly financed “intermediate education” in Wales before a compromise of
sorts was reached in 1889 (Evans 1990, 202–206). 14 Conservative forces delayed the
arrival of a similar form of public education to England for another decade.
13 Proposals were also made to use the county as the basis for financing and administering public education,
but they never made it into law.
14 According to the terms of the compromise, Wales was allowed to establish a publicly financed system of
secondary education, but it had to accept shared control of its education system. Under this arrangement,
local school boards were abolished and new Joint Education Commission was established. This commission,
which was comprised of representatives from both the central and regional governments, was responsible for
overseeing both primary and secondary public education. This agreement would serve as model for the 1902
Education Act that affected England.
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In the last two decades of the nineteenth century, conservative elites became increas-
ingly focused on using centralized authority to curtail the power of local school boards. The
school boards had become a concern for elites because many of them, particularly those in
urban areas, were establishing post-primary schools to enhance their educational offerings
for older children (Robinson 2002, 161). School boards were able to do this because the
1870 Education Act had not clearly defined the institutional bounds of elementary school-
ing. Seeing this behavior as a threat to the class-based distinction between primary and
secondary education, conservative elites took action to reign in the school boards. In 1899,
at the behest of a Conservative government, the Education Department ruled that school
boards were no longer eligible for a set of public grants that had been the main source of
funding for their post-primary programs (Ibid).15 In the same year, the Education Depart-
ment and two other government entities responsible for education matters were replaced by
a more centralized Board of Education (Robinson 2002, 162).16 In the following year, the
same department codified a definition for “Higher Elementary School” that included many
restrictions on student eligibility and course content. These narrow technical changes paved
the way for more sweeping and consequential educational reform in 1902.
Passed amidst significant controversy, the Education Act of 1902 allowed conservative
elites to reassert much of their lost control over the English education system. Although
this act did establish the notion of public secondary education in England for the first time,
its main aims were to restrict local control over education and to reinforce class-based
divisions within education. The 1902 Act abolished all 2568 schools boards that had been
set up after the 1870 Act, replacing them with Local Education Authorities (LEAs) run by
local boroughs or county councils. These LEAs were empowered, in conjunction with the
15 This decision is often referred to as the Cockerton Judgment, with Cockerton being the district auditor who
made the ruling.
16 By combining the Education Department, Science and Art Department, and education section of the Charity
Commission, the British government created one central government unit to oversee education matters at both
the primary and secondary levels (Gordon 1962).
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central government, to organize and oversee the provision of education at both the primary
and secondary levels. A clear set of guidelines and limits was imposed on these new LEAs
to prevent them from pushing the boundaries of public education: the central Board of
Education had to approve all education schemes developed by LEAs and caps were placed
on LEA funding of secondary education (Robinson 2002, 162). At the same time, LEAs
were required to subsidize endowed grammar schools that agreed to reserve 25 percent
or more of their places for high achieving “free students” (Ringer 1979, 216).17 While
these changes did, to some extent, help rationalize the English education system and create
educational opportunities for clever members of the lower classes, the main effect of the
1902 Act was to formalize and sharpen the division between a mass-oriented primary level
and a elite-oriented secondary level. The strengthening of this dual system would have
lasting effects on the development of secondary education in the following decades.
In this political struggle over English secondary education, the Parliament made little
effort to promote vocational training as an alternative to general education. Other than es-
tablishing a weak Art and Science Department in 1853 to stimulate and coordinate efforts in
technical education, the British state took no steps toward developing a nationwide system
of vocational training for most of the nineteenth century. In 1889 and 1890, legislation was
passed that permitted local authorities to raise and spend some public funds on initiatives
to increase and improve vocational training, but government inaction and conflicting policy
limited the impact of this legislation; by 1894, only 12 out of 108 councils were using its
provisions (Roderick and Stephens 1978, 74). At the turn of the century, the little technical
instruction that was available to the masses tended to be part-time and pre-vocational in
character (Ringer 1979, 215). Besides this half-hearted effort, the British state remained
uninvolved in the provision of vocational training. This lack of involvement reflected the
view pervasive in government circles at the time that public education should concentrate
17 These free students were selected by the LEAs on the basis of exams.
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on teaching classical principles rather than “imparting skills in manual occupations” (Ab-
bott 1933, 61).
The slow and tepid response of the British state to growing demands for education re-
form did prompt the development of some mass education initiatives outside the state, but
these efforts largely failed in reshaping the English educational landscape. While conser-
vative elites were working to suppress the expansion of post-primary mass education in the
1890s and early 1900s, a number of voluntary and philanthropic organizations were spring-
ing up to revive a faltering British apprenticeship system. Seeing that the British state had
largely withdrawn its support for this training system, these organizations sought to provide
the resources and know-how needed to maintain a large supply of effective apprenticeships
(Thelen 2004, 119–121). Similar movements were also being made to expand the private
offerings in school-based vocational training directed at the lower classes. In the end, how-
ever, these efforts failed to produce a viable system of mass vocational training on the same
scale as that seen in Germany or elsewhere in Europe. A lack of coordination among key
parties, including workers and firms, made it basically impossible for these localized ef-
forts to scale up (Thelen 2004, 121). As a result, few new opportunities for secondary-level
training became available for the masses.
From this case study, it is apparent that the centralized nature of the British state and
the weak legacies of coordinated training in the United Kingdom significantly hindered the
expansion and reform of English secondary education. For much of the nineteenth century,
conservative elites were able to use their considerable sway in the British Parliament to
block the creation of a public education system that would compete directly with one run
by the Church, voluntary organizations, and other elite-friendly groups. Although these
elites did eventually have to concede some ground on state involvement in primary educa-
tion, this only occurred after a considerable delay – England was one of the last wealthy
societies to implement public and compulsory primary education. Despite making this
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concession, British elites enjoyed continued success in holding down further pressures for
educational reform and maintaining the integrity of the parallel education system in Eng-
land. When enterprising school boards attempted to blur some of the distinctions between
primary and secondary education, conservative elites used the British government’s cen-
tralized authority to replace these boards with a set of more obedient administrators. Given
their success in protecting secondary education from the masses, British elites had little
need to use vocational training as an instrument of diversion, as was the case in Germany
and the United States. Even if they had pursued this strategy, it would have likely failed
because late-nineteenth-century England lacked the strong traditions of coordinated train-
ing needed for such state initiatives to flourish. This reality explains why non-state efforts
to expand vocational training in England around the turn of the century never gained mo-
mentum in the long run.
3.4 Sweden
Like the other education systems that have been examined, the Swedish education sys-
tem of the mid-nineteenth century featured a strong class-based division between primary
education and higher forms of education. Until the introduction of public primary schools
in 1842, most Swedes were informally educated at home and in the Church.18 As a conse-
quence, the Swedish masses were only given a year or two of instruction in the most rudi-
mentary subjects, and this largely remained true even after the initial expansion of state-run
common schools (folkskola) in the 1840s and 1850s.19 For the more privileged segments
of Swedish society, there was a mix of public and private secondary schools (collectively
referred to as the lŁroverk that mostly offered classical education. The most selective of
these schools were the selective grammar schools (gymnasium), which prepared students
18 There were also some charity schools (fattigskolor) for the lower classes, but these schools only reached a
small portion of this group.
19 To ensure that the masses acquired some basic education, Sweden had made literacy compulsory in 1686.
Members of the clergy enforced this literacy law by administering annual reading and writing tests to their
parishioners.
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to join the clergy and the bureaucracy and other prestigious professions.20 These academic
schools also served as the entry point to the few colleges and universities that existed in
Sweden at this time, but, as of 1840, less than one percent of each age cohort completed
the nine years of schooling and entrance exam (studentexamen) required to move on to
higher education (Landquist 1959, 238).21 Similar to the situation in England, the Church
of Sweden had a central role in m administering education at all levels and maintaining
the class-based barriers between these levels.22 Overall, the Swedish education system had
many features in common with the systems found in more economically developed peers.
The structure of authority over education in Sweden had played an important part in
the development of this uneven distribution of education between the country’s masses and
elites. The unitary nature of the Swedish state allowed the central governments to set policy
for all levels of education, and this centralized authority was mostly used to aid the elite-
oriented grammar schools and universities that constituted the higher levels of Swedish
education. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the central government had become
the principal financier of education at these higher levels, and it continued to retain com-
plete control over policy affecting these particular levels. When it later established, for the
first time, a school system for the masses through the folkskola Act of 1842, the central
government chose an institutional setup that allowed it to hand off financial responsibility
for the system while retaining significant, though somewhat indirect, control of the sys-
tem (Paulston 1968, 22–23). In particular, the Act required each parish – the local unit
of civil and religious administration at the time – to set up and fund at least one folkskola
with at least one seminary-trained teacher, but it also specified that these schools would
20 Before attending these secondary schools, children from the upper classes often attended private prepara-
tory schools. It was possible, however, to enroll in secondary schools without prior schooling.
21 These entrance requirements could be waived if an applicant had a sponsorship from someone associated
with a university. This exception mostly benefited students from wealthy families.
22 In a symbolic acknowledgement of the Church’s role in administering education, the ministry formed in
1840 to oversee Swedish education was called the Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs.
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be monitored and managed by Church-dominated school boards.23 Because of this fiscally
decentralized yet Church-controlled arrangement, the Swedish common schools did not
experience the same quick growth that many of their German and American counterparts
did in the first half of the nineteenth century; over the second half of the nineteenth century,
one third of children continued to be schooled at home or in traveling “ambulatory” schools
(Paulston 1968, 23). In effect, by constructing two distinct systems of educational gover-
nance, the central government had created a situation where the lower levels of Swedish
education would face many more obstacles to development than the upper levels for many
decades to come.
While this split structure of educational governance did hinder the growth of mass ed-
ucation in Sweden, it did not stop pressures for mass-oriented educational reform from
growing. Recognizing that the creation of the folkskola had accentuated class differences
in the Swedish education system and broader society, a group of liberal politicians sub-
mitted several motions to the Swedish Parliament (riksdag) in the 1850s that called for the
transformation of the folkskola into a comprehensive school – a school that would serve all
Swedish children, regardless of their class (Paulston 1968, 28).24 Though these motions
ultimately failed, they inspired other pieces of legislation in the following four decades,
including a bill introduced to the riksdag in 1867 that sought to replace the folkskola with
a kommunalskola, or community school, that would serve as the entry level of for all and
create a linkage between the primary and secondary levels (Ibid).
Although these reform efforts were initially led by a small groups of liberal idealists,
they gained broader momentum as the folkskola became more thoroughly established and
23 Each folkskola school board was comprised of six members: the local rector served as the president, the
local minister served as the secretary, and the remaining four members were elected by the local church
assembly. According the 1842 Act, each parish had five years to implement the provisions of the law.
24 Count Torsten Rudenschld, who was a prominent critic of the folkskola and a strong advocate of a class-
integrated school system, led these efforts.
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Sweden became more politically and economically developed. The 1867 reform bill men-
tioned above was proposed just one year after the riksdag had undergone a significant
overhaul that made it modestly more representative.25 While it was some time before other
democratizing changes were made to the national political system, this institutional reform
gave liberal demands for education reform in the riksdag some more weight. These reform
efforts gained a further boost in 1879, when the folkskola teachers formed a professional
association that backed a comprehensive model of elementary schooling . Not long after,
the Swedish Social Democratic Party was also founded, which gave the educational reform
movement some more organizational resources. Together, these forces inside and outside
of the riksdag were gradually shifting the balance of power in Swedish politics in favor of
educational expansion for the masses.
As these pressures became more pronounced, the riksdag did take some steps to im-
prove the folkskola system, but it also began to assert more direct control over this lower
level of education. Starting in the 1860s, the central government allocated more funds to
the common schools in an effort to accelerate their development, but its investment in pri-
mary education still paled in comparison that for grammar schools and other institutions
of higher learning. In 1870, for instance, the central government spent over three times as
much on secondary education as it did on primary education, even though the latter served
over one hundred times as many students as the former (Paulston 1968, 26). In 1876, the
central government also extended the folkskola’s duration to six years, though attendance,
for all of these years was not compulsory. Coinciding with new spending and institutional
changes, the central government established a central school inspection authority in 1864
and a national curriculum in 1878. While these measures did ultimately help to standardize
and improve some aspects of primary education (Evertsoon 2012), they also reflected a
growing distrust among conservatives in the clergy who were charged with administering
25 Per Adam Siljestrm, who was a notable educational reformer and member of the agrarian faction in the
riksdag, spearheaded these reform effort.
97
the folkskola system (Paulston 1968). During these two decades, many members of this
clergy had become openly sympathetic to the idea of comprehensive schooling, and several
had emerged as prominent leaders in the educational reform movement. By devising and
enforcing a new set of school codes, the conservative-dominated central government could
keep this group in check and prevent them from inflating the boundaries of the folkskola.
To prevent mass education at the primary level from spilling over into the secondary
level, conservative elites used their power in the central government to push through an-
other institutional reform that strengthened the class-based division between these two lev-
els. In what looked like a major concession to proponents of a unified education system,
the conservative first chamber of the riksdag approved a bill in 1894 that made three years
of elementary schooling a prerequisite for entry into state-supported secondary schools.
This was an important development because, for the first time, there was a link between the
primary and secondary levels of the Swedish education system. It was initially thought that
this reform would transform the folkskola into a common school that for children from all
social backgrounds and enable more members of the lower class to progress on to higher
levels of education. In a follow-up reform passed in 1904, however, the riksdag erased
this hope by restricting secondary education to make it more attractive to the urban middle
class. In particular, it replaced the nine-year classical gymnasium that had served as the
main secondary school for centuries with a lower six-year, Latin-free realskola and an up-
per three- or four-year Latin-based gymnasium. The new realskola, with its more practical
curriculum and own leaving exam (realexamen), became an instant draw for middle-class
students, which thus encouraged this group to leave the folkskola immediately after com-
pleting the three years of required attendance (Paulston 1968, 32–33). This behavior meant
that only lower-class students ended up completing the entire eight years of folkskola of-
fered at the time, which reinforced the folkskola’s image as a charity school.26 As a result
26 As Fridtjuv Berg, a prominent liberal politicians stated, the creation of the realskola had “put aside the
hopes for an elementary school for children of all social classes in a more decisive way than anything that
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of this strong and persistent social division, few members of the lower classes ever went on
to secondary education in this period around the turn of the century.
While conservative elites were active in steering the development of general education
in Sweden, they took a more passive approach to vocational training. As was the case
in Germany, Sweden once had a strong system of craft guilds that were central involved
in the training of skilled workers. Although this guild system was formally abolished in
1846 during an episode of increased economic liberalism, artisans remained an active force
in Sweden’s developing economy and domestic politics. In the last three decades of the
nineteenth century, these artisans became particularly active in national politics as industri-
alization in Sweden picked up speed. In 1876, handicraft associations from across Sweden
representing these artisan submitted a petition to the riksdag requesting that the apprentice-
ship regulations and compulsory associations that had previously existed be reintroduced,
but nothing came of this request (So¨derberg 1965, 124–155). The leader of the Stockholm
handicraft association, who was also a member of the riksdag, later introduced a bill to
revive the compulsory trade system, but it too was rejected in 1883 (Ibid). In the 1890s,
various artisan associations came together to form the Hantverks- och industriorganisa-
tion (The Handicraft and Industry Organization), which became a strong advocate for a
number of policy changes that would enhance the standing of the Swedish Mittelstand, in-
cluding apprenticeship regulations (Ericsson 1984, 321). Yet, despite having many ties to
what would become the Conservative Party, this handicraft movement never managed to
convince the riksdag to reestablish any of the privileges it had lost in the mid-nineteenth
century (Ericsson 1984, 328).
The central government’s general refusal to improve and expand the educational oppor-
tunities available to the masses compelled several non-state groups to develop a system of
vocational training outside of the Swedish state. After the guild system had been abolished
had occurred in a generation” (LO 1904).
99
in Sweden in 1846, associations representing artisans, employers, and workers started to
form a variety of educational programs that offered older children and young adults train-
ing in work-related subjects and activities (Nilsson n.d.). While some of these programs
were specifically designed to train members of the middle class to become engineers and
managers, the bulk of these programs were targeted at the emerging working class. These
mass-oriented programs, which first started to appear in Sweden during the 1850s, were
initially comprised of evening courses and “Sunday schools” that provided basic instruc-
tion in subjects like mathematics and drafting. As these programs continued to develop,
however, they added more vocation-specific content to their training courses and increased
the duration and formality of these courses. The expansion of this school-based form of
vocational training really took off in the mid-1890s and early 1900s, which was the period
when the push for integrated primary and secondary schooling was really beginning to fal-
ter. More specifically, enrollment in school-based training increased by nearly 60 percent
during the ten-year period after 1894 continued to rise afterward (Nilsson 2008, 157).27
Unlike in the British case, these non-state efforts to expand school-based vocational
training in Sweden did ultimately succeed in producing a mass training system at the sec-
ondary level. As mentioned before, Sweden had strong traditions of coordinated training
that had developed over centuries by well-established system of craft guilds. After the
guild system was formally abolished, many of the artisans who had been trained under
this old apprenticeship-based system became involved in developing the new school-based
system (So¨derberg 1965, 226–295). As industrialization picked up, unions and employers
were drawn into this system and steadily developed partnerships in managing individual
schools. The state also started to play a more active role in this system as the conservative
elites’ control over the central government became incrementally weaker in the early part
of the twentieth century. In 1918, a Liberal-Socialist government formally integrated this
27 In absolute terms, the number of students increased from 12,494 in 1895 to 19,990 in 1904.
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private school-based model into the public education system by creating the praktiska ung-
domsskola (practical trade school). This school was designed to provide male graduates
of the folkskola with two years of vocational training, thus linking general education and
vocational training at the primary and secondary levels for the first time.
As this case study of the Swedish experience shows, centralized educational authority
and strong coordination legacies were key to the development of a secondary education
system that emphasized school-based vocational training. Centralized authority over gen-
eral education allowed conservatives elites to stall the development of mass education at
both the primary and secondary levels throughout the nineteenth century. Although these
elites allowed public primary education to be formally established in Sweden relatively
early, they were slow to implement policies that would have allowed it to expand more
rapidly. When the pressures for mass education started to shift from the primary level to
the secondary level, conservative elites again drew on the central government’s power to
set national education policy. This time they used the authority to reconfigure the entire
institutional basis of secondary education in an effort to bolster the class-based division
between the primary and secondary levels. Given their strong capacity to shape national
education policy, Swedish elites, like British elites, had little reason to become actively
engaged in the development of a vocational training system.
3.5 Discussion
These historical analyses of the development of education and training in Germany, the
United States, the United Kingdom (England), and Sweden show that there was a great deal
of consistency in the objectives and strategies of conservatives and reformers. In all four of
these cases, conservatives elites sought to preserve the significant educational advantages
that they had accumulated by the mid-nineteenth century. This ambition was challenged,
however, by progressive reformers who sought to democratize education and make it fully
available to the underprivileged masses. In the struggles that these clashing aims generated,
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control over general education – the schools providing academic training – became the
main point of contention between conservatives and reformers. For both sides, general
education was seen as an essential instrument for either maintaining or transforming the
underlying social orders of societies because it had long served as the main conveyor of
social status between successive generations. When conservatives had control over general
education, they moved to restrict access to it through the construction of parallel systems.
In the hands of reformers, however, general education was made more comprehensive in
the sense that more people gained better access to additional educational levels. As these
cases studies have highlighted, institutions played a decisive role in determining whether
and how these competing strategies succeed.
From a broad perspective, these case studies confirm that authority structures and coor-
dination legacies strongly shaped the nature of these struggles between conservative and re-
formers over general education, particularly as these struggles reached the secondary level
of education. The historical analyses of the German and American experiences show that,
as expected, conservatives used centralized training policy as a tool for influencing subna-
tional education policy when decentralized educational authority made direct interventions
in education policy impossible. If these constitutional barriers to direct intervention did
not exist – as was the case in the United Kingdom and Sweden – then conservatives had
no compelling reason to employ this strategy of promoting vocational training. Regardless
of whether or not conservatives actively promoted vocational training as an alternative to
general education, the strength of coordination legacies in a society ultimately determined
whether the society developed a mass system of vocational training. With their strong tradi-
tions of coordinated training, Germany and Sweden erected such systems, while the United
Kingdom and United States, with their much weaker traditions, did not.
Although decentralized authority is often considered inimical to the development of
social policy that benefit the underprivileged masses, a comparison of these cases reveals
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that there are instances where the reverse is true. As seen in both the Germany and United
States, the decentralization of authority over general education via federalism allowed the
more democratic parts of these countries to move forward with educational expansion with-
out the threat of a veto from the national level. If education had been a responsibility of
central governments in these two countries, it is reasonable to believe that conservative
forces – particularly the landholding elites in the Prussian East and the American South
– would have used their political sway at the national level to curtail the broad expansion
of mass education to protect their local interests. Fortunately for German and American
proponents of mass education, constitutional structures in these two countries prevented
conservative elites in some regions from blocking progressive policy changes implemented
in other regions.
The case studies of the United Kingdom and Sweden make it clear that decentralized
authority only had positive effects on the early development of mass education if it was
constitutionally guaranteed. In both of these countries, primary education was established
using decentralized models of public financing and administration. More specifically, local
school boards were made responsible in both countries for raising the funds needed for pri-
mary schools and running the day-to-day operations of these schools. Some of these school
boards tried to expand the scope of mass education by inflating their roles in provisioning
education, but these efforts ultimately failed. Once British and Swedish conservative elites
became aware of these expansionary actions, they used the central government’s authority
to restructure and regulate these local units to prevent further deviations from their inter-
pretation of policy. Therefore, the de facto decentralization of education systems did not
have the same positive effect that constitutionally defined decentralization did on mass ed-
ucational development.
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The analyses of these four cases also make it clearer why some countries came to em-
phasize apprenticeship-based vocational training and others school-based vocational train-
ing. In the case of a federal country like Germany, it made better political sense for elites to
embrace the apprenticeship-based form rather than school-based form because they could
exercise more direct control over the former through the central government. In this system
with dispersed educational authority, the central government could only claim control over
vocational training if it was widely considered to be a matter of economic policy rather
than education policy. Given how school-based vocational training operated around the
onset of the twentieth century, this form of training would have been less likely to pass this
constitutional test. To spur the development of school-based training under these circum-
stance, elites had to rely on more indirect mean of shaping policy, such providing financial
incentives to subnational governments – as seen in the American case.
School-based vocational training became prevalent in countries with unitary systems
of governments, such as Sweden, because they could be developed without much state
assistance. In this type of system with centralized educational authority, the conservative-
controlled central governments had few incentives to become involved in the development
of vocational training. Consequently, when non-state actors initiated their vocational train-
ing efforts, they had to select a training model that was viable in the absence of any state
coordination or financing. The apprenticeship-based form was not a good choice because
it typically required some far-reaching state regulations to function properly. The school-
based form, on the other hand, could be developed in the absence of any overarching legal
framework for vocational training. Yet, even though this form of training did not require
much state involvement to get started, it did require substantial coordination among non-
state actors to be workable in the long run.
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4 THE DISTRIBUTIONAL POLITICS OF EDUCATION IN THE POSTWAR
ERA
The four decades after World War II were a period of significant growth and change in
the education and training systems of economically advanced societies. During this time,
the rich democracies of Europe, North America, and Oceania all carried out major expan-
sions in the areas of education to enhance the social wellbeing and economic capacities of
their populations. Between 1950 and 1985, these countries saw, on average, their public
expenditures on education increase by 112 percent and their overall enrollment rates grow
by 24 percent.1 As part of this far-reaching expansionary push, education and training at
the primary and secondary levels were affirmed to be basic social rights, and access to
other levels of education, such as higher or tertiary education, was greatly improved. As a
consequence, educational attainment increased steadily in these societies and skilled labor
became more abundant in their economies. These developments were proof that systems
of mass education remained a cornerstone of the evolving welfare states in these advanced
capitalist countries.
As was the case in the prewar phase of educational expansion, however, this postwar
phase saw the emergence of several important institutional differences in the education sys-
tems of these countries. Public spending on education did grow in all of these countries
during this phase, but the level of growth was much higher in some countries than others.
In most countries belonging to the Nordic region and the westernmost part of continental
Europe, for instance, spending increases were approximately one-and-a-half times larger
1 These enrollment rates are caculated as the number of students in primary, secondary, and tertiary education
per 1,000 people aged 5 to 24 years.
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than those in other affluent countries. Likewise, this general increase in state support for
education did not affect all levels of education equally across all of these countries; for
some countries, expanding state support for tertiary education came at the expense of ex-
isting state support for lower levels of education. This institutional bias was particularly
evident in several of the Anglo countries, including Australia, New Zealand, and the United
Kingdom. Finally, even as state-sponsored education continued to reach more people, the
ideal of universalism was not upheld to the same degree in all countries. Anglo and Nordic
countries were often much more ambitious in this regard, and thus they continued to lead
in terms of student enrollments.
In an effort to explain these institutional divergences in education system, the study in
this chapter considers a number of relevant economic and political factors. Among these
factors, this study contends that partisan government participation and constitutionally de-
fined veto points are the key political determinants of generosity, distribution, and coverage
in education systems for the early postwar period. Of the three types of partisan govern-
ment considered, it is argued that left government is the main force behind the development
of highly generous and broadly accessible education systems. Right government, on the
other hand, is theorized to have no positive effects on the overall generosity and coverage
in education systems. When it comes to the distribution of public resources among dif-
ferent levels of education, however, it is claimed that right governments prioritize tertiary
education over lower levels of education. The effects of Christian democratic government
participation are thought to lie in between those for the left and right. In terms of institu-
tional determinants, this study claims that veto points also contribute to the development of
tertiary biases in the distribution of public educational within education systems. Contrary
to prior work, this study argues that territorial decentralization has no appreciable impact
on these three elements of education systems.
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The above arguments are assessed in this study using the same high-level analytical ap-
proach employed in the prior investigation of education-training regimes. To begin, a new
set of data on education are used to compare and contrast the generosity, distribution, and
coverage of postwar education systems in 17 advanced capitalist countries. Once the main
trends and divergences in these data have been identified, a series of plausible explanations
for these developments, which include the core arguments of this study, are presented. Af-
terward, methodological aspects of the statistical analyses used to evaluate these competing
explanations are described. Finally, the results of these quantitative analyses and their the-
oretical implications are discussed in the remaining two sections.
4.1 Postwar Patterns of Change in Education Systems
While the politics of education in the early twentieth century had largely revolved
around the structure and scope of secondary-level programs, the politics of education in
the early postwar era dealt with a much wider range of issues. As education and training
at the secondary level approached ubiquity during the initial decades of the postwar recov-
ery and boom, there were new debates about whether and how to reform and extend mass
education. On one side of these debates were social reformers who sought to enhance the
educational opportunities available to the masses by increasing public investments in edu-
cation and strengthening public commitments to universalism. Among other things, these
reformers spearheaded efforts to reduce segmentation in primary and secondary education
through the introduction of comprehensive schools and to enhance access to tertiary edu-
cation through the expansion of public universities. Opposing these movements for change
were conservative elites who were determined to maintain the privileges in education that
had accrued to those of higher means and status. In pursuit of this objective, these actors
attempted to restrict public involvement in education and allocate public resources in a
manner that preserved their institutionalized advantages. With the accelerated transforma-
tion of secondary education and training into a mass enterprise after World War II, tertiary
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education became the main bastion of elite resistance. Although the objects of contention
had changed, this postwar struggle over education and training shared many features with
the nineteenth-century battles discussed in prior chapters.
In light of this contentious environment, it is perhaps not surprising to find evidence that
new institutional divergences in education emerged between advanced capitalist societies
in the early postwar era. Indicators of public expenditures on education for this period
(see Table 4.2) show that countries like Switzerland and the United States lost their relative
leads in overall education spending after World War II. Although total public expenditures
grew significantly in all rich countries between 1950 and 1985, the size of these gains were
most pronounced in the Nordic countries and the westernmost countries of continental
Europe. As a result of these differential shifts, countries like Sweden and the Netherlands
rose from indistinctive positions in the 1950s to leadership positions in the 1980s when it
came to public investment in education. To some extent, this reordering of the educational
landscape resembles patterns of development observed for other types of social policy in
the postwar period (see Danforth 2014; Huber and Stephens 2001).
When these educational expenditure figures are disaggregated by level, however, an-
other important pattern emerges. A look at the distribution of these expenditures between
the lower levels (preprimary, primary, and secondary (PPS)) and tertiary level (see Table
4.2 again) reveals that some countries prioritized tertiary education significantly more than
others did. In the period from 1950 to 1985, all countries saw their shares of expenditures
on tertiary education rise, but this shift went the furthest in the Anglo-settler countries. On
average, a country saw its tertiary expenditures share nearly double during this 35-year
period, ending up around 25 percent. Yet, for the Anglo-settler countries, this expenditure
share tripled, on average, to a level of 32 percent in 1985. Comparing figures on expen-
ditures per student (see Table 4.3) confirms the presence of a strong bias toward tertiary
education in these countries – on average; they devoted two to three times more resources
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to each tertiary student than each lower level student during the 1980s. Ireland, the United
Kingdom, and several continental European countries also showed a tendency to favor ter-
tiary education in this period of educational expansion. On the flip side, the Nordic coun-
tries developed less of a tertiary bias because they allocated substantially more resources
to the lower levels than their peers while maintaining modest expenditures at the tertiary
level. It is evident from these trends that resource distribution was a key distinguishing
factor among the education systems of advanced capitalist countries.
Turning from expenditures to enrollments as the basis for comparison brings to light
some other important developments in the selected education systems (see Table 4.1). The
series of aggregated enrollment rates for the PPS levels indicate that the prewar gap in
general education enrollments between Europe and the Anglo-settler countries quickly nar-
rowed in the first decades after World War II. Despite experiencing some significant growth
in tertiary enrollments, however, many European countries continued to be laggards on this
dimension. While the Nordic countries, Belgium, France, and Italy managed to catch up
with Australia and New Zealand, they remained well behind Canada and the United States
– the clear standouts at the tertiary level.
In the end, these divergent trends in generosity, distribution, and coverage led to the
formation of five distinct institutional patterns by the early 1980s. By this stage, the Nordic
countries had education systems that were notable for their higher levels of public expen-
ditures and stronger emphasis on PPS education. These countries provided more modest
support for tertiary education, but their enrollment rates at this level were among the high-
est in Europe. Although the Anglo-settler countries tended to have the highest levels of
tertiary enrollment, they were also exceptional for their smaller public investments in PPS
education and in education overall. Ireland and the United Kingdom also exhibited a strong
bias in public education spending away from the lower levels to the tertiary level, though
their tertiary participation rates were especially low rather than exceptionally high. The
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education systems of continental Europe had institutional qualities that fell between these
Anglo–Nordic extremes, with the Germanic systems having stronger resemblances to those
in the Anglo countries and the other systems having more similarities with those in the
Nordic countries.
4.2 Hypotheses
Having established that important differences emerged in the generosity, distribution,
and coverage of education in advanced capitalist countries during the early postwar era,
the question then becomes, what explains these differences? In addressing this question,
this study considers several competing sets of explanations related to democratic agency,
political institutions, and economic development (see Table 4.4). As has been mentioned
before and is discussed below, this study argues that differences in power resources and
constitutional structures were two key determinants of these cross-national variations in
education.
4.2.1 Political Agency
In accounting for postwar differences in education systems across affluent countries,
factors related to democracy and political agency are bound to figure prominently. While
democratic competition between different agents had existed in all of these countries prior
to World War II, it reached new heights in the postwar era as democratic representation and
stability in these countries continued to improve. In this reinvigorated political environ-
ment, the dominant competitors were typically parties and movements representing differ-
ent class-based interests, and they primarily battled with each other over policies affecting
socioeconomic matters. The distribution of resources among these competing groups has
therefore often been used to explain variation in postwar social policy (Huber and Stephens
2001), and this power resources logic is thought to be applicable to education as well. And
yet, it could be the case that the dramatic changes made to education systems in the postwar
era simply reflect the preferences of more politically and economically advanced societies.
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These competing theoretical perspectives on welfare state politics and their implications
for postwar education systems are elaborated below.
According to power resources theory, the development of education should reflect the
relative balance of power between class-based partisan forces over time. As discussed in
Chapter 1, the key partisan forces in this dominant political struggle are left parties, Chris-
tian democratic parties, and right parties. The relative power of these forces is determined
by their capacities to amass politically valuable resources: left power is largely tied to the
mobilization of the least advantage while right power is primarily derived from the ac-
cumulation of financial resources. Given their distinct sources of power and ideological
underpinnings, it is reasonable to expect these partisan forces to shape education systems
differently while in government.
Left Government. Given that left parties are chiefly concerned with improving the life
chances of the lower classes, they should be strong proponents of high generosity, balanced
distribution, and extensive coverage in public education, Recognizing that educational at-
tainment and economic success are strongly correlated, left parties seek to raise the skill
levels of the least advantaged through public investments in education. To maximize this
process of human capital development, left parties support the improvement of education
across all levels, from preprimary education to tertiary and continuing education. Fur-
thermore, left parties emphasize the dismantling of social segmentation and barriers in
education systems to enable more students to progress farther up the educational ladder
and thus weaken the link between social class and educational attainment. Besides signif-
icantly aiding their core constituents, these policy strategies also help left parties expand
their electoral bases because the middle class tends to view high-quality public education
as attractive alternative to more costly private alternatives (Busemeyer 2009).
Christian Democratic Government. While Christian democratic parties might favor in-
creases to the overall generosity of education, they are not expected to support reforms
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that upset existing class-based arrangements in this policy area. Recalling that Christian
democratic parties are generally structured as cross-class coalitions, they are likely to face
strong internal resistance to any proposed changes that erode class boundaries in education
systems. This resistance ought to be particularly strong in Christian democratic parties
with Catholic roots because Catholic social doctrine views social stratification as a natural
component of human society that should not be altered. Therefore, Christian democratic
governments should distribute educational resources in a manner that preserves or enhances
the class-based divisions associated with particular levels of education. Christian demo-
cratic governments might, however, allocate more resources to lower levels of education
if this is deemed necessary for maintaining a basic economic floor; despite their embrace-
ment of social stratification, Christian democratic parties also tend to be strong supporters
of poverty alleviation.
Right Government. Since right parties generally wish to preserve the educational advan-
tages enjoyed by elites, they should oppose most increases in the generosity and coverage
of public education and promote a distributional model that favors tertiary education over
other forms of education. For the most part, right parties do not want to eliminate public
education for the masses entirely, but they do seek to limit the scope of this basic entitle-
ment. These positions reflect a tension found within right parties between those who want
to supply businesses with adequate amount of skilled labor and those who want to keep
education systems restricted and under elite control. To ensure that benefits of public edu-
cation mostly accrue to elites, right parties prioritize tertiary education over other forms of
education in the allocation of public educational resources. This distributional arrangement
provides the masses with some educational opportunities, but they are less generous than
those given to elites.
In addition to the partisan elements described above, there are two other forms of po-
litical agency that potentially explain the divergent trajectories of education systems in the
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postwar period. As women entered national labor forces in ever-increasing numbers during
this period, they became an important force in the design and construction of new social
policies, some of which applied to education (Huber and Stephens 2000). On top of this
increasing mobilization of women, there was also a broader movement in affluent societies
toward more inclusive political participation. This broader incorporation of publics into the
political process created openings for new organized interests (Myles 1984), which in turn
created new pressures and demands on postwar welfare states, of which education systems
were central parts.
Women’s Mobilization. As women assume a larger role in modern economies, it is
expected that they will push for more generous, open, and extensive education systems.
Essentially all countries have histories of gender inequality in educational attainment and
economic outcomes, so women are likely to favor the expansion and improvement of edu-
cation at all levels as a way of combating these legacies. More extensive education systems
can also help women in balancing the demands of work and family, which makes these
types of systems even more attractive to women. Like other social services, education
is often delivered by women, so enhancements to education systems can be expected to
improve women’s employment prospects. When combined, these factors are likely to mo-
bilize women around education issues and should lead to broad expansions in education
systems over the long run.
Pluralism. The expansion of political participation in economically developed coun-
tries is also expected to generate broad growth in education systems. When societies in-
dustrialize, they often experience dramatic changes in core social institutions, such as the
workplace and the family. These social changes, in turn, usually engender new popular
demands for state-provided services, particularly in the area of education. Greater democ-
racy is likely to accentuate these demands because it gives the public more influence over
the governing process. Interest groups often play a key role in channeling these popular
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demands, and this is certainly the case for education. As states confront these demands for
education, they should respond by increasing public effort in the provision of all types of
education.
4.2.2 Political Institutions
Given the central role they play in shaping the opportunities and incentives presented
to political actors, political institutions are also likely to be important factors in explain-
ing postwar divergences in national education systems. As shown in Chapters 2 and 3,
differences in authority structures have contributed to the rise of distinct institutional ar-
rangements in secondary education, and a similar relationship might exist for other areas
of education. Prior research has, moreover, frequently emphasized the role of political in-
stitutions in influencing the long-term trajectories of other forms of social policy. When
it comes explaining cross-national differences in postwar education systems, territorial de-
centralization and veto points are two potentially important factors.
Since subnational governments are often involved in the financing and provision of
education, the level of authority granted to them is frequently viewed as an important de-
terminant of the quality and scope of public education. In theorizing this relationship,
the notion of interregional (and interlocal) competition is frequently identified as the main
causal mechanism, but there is significant disagreement over how this mechanism works.
On the one hand, it has been argued that giving subnational governments more authority
is harmful to education systems because it produces a “race to the bottom” (Castles 1998,
181). This view is based on the well-established logic that fiscal decentralization leads
to reductions in social expenditures because it increases competition between subnational
governments over taxes (Brennan and Buchanan 1980; Weingast 1995). On the other hand,
the exact opposite argument has also been made: granting subnational government more
authority engenders a “race to the top” (Busemeyer 2007, 589; 2008). According to this
argument, regions and localities primarily compete on the quality of their social benefits
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and services rather than the level of their tax rates. Based on these competing arguments,
it appears that the relationship between decentralization and the distributional aspects of
education is still not fully understood.
Territorial Decentralization. If one assumes that territorial decentralization can pro-
duce both positive and negative competitive effects, then it may not have a meaningful
impact on educational generosity and coverage in the aggregate. While some subnational
governments involved in administering public education might choose to compete on lower
taxes, others are likely to emphasize the quality of their services to attract citizens and cap-
ital. The pursuit of these different strategies are bound to increase regional disparities in
educational quality and access, but they are not likely to have a decisive impact on these
educational dimensions at the country level.2 At the same time, there is no reason to believe
that these competitive processes affect the lower and upper levels of education differently.
Therefore, territorial decentralization should not be associated with any particular cross-
level pattern of distribution in education.
In addition to territorial decentralization, constitutional structures are also sometimes
thought to be an important determinant of public effort and distributional patterns in ed-
ucation. While these two phenomena are obviously related – constitutions usually deter-
mine whether a system of governance is federal or unitary – constitutional structures have
stronger and more direct effects on the nature of the policy-making process and the poten-
tial for broad policy innovation. In particular, constitutional structures largely determine
the number and location of critical influence points in the policy-making process and the
ease with which minority interests can exploit these influence points to stall or block pol-
icy reforms (Immergut 1990, 1992). For most forms of social policy, these veto points are
commonly seen as inimical to the development of far-reaching reforms that benefit the less
2 It is well established that decentralization increases subnational disparities, but the social and economic
implications of this relationship continue to be debated (see, e.g., Oates 1972; Prud’Homme 1995; Tanzi
1996; Tiebout 1956).
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privileged (Huber and Stephens 2001; Huber, Ragin, and Stephens 1993). Yet, it remains
unclear whether this logic holds for education as well. In the limited research that has been
done on this issue, the findings have been mixed: some studies have found a negative asso-
ciation between veto points and distributional aspects of education systems (e.g., Cameron
and Hofferbert 1974) while others have detected a positive association (e.g., Busemeyer
2007; Huber and Stephens 2014). Moreover, none of this existing research seriously con-
siders the mechanisms that connect veto points to educational outcomes.
Veto Points. Given their tendency to hinder major policy changes and reinforce the
status quo in social policy, veto points should support the development of tertiary-skewed
distributional arrangements in education systems. As discussed in Chapter 1, veto points
generally hinder efforts to improve lower-level education more than efforts to advance ter-
tiary education. This asymmetrical effect exists for three reasons.
First, veto points tend to be more numerous in the policy-making process for prepri-
mary, primary, and secondary education compared to that for tertiary education. This is
because, when authority over education is divided across different levels of government,
authority over PPS education is usually assigned to local and regional governments while
authority over tertiary education is typically given to regional and central governments.
Given that lower levels of government are almost always comprised of more jurisdictions
than higher levels of government, the policy process for PPS education should involve
more institutions than the policy process for tertiary education. When this dispersion of
authority among levels, jurisdictions, and institutions is constitutionally guaranteed, then
there are many opportunities for minority interests to block and delay broad improvements
to PPS education than tertiary education, which in turn should contribute to disparities in
development between these two educational levels.
Second, by hindering broad change to education policy, veto points favor a status quo
that already provides tertiary education with many advantages. With their historically
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strong ties to elites, tertiary education institutions have often been given high levels of
state support relative to the smaller-sized populations they have served. Proposed reforms
that aim to reduce this disproportionate public support are likely to face significant resis-
tance in a policy-making process containing many veto points because beneficiaries of the
existing tertiary bias and other interest groups have more opportunities to intervene and
stop broad changes.
Third, when there is competition between educational interest groups for public re-
sources, veto points enhance the influence of elite-oriented groups and weaken the power
of mass-oriented groups. Lower-level education and tertiary education tend to be repre-
sented by separate interests groups that, among other things, seek to increase the allocation
of public resources to the respective levels they represent. Although they are not always
competing for the same resources, elite-oriented groups tied to tertiary education are likely
to have the upper hand when there is such direct competition. This is because veto points
provide advantages to those groups with more resources, both financial and organizational.
In the case of education policy, elite-oriented groups tend to be better funded and more
cohesive than their mass-oriented counterparts, especially in earlier phases of educational
development.
All in all, these three mechanisms imply that veto points should favor the development
of education policies that reinforce existing inequalities in education systems. This means
that veto points should help reinforce distributional arrangements that are skewed away
from the PPS levels and toward the tertiary level.
4.2.3 Economic Development
Industrialization, globalization, and other forms of economic change have also been
frequently identified as causes of educational growth and reform. Human capital theory
has established that educational advancement and economic development are inextricably
linked – one cannot occur without the other. This logic has been further developed and
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extended to explain cross-national differences in the systems that provide education. In ad-
dition, as countries become increasingly integrated into a global, service-based economy,
more attention has been paid to international factors as drivers of change in education sys-
tems. According to these strands of thinking, differences in national affluence and trade
openness likely account for some of the cross-national variation observed in postwar edu-
cation systems.
National Affluence. As countries become wealthier, their states should invest more in
education and increase its coverage, particularly at the higher levels of education. It is well
established that countries develop more generous welfare states as they become more afflu-
ent (Wagner’s Law; see also Kerr et al. 1960; Wilensky 1975), and this relationship is likely
to apply to education systems as well. Given that continued improvements in educational
attainment are usually necessary for sustained economic development, countries can be ex-
pected to expand their offerings at higher levels education as they reach more advanced
stages of development. Therefore, for the late industrial stage – the stage that affluent so-
cieties reached in the early postwar era – countries can be expected to place increasingly
more emphasis on tertiary education relative to other forms of education.
Trade Openness. A higher degree of trade openness should also increase the demand
for more generous and extensive public education and lead to significant growth in tertiary
offerings. The reduction of trade barriers exposes national economies to more competitive
forces and technological change, which in turn spurs internal demands for compensations
from the state in the form of expanded social benefits and services (Cameron 1978; Garrett
1998; Katzenstein 1986; Rodrik 1997). Given that education is essential for improving
human capital and thus the economic competitiveness of domestic workers, it is likely
to be a prominent component of any compensatory policy package provided by the state.
The resulting improvements in education should be broad based, affecting all levels of
education, because of the progressive nature of educational attainment: to reach higher
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levels of education systems, individuals must first complete the lower levels. However,
if tertiary education is relatively underdeveloped compared to other forms of education –
as was the case in rich societies after World War II – then there is likely to be a stronger
emphasis on expanding this part of the education system.
4.2.4 Education-Training Regimes
The distinct education-training regimes that developed at the secondary level during the
prewar era should also have some lasting effects on the evolution of education systems in
the postwar era. As discussed in Chapter 2, these regimes represent different institutional
mixes of general education and vocational training. Given that general education at the sec-
ondary level is usually designed to prepare students for higher education while vocational
training at the same level is not, one would expect there to be less demand for educational
expansion at the tertiary level in education systems that emphasize vocational training. At
the same time, vocational training encourages students to make an earlier transition from
education to work, so this might depresses PPS enrollment rates. In addition, these regimes
are associated with different rates of growth in secondary education for the prewar period.
The momentum from this prewar growth should also influence the demand for educational
expansion in the postwar period. Therefore, the education-training regime characterized by
rapid growth in general education – the regime associated with the Anglo-settler countries
– can be expected to have a strong positive effect on educational coverage in the postwar
era. For the other regimes, this effect should be more muted or negative in the case of the
Anglo-Irish regime.
4.3 Methodology
The above hypotheses on the postwar development of public education are assessed
using an analytical approach similar to that employed in Chapter 2: cross-national data
for 17 advanced industrialized societies for the period from 1950 to 1985 are examined
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for correlational relationships using statistical techniques. As mentioned before, this 35-
year period has been selected because it represents the main phase of welfare expansion
among rich democracies and a crucial stage in the development of the education systems in
these countries. Quantitative analysis of the cross-national differences in education systems
that emerged during this postwar period will provide the first initial test of this study’s
theoretical claims and alternative explanations. The specifics of this quantitative analysis –
the data and techniques used – are provided below.
4.3.1 Data
The variables identified in the theoretical section are operationalized using a combina-
tion of new measures of education systems and extended measures of political economy
for the postwar period. The education measures come from an original dataset that has
been assembled to rectify a notable dearth of comparative data on education and train-
ing. While some cross-national data on these policy areas have become available from
organizations like the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
UNESCO, and World Bank, the historical coverage of these data are often quite limited
and contain significant gaps. The new dataset used in this study has been constructed to
address these shortcomings in coverage and incorporate new institutional indicators. Simi-
larly, the political economy measures are augmented versions of several measures included
in the Comparative Welfare States Dataset. The starting year for this dataset is 1960, so
the measures taken from it have, where possible, been extended back to 1950. A list of the
specific measures of education systems and political economy used in this particular study
and their summary statistics can be found in Table 4.5, and more specific details about the
construction of these measures and their sources are provided in Appendix C.
With respect to geographical and temporal coverage, the data for this study cover 17
rich democracies for the period from 1950 to 1985.3 Most of these data are available for
3 As in Chapter 2, the 17 countries examined include: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the
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the entire period from 1950 to 1985, but some gaps exist – mostly in observations for the
first decade, the 1950s. As a consequence, several of the analyses presented in this study
only cover the years from 1960 to 1985 due to missingness in the outcome variable.
To capture the development of education systems in the early postwar era, several mea-
sures of educational generosity and coverage are employed. As the broadest measure of
public effort in the provision of education, total public expenditures on education as a per-
centage of GDP is employed. While this study is by no means the first to use this measures
as an outcome variable in a comparative analysis of education systems, it does have the ad-
vantage of having a more extensive and complete data series for this measure. Most prior
inquiries have had to limit their scope to the years after 1970, but, with its extended data,
this study is able to peer back to the beginning of the postwar era. Likewise, the coverage of
education systems is assessed using an extended set of enrollment rates. These enrollment
rates have been constructed in a similar fashion to those used in Chapter 2 and represent the
number of students enrolled in a given level of education per 1,000 people in the relevant
age group.
In order to gauge how public resources are distributed among different levels of educa-
tion systems, two sets of measures are used. The first set consists of the shares of current
expenditures on public education allocated to two different levels: the aggregate of prepri-
mary, primary, and secondary (PPS) education on the one hand and tertiary education on
the other.4 These two measures have been constructed so that they sum to 100 percent.5 As
United Kingdom, and the United States.
4 Expenditures on education are often broken down into capital expenditures and current expenditures. Cur-
rent expenditures are spending on goods and services that are consumed within a year (e.g., teacher and staff
salaries, basic supplies, etc.) while capital expenditures are spending on more permanent things (e.g., build-
ings, equipment, etc.). On average, roughly 80 to 90 percent of total expenditures on education is classified
as current expenditures.
5 This measure construction reflects the fact that expenditures categorized as adult education, other, and
undistributed have been excluded. These categories typically represent a small portion of current expenditures
(usually 0 to 10 percent).
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for the second set, measures of expenditures per student at the PPS and tertiary levels pro-
vide additional points of cross-national comparison. These public support ratios provide a
good indicator of generosity by level of education (Lindert 2004).
For the hypothesized determinants of these outcomes in education, conventional mea-
sures are used to operationalize the variables dealing with political agency. To capture
the long-run impact of different partisan forces on the post-war trajectories of education
systems, cumulative measures of left, Christian democratic, and right government partici-
pation are used. These measures are constructed by summing the share of legislative seats
held by different parties in government from 1945 to the year of observation, with the par-
ties classified into different types (i.e. left, center, right, etc.). Women’s participation in the
labor force serves as the measure for women’s mobilization because it has been shown to
be a good proxy of women’s power and involvement in contemporary politics (Huber and
Stephens 2000).
The political institutional variables are operationalized using two composite indexes.
For territorial decentralization, the Regional Authority Index (RAI) developed by Hooghe
et al. (Hooghe, Marks, and Schakel 2008, 2010; Hooghe et al. 2014) is employed. This
index is preferable to other common measures of decentralization, such as the binary mea-
sures of federal and unitary government, because it is dispersion of authority between the
national and regional levels. Unlike other measures of the same class, the RAI index does
not simply focus on the structures of authority enshrined in constitutions but also those
established by law. Given that laws change more frequently than constitutions, this broad
conceptual scope makes the RAI index a more sensitive measure. For veto points, an in-
dex that captures four constitutional features (federalism, bicameralism, presidentialism,
and judicial review) is used. This index of constitutional structures has been regularly em-
ployed in other studies of social policy (see Huber, Ragin, and Stephens 1993; Huber and
Stephens 2001).
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The variables associated with economic development are measured using a set of well-
established indicators. Level of national affluence is captured by the logged real GDP per
capita in constant international dollars. The sum of exports and imports as a percentage of
GDP is used to measure trade openness.
A set of dummy variables is used to capture the potential effects of education-training
regimes at the secondary level. The regime type associated with Ireland and the United
Kingdom (limited general education) is used as the base category. The other three cate-
gories are: the Nordic and westernmost continental countries (school-based training); the
Germanic countries (firm-based training); and the Anglo-settler countries (extensive gen-
eral education).
In addition to these more theoretically relevant economic measures, three other eco-
nomic measures are included as basic controls. A measure of military expenditures as a
percentage of GDP is added to capture any potential trade-off between support for this
state function and spending on public education. Given that social expenditures are sensi-
tive to changes in inflation and unemployment, measures for these economic phenomena
are also incorporated.
Recognizing that demand factors also shape expenditures and enrollment patterns in
education, demographic controls are employed as well. The primary type of measure used
for this purpose is the share of population belonging to a particular age group, with the
range of the age group determined by the level or levels of education under investigation.
These age groups include: ages 0 to 29 for all education, 15 to 29 for tertiary education, 0
to 19 for PPS education.
Great efforts have been made to assemble complete dataset for the analyses contained
in this study, but missingness remains an issue for several variables. As Table 4.5 indicates,
five variables have incomplete data series, with the level of missingness for these variables
ranging from 0.82 percent to 3.10 percent. To avoid dropping observations with missing
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data, which can severely bias regression estimates, multiple imputation is applied to the
working dataset with missingness. Drawing on practices and techniques first devised by
Rubin (1987) and later extended by Honaker and King (2010), 10 sets of imputed data are
generated prior to each individual analysis. Each estimation procedure described in the
next section is then applied to these datasets, and the 10 sets of results are subsequently
pooled together using formulas developed by Rubin (1987).
4.3.2 Estimation
To analyze the above set of data, the Prais-Winston variant of ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression is used. As discussed in Chapter 2, this technique represents the best,
though not perfect, approach to analyzing time-series cross-section (TSCS) data for long-
run divergences in the political economies of comparable countries. While the OLS es-
timator has many well-established drawbacks in estimating TSCS models, it does have
some qualities that can make it more suitable than popular alternatives. For this study, the
most important qualities of the OLS estimator are its ability to detect difference between
countries and its capacity to deal with time-invariant and sluggish explanatory variables.
Of the conventional estimators used to analyze TSCS data, the OLS estimator is most
capable of evaluating differences between cases. Given that TSCS data vary along two
dimensions – both time an space – the selection of an estimator has important implications
for how these effects are handled. Remembering that this study is mostly interested in ex-
plaining differences between relevant cases rather than changes within a typical case, some
estimators are not appropriate for this analysis. In particular, the fixed-effects estimator is
not a suitable choice because it includes, by design, a set of controls that eliminate between
effects (or “unit effects”) and isolate within effects. By contrast, the random-effects and
OLS estimators do not contain these controls and are thus capable of modeling both types
of effects using a weighted-average approach. Of these two estimators, the random-effects
estimator is less suited for capturing between effects because its averaging procedure gives
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more weight to within effects than between effects. OLS estimates do not exhibit such a
bias, which makes the OLS estimator the better, though not optimal, method for this study.
Besides having the strongest capacity to detect difference between countries, the OLS
estimator is suitable for analyzing variables featuring little to no change across time. A
number of the key predictors in this study are mostly or completely time invariant, so it
is essential to employ an estimator that can handle these kinds of variables. The fixed-
effects estimator is not appropriate for this type of application because its controls for unit
effects remove all time-invariant variation from TSCS data, leaving nothing behind to be
estimated. As a consequence, the random-effects estimator is often selected for analyses
involving time-invariant and rarely changing explanatory variables, but its use involves the
controversial assumption that unit effects are uncorrelated with all regressors. In an attempt
to overcome the problems associated with both of these estimators, the fixed-effects vector
decomposition (FEVD) method has been developed (Plu¨mper and Troeger 2007). Yet, de-
spite addressing the main shortcomings of the fixed-effects and random-effects estimators,
the FEVD technique suffers some major problems of its own. The most important of these
problems is its inconsistent treatment of between and within effects: time-invariant predic-
tors are estimated as between effects while time-varying predictors are estimated as within
effects. Given all of the issues with its alternatives, the OLS estimator looks most appro-
priate for this study, as it can easily model the effects of temporally sluggish and invariant
predictors.
In addition to employing a variant of the OLS estimator, this study uses a modeling
approach that focuses on levels rather than changes in identifying statistical associations.
The core hypotheses of this study deal with broad differences and long-term developments
in policy outcomes, so it is more reasonable to look at how levels in variables relate rather
changes in variables relate. Attempting to model these changes through dynamic specifica-
tions, such as lagged dependent variable (LDV) specification, would likely undermine the
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identification of these more encompassing, long-term relationships. Despite having some
statistical advantages, for instance, the LDV specification has been shown to bias the es-
timates of predictors toward zero (Achen 2000, 13; Plu¨mper, Troeger, and Manow 2005,
343), which can in turn lead to erroneous inferences. For these theoretical and methodolog-
ical reasons, dynamics are not explicitly modeled in this study.
Steps have also been taken to deal with several efficiency issues that are commonly as-
sociated with TSCS analysis. The Prais-Winsten procedure is used to control for the effects
of serial correlation on estimated standard errors. At the same time, panel-corrected stan-
dard errors are also incorporated into the modeling process, helping to reduce the effects
on contemporaneous errors and panel heteroskedasticity on error estimates (Beck and Katz
1995).
4.4 Results
The results of the regression analyses are reported in Tables 4.6–4.9. Table 4.6 presents
the results for the first outcome variable, total expenditures, while Tables 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9
contain the results for the outcome variables dealing with distribution, expenditures, and
enrollment by educational level. In these tables, multiple models are presented for each
outcome variable. For the expenditure-related variables (in Tables 4.6–4.8), these models
are: (I) a baseline analysis, (II) a model where the right government variable is introduced,
and (III) a model where the veto points variable replaces the regionalization variable. For
the enrollment-related variables (in Table 4.9), the model series is comprised of: (i) a base-
line analysis that includes the right government variable and controls for education-training
regimes and (II) a model where the veto points variable is swapped with the regionalization
variable. To aid in interpreting the results, standardized versions of the estimates contained
in each final model (III or II) are presented in a series of graphs (see Figures 4.1–4.6) and
included in the discussion below.
Looking first at the results for total public expenditures on education (see Table 4.6,
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particularly model III, and Figure 4.1), the estimates confirm that long-term partisan trends
have strongly influenced the overall generosity of education systems. As predicted, left
and Christian-democratic government participation are both positively associated with this
aggregate variable, and the relative magnitude of the left effect is larger than the Christian
democratic one. In particular, a two standard deviation increase in left involvement would
be expected to produce a 1.75 percentage point jump in total public expenditures on educa-
tion as a percentage of GDP. For an equivalent shift in Christian democratic involvement,
the expected increase in the outcome variable is a more modest 1.23 percentage points.
While left and Christian democratic government participation have statistically significant
effects, right government involvement is not shown to have any meaningful association with
total education expenditures.6 This result is consistent with the non-positive relationship
hypothesized for this variable.
With the exception of the youth population variable, the remaining variables have ef-
fects that are magnitudinally weaker or statistically insignificant. As expected, women’s
labor force participation is positively related to total public expenditures on education, but
this relationship has less weight than those involving left and Christian democratic govern-
ment – its comparable effect size is only 0.69 percentage points. In addition, the estimates
for the regionalization and veto points variables are not significant, which corroborates this
study’s contention that these factors are irrelevant in explaining aggregate expenditure pat-
terns. Contrary to the hypothesis for pluralism, voter turnout has a negative association
with the total expenditures variable. The results for GDP per capita suggest that there is
a positive yet weak association between national affluence and aggregate expenditures in
the area of education. Among the control variables, only the estimate for youth population
is large and significant, having a comparable effect size of 1.51 percentage points. This
result supports the uncontroversial notion that demographic demands partly drove the early
6 In determining the statistical significance of estimates, the conventional 0.05 threshold for p-values is used.
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postwar expansion of modern education systems.
The distributional analyses of education by level reveal some interesting partisan and
institutional patterns. As anticipated, left government participation is shown to have no
meaningful effect on the overall distribution of public resources between the PPS levels and
the tertiary level (see Table 4.7 and Figure 4.2). Similarly, the effect of Christian demo-
cratic government involvement is statistically indistinguishable from zero in all of these
distributional analyses, matching the expectation that Christian democratic rule produces
little to no distortion in the distribution of expenditures across levels. Right government
participation, on the other hand, is shown to have a significant effect on the allocation of
resources between lower and upper levels of education. Holding all else equal, a two stan-
dard deviation increase in this variable is associated with a 5.49 point decrease in the PPS
share of total spending and a 5.25 point rise in the tertiary share. The net effect of right
government is, therefore, to skew public education spending away from the PPS levels and
toward the tertiary level. As theorized, increasing numbers of veto points also appear to
contribute to this tertiary bias – the veto points variable has significant and opposite asso-
ciations with the two distributional indicators. In terms of comparable effect size sizes, the
veto points variable is associated with a 2.50-point decrease in the PPS share and a 2.21-
point increase in the tertiary share. The statistically insignificant result for regionalization
gives credence to the idea that this institutional bias stems more from opportunity structures
than interregional competition.
Of the remaining predictors, only the affluence and demographic variables have statis-
tically significant effects. None of the estimates for women’s labor force participation and
voter turnout are significant, which supports the notion that women and publics do not in-
herently favor spending on one level of education over another. The positive and significant
associations detected for GDP per capita and youth population in the tertiary share models
do imply, however, that societies place a greater emphasis on tertiary education relative
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to PPS education as they reach more advanced stages of economic development and de-
mographic change. Increases of two standard deviations in these variables are expected to
generate upward shifts in the tertiary share of 4.66 and 2.60 percentage points, respectively.
The results for the models of public expenditures on education by level further indicate
that partisan factors influence the funding of education at different levels. The analyses of
spending per student at the PPS levels (see Table 4.8) show that left and right government
participation have opposite effects on this indicator of generosity, with the left effect being
positive and the right effect being negative. Christian democratic government involvement
also has a positive association with per student spending at the PPS levels, which suggests
that concerns about social risks outweigh concerns about social change in Christian demo-
cratic thinking on PPS education. For both the Christian democratic and left government
variables, however, the statistical significance of the estimates falls slightly below the con-
ventional 0.05 threshold when the right government variable is included. This implies that
the effect for right government participation is more robust than those for the other two
partisan variables. In the set of analyses for the tertiary level, there are less discernible
partisan trends. Only the estimate for left government, which is correctly signed in all of
the models, reaches statistical significance in one of the three models. Although they are
not significant in any of these models, it is interesting to note that the estimates for Chris-
tian democratic government involvement are consistently negatively signed while those for
right government involvement are positively signed.
Turning to the estimates for the institutional variables, it appears that constitutional
structures still matter more than territorial decentralization in predicting public generosity
in education. The estimates for regionalization are not significant in any of the models for
either the PPS levels or the tertiary level, and the PPS estimates are negatively signed. To-
gether, these results further undermine the notion that practical decentralization influences
aggregate education spending. By contrast, the estimates for veto points are all correctly
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signed – negative for the PPS levels and positive for the tertiary level – and are statistically
significant or very close to significant. Although it does not meet the conventional 0.05
threshold, the estimate for constitutional veto points does has a relatively low p-value of
0.055 and thus should not be completely discounted.
Only a few of the remaining theoretically relevant variables are shown to have meaning-
ful associations with the spending indicators for the PPS and tertiary levels. The estimates
for women’s labor force participation are only significant for the PPS models, and they
consistently suggest that women’s mobilization is positively related to public spending on
PPS education. Voter turnout is not found to have a statistically meaningful relationship
with spending in either two levels examined, whereas trade openness is determined to have
an expansionary effect on spending on PPS education. This latter finding supports the
hypothesis that public education spending can be used to compensate for heightened eco-
nomic competition, but it is interesting to find that this logic is not applicable to tertiary
education. Similarly, the estimates for GDP per capita are not uniform across both levels
– they are positive in the PPS models and negative in the tertiary models. These findings
suggest that the convergence in per-student spending across the two education categories
observed across all countries (see the spending ratios in Table 4.3) can partly be attributed
to continued economic development.
A comparison of the relative effect sizes for the above explanatory variables is provided
in Figures 4.3 and 4.4. Of the included political variables, women’s labor force participa-
tion has the largest absolute effect on per student spending at the PPS levels. A two standard
deviation increase in this variables is expect to generate a 3.71 percentage point increase in
this indicator of generosity. While right government involvement also a significant effect
on this outcome variable, the comparable size of its negative effect is smaller at 2.18 points.
In the model of per student spending at the tertiary level, left government participation has
a smaller effect than veto points, though both are strong. The comparable effects of the
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left government and veto point variables on this indicator of generosity are 12.70 points
and 16.35 points, respectively. Overall, these political effects are higher or comparable in
size to those of the statistically significant economic and demographic variables for these
expenditures models.
When it comes to explaining differences in enrollment rates, the political agency vari-
ables are shown to be more important the political institution ones. The results in Table
4.9 indicate that left government participation has a significant and positive effect on the
enrollment rates at both the PPS levels and tertiary level. While Christian democratic and
right government participation are not shown to have any meaningful associations with
the PPS enrollment variable, the Christian democratic variable is a positive and significant
predictor of tertiary enrollment while the right variable is not. All of these results, except
the positive relationship between Christian democratic government and tertiary enrollment,
are consistent with this study’s hypotheses. Likewise, as anticipated, neither of the institu-
tional factors considered – regionalization and veto points – has a statistically meaningful
association with either outcome variable.
It is interesting to note that education-training regimes have some significant effects on
postwar educational developments. Holding all else equal, switching from an education
system that features limited general education at the secondary level to one that has exten-
sive school-based training at the secondary level is associated with a 50.749 decrease in
the PPS enrollment rate. A switch to a system with extensive firm-based training is also
expected to have a negative effect, though this effect is not consistently significant. For
tertiary enrollment, a switch from a system with limited general secondary education to
one with extensive general secondary education is associated with a 60.400 increase in the
enrollment rate. All of these results are consistent with the hypotheses developed earlier.
The influence of the remaining explanatory variables on enrollment rates looks fairly
limited, particularly for the PPS levels. The estimates for women’s labor force participation
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and voter turnout are only statistically significant in the models of tertiary enrollment, and
the sign of the latter is unexpectedly negative. The results for GDP per capita are positive
and mostly significant in both sets of enrollment analyses, and unemployment is found to
be a meaningful predictor of tertiary enrollment.
The comparative effect sizes for the enrollment analyses are depicted in Figures 4.5 and
4.6.7 Between left government participation and GDP per capita, the former has a slightly
larger effect on PPS enrollment rates than the latter. More specifically, a two standard de-
viation increase in left government participation is associated with 40.02 point increase in
this enrollment rate while a similar shift in GDP per capita is expected to produce a more
modest 34.52 point increase. Looking at the standardized magnitudes for the predictors of
tertiary enrollment rates, it is apparent that Christian democratic government involvement
and women’s labor force participation are strongest of the political variables. Their com-
parable effect sizes are 23.30 points and 26.72 points, respectively, and they are notably
larger than the 15.20 points for left government and -10.54 points for voter turnout. None
of these political effects are quite as large at the effect of GDP per capita, which has an
effect size of 35.73 points.
4.5 Discussion
Broad advancements were clearly made in the extension of mass education after World
War II, but some countries were more ambitious than others in their efforts to enhance and
democratize this essential element of modern welfare states. In the Nordic countries and
elsewhere in Europe, strong efforts were made to expand educational offerings across the
life course and to open educational opportunities to all citizens. By contrast, in other parts
of Europe and the Anglo-settler countries, the push for expansion in education was more
muted and less sweeping. As a result of these inconsistent efforts, significant differences
7 To show the relative effect size of left government, the graph for tertiary enrollment is based on model I
rather than model II. A graph based on model II would essentially be the same except the left government
effect would be gone.
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emerged in the generosity, distribution, and coverage of education systems found in these
advanced capitalist countries.
This study shows that differences in partisan government participation and veto points
in policy-making are the key political factors in accounting for these divergences. A long
history of left government is found to have strong and positive effects on the generosity and
coverage of education systems. Christian democratic government incumbency also appears
to have positive effects on the overall generosity of education systems, but not to the same
extent as the left case. This difference becomes more visible when one looks at generosity
by level of education: while left government participation is positively associated with gen-
erosity across all levels of education, Christian democratic government involvement only
has a positive effect on generosity of lower levels of education. Although it is not found
to influence the overall generosity of education systems, right government participation
has significant effects on the distribution of resources within these systems. A long record
of right rule is associated with a distributional arrangement that increasingly emphasizes
tertiary education at the expense of preprimary, primary, and secondary education. Politi-
cal systems with many veto points also appear to make education systems more prone to
developing tertiary biases in their allocation of public resources.
These results add weight to notion that distributional considerations played a central
role in shaping the long-term development of education systems. Despite being widely
accepted as a social right, education was not immune to the class-driven left-right dynamics
that largely defined early postwar politics in rich democracies and elsewhere. Given their
well-known proclivity for generosity and universalism in social policy, it is not surprising
to find that left parties were at the forefront of efforts to expand and improve educational
opportunities across all levels of education. In the decades after the war, many social
democratic parties and other left parties increasingly embraced the idea of using education
as instrument for social change. In Sweden and the other Nordic countries, where social
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democratic parties were particularly active in educational reform, they spearheaded efforts
to remove the last vestiges of parallel education and to make education more accessible and
applicable for a modern democratic society.
Christian democratic governments
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4.6 Tables and Figures
Table 4.1: Enrollment Rates by Educational Level in Advanced Capitalist Soci-
eties, 1950–1985
Preprimary/Primary/Secondary Tertiary
Country 1950 1960 1970 1980 1985 1950 1960 1970 1980 1985
Austria 675 664 679 708 768 26 37 59 102 128
Germany 724 702 800 714 754 17 30 64 97 99
Switzerland 631 654 687 804 820 24 34 54 84 105
Mean 677 673 722 742 781 22 34 59 95 111
Belgium 732 827 764 781 790 16 47 87 125 162
France 643 749 732 757 772 22 55 96 124 146
Italy 477 557 695 725 737 18 35 86 127 129
Netherlands 730 747 721 783 799 38 62 101 143 156
Mean 617 684 716 755 770 26 51 94 131 144
Denmark 584 728 750 809 840 31 46 96 139 145
Finland 611 698 739 812 827 23 58 68 160 166
Norway 624 721 902 765 750 17 63 81 123 147
Sweden 653 775 765 742 753 19 41 116 179 154
Mean 629 731 802 773 776 20 54 89 154 156
Ireland 685 761 850 706 728 19 32 60 83 109
United Kingdom 694 762 785 800 788 20 32 67 90 109
Mean 689 762 817 753 758 20 32 63 86 109
Australia 810 798 838 742 793 30 56 82 126 139
Canada 716 794 849 741 799 36 74 159 213 266
New Zealand 772 806 682 822 859 52 59 87 134 158
United States 799 818 809 768 775 103 131 233 272 306
Mean 762 806 780 777 811 64 88 159 206 243
Overall Mean 675 734 767 762 783 29 50 91 133 150
Note: The enrollment rates represent the number of students of all ages enrolled in the
respective levels of education per 1,000 persons aged 19 and under
(preprimary/primary/secondary) or 15–24 (tertiary).
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Table 4.4: Hypothesized Effects of Explanatory Variables on Education Systems
Explanatory Variable Overall PPS Ter PPS Ter PS Ter
Political Mobilization
Left Government + 0 0 + + + +
Christian Dem.
Government
0/+ 0/- 0/+ 0/+ 0/+ 0/- 0/-
Right Government 0/- - + - 0/+ 0/- 0/-
Women’s Mobilization + 0 0 + + + +
Pluralism + 0 0 + + + +
Authority Structures
Decentralization -/+ -/+ -/+ -/+ -/+ -/+ -/+
Veto Points 0/+ - + - + 0/- 0/-
Economic Development
National Affluence + - + + + + +
Trade Openness + - + + + + +
Education-Training
Regime
Dual / General Base Case
Dual / School - -
Dual / Apprentice - -
Single / General + +
Notes: [+] positive effect, [-] negative effect, [0/-] non-positive effect, [0/+] non-negative effect,
and the effects for dispersion of authority and training legacies are interactive; PPS is the
aggregate of the preprimary, primary, and secondary levels, Ter represents the tertiary level.
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Table 4.6: Determinants of Public Expenditures on
Education, 1950–1985
Variable I II III
Left Government 0.127** 0.129** 0.119**
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017)
Christian Dem.
Government
0.082** 0.084** 0.085**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Right Government 0.011 0.009
(0.014) (0.014)
Women’s Labor
Force Participation
0.030** 0.029** 0.030**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Voter Turnout −0.011 −0.011* −0.012*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Regional Authority 0.005 0.005
(0.009) (0.009)
Veto Points −0.062
(0.057)
GDP per Capita
(log)
0.697** 0.620* 0.758*
(0.253) (0.275) (0.297)
Trade Openness −0.005 −0.005 −0.006
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Military
Expenditure
0.004 0.005 0.005
(0.024) (0.0.024) (0.024)
Inflation 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Unemployment 0.066** 0.064** 0.064**
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Population Aged
29 and Under
0.188** 0.185** 0.179**
(0.028) (0.028) (0.027)
Constant −13.057** −12.250** −12.928**
Rho 0.901 0.895 0.894
R2 0.149 0.160 0.163
N 612 612 612
Pre/Pri/Sec is the aggregate of the preprimary, primary, and
secondary levels.
Figures in parentheses are standard errors.
Significance levels: * = 0.05, ** = 0.01, based on
two-tailed t-test.
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Table 4.7: Determinants of the Distribution of Public Expenditures on Education, 1950–
1985
Share Allocated to Pre/Pri/Sec Share Allocated to Tertiary
Variable I II III I II III
Left Government 0.043 −0.037 −0.089 0.051 0.046 0.088
(0.081) (0.078) (0.087) (0.074) (0.081) (0.081)
Christian Dem.
Government
−0.001 −0.081 −0.107 −0.038 0.055 0.066
(0.085) (0.078) (0.079) (0.076) (0.073) (0.071)
Right Government −0.374** −0.383** 0.362** 0.367**
(0.096) (0.098) (0.102) (0.100)
Women’s Labor
Force Participation
−0.060 −0.044 −0.034 0.035 0.016 0.005
(0.047) (0.044) (0.044) (0.054) (0.050) (0.050)
Voter Turnout −0.042 −0.040 −0.055 0.044 0.037 0.052
(0.037) (0.035) (0.037) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036)
Regional Authority −0.075 −0.117 0.058 0.090
(0.066) (0.063) (0.067) (0.066)
Veto Points −0.691* 0.610*
(0.299) (0.294)
GDP per Capita
(log)
−10.086** −7.075** −6.558** 9.098** 5.951** 5.688**
(1.432) (1.481) (1.527) (1.460) (1.535) (1.527)
Trade Openness 0.022 0.016 0.016 −0.025 −0.021 −0.019
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015)
Military
Expenditure
0.008 −0.010 −0.023 0.071 0.071 0.086
(0.145) (0.135) (0.137) (0.146) (0.139) (0.139)
Inflation −0.045 −0.037 −0.039 0.034 0.029 0.030
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020)
Unemployment −0.168 −0.085 −0.092 0.083 0.010 0.022
(0.082) (0.081) (0.082) (0.084) (0.084) (0.084)
Population Aged
19 and Under
−0.245 −0.235 −0.215
(0.179) (0.163) (0.165)
Population Aged
15-29
0.685** 0.592** 0.613**
(0.228) (0.211) (0.210)
Constant −192.896** 166.892** 162.350** −89.500** −59.711** −58.809**
Rho 0.902 0.883 0.890 0.897 0.892 0.889
R2 0.907 0.918 0.915 0.084 0.127 0.133
N 612 612 612 612 612 612
Pre/Pri/Sec is the aggregate of the preprimary, primary, and secondary levels.
Figures in parentheses are standard errors.
Significance levels: * = 0.05, ** = 0.01, based on two-tailed t-test.
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Table 4.8: Determinants of Public Expenditures per Student by Educational Level,
1950–1985
Expenditures on Pre/Pri/Sec Expenditures on Tertiary
Variable I II III I II III
Left Government 0.194** 0.090 0.063 0.389 0.491 0.865*
(0.061) (0.056) (0.057) (0.342) (0.358) (0.416)
Christian Dem.
Government
0.194** 0.104 0.106 −0.220 −0.097 −0.114
(0.062) (0.055) (0.055) (0.238) (0.275) (0.273)
Right Government −0.150** −0.152** 0.302 0.332
(0.043) (0.040) (0.312) (0.312)
Women’s Labor
Force Participation
0.173** 0.155** 0.162** −0.272 −0.253 −0.328
(0.049) (0.043) (0.043) (0.208) (0.210) (0.217)
Voter Turnout −0.040 −0.016 −0.035 −0.103 −0.119 0.043
(0.024) (0.021) (0.020) (0.173) (0.178) (0.171)
Regional Authority −0.013 −0.052 0.407 0.437
(0.044) (0.042) (0.266) (0.267)
Veto Points −0.406 4.516**
(0.210) (1.582)
GDP per Capita
(log)
0.322 2.836* 3.143* −17.508* −21.174* −26.442**
(1.148) (1.166) (1.109) (7.229) (8.277) (8.194)
Trade Openness 0.026* 0.032** 0.030** 0.056 0.056 0.075
(0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.078) (0.080) (0.082)
Military
Expenditure
0.004 0.061 0.039 1.705 1.612 1.546
(0.166) (0.151) (0.135) (0.929) (0.934) (0.948)
Inflation 0.011 0.025 0.020 0.097 0.090 0.127
(0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.148) (0.149) (0.148)
Unemployment 0.363** 0.399** 0.364** −0.809* −0.877* −0.632
(0.074) (0.069) (0.069) (0.411) (0.409) (0.421)
Population Aged
19 and Under
−0.010 −0.083 −0.079
(0.120) (0.107) (0.105)
Population Aged
15-29
1.897* 1.825 2.048*
(0.936) (0.936) (0.944)
Constant 3.313 −17.215 −18.482 183.050** 216.568** 245.569**
Rho 0.789 0.726 0.720 0.833 0.837 0.847
R2 0.371 0.441 0.449 0.236 0.236 0.243
N 442 442 442 442 442 442
Pre/Pri/Sec is the aggregate of the preprimary, primary, and secondary levels.
Figures in parentheses are standard errors.
Significance levels: * = 0.05, ** = 0.01, based on two-tailed t-test.
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Table 4.9: Determinants of Enrollment Rates by Educational
Level, 1950–1985
Pre/Pri/Sec Tertiary
Variable I II I II
Left Government 2.994* 2.726* 1.036* 0.634
(1.250) (1.281) (0.495) (0.500)
Christian Dem.
Government
0.694 1.050 1.616** 1.750**
(0.987) (0.902) (0.406) (0.374)
Right Government 0.580 0.372 0.788 0.506
(0.865) (0.844) (0.428) (0.410)
Women’s Labor
Force Participation
−0.722 −0.677 1.168** 1.273**
(0.524) (0.518) (0.214) (0.212)
Voter Turnout −0.355 −0.325 −0.481** −0.571**
(0.474) (0.453) (0.153) (0.160)
Regional Authority 1.438 0.615
(0.834) (0.353)
Veto Points 0.704 −2.583
(5.257) (1.961)
GDP per Capita (log) 36.963 42.100
** 43.570** 49.167**
(20.395) (19.354) (7.444) (7.522)
Trade Openness 0.319 0.317 0.064 0.065
(0.195) (0.194) (0.071) (0.069)
Unemployment −0.987 −0.746 2.062** 2.312**
(1.271) (1.262) (0.374) (0.383)
Population Aged 19
and Under
−0.925 −1.677
(1.979) (1.868)
Population Aged
15-29
1.945 2.192*
(1.037) (1.022)
Prewar Regimea
School-Based
Vocational
−52.901** −51.315** 4.356 7.692
(16.738) (16.713) (8.026) (7.781)
Firm-Based
Vocational
−67.582** −53.719 −30.032** −14.276
(26.637) (34.012) (9.891) (11.310)
Extensive General
Education
17.706 31.975 49.382** 60.440**
(23.672) (24.237) (9.689) (9.725)
Constant 449.037** 425.724** −430.931** −479.102**
Rho 0.804 0.799 0.827 0.912
R2 0.723 0.722 0.274 0.336
N 612 612 612 612
Pre/Pri/Sec is the aggregate of the preprimary, primary, and secondary
levels.
Figures in parentheses are standard errors.
Significance levels: * = 0.05, ** = 0.01, based on two-tailed t-test.
a Base case is the regime featuring limited general education (e.g.,
Ireland and the United Kingdom).
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Figure 4.1: Relative Effects of Explanatory Variables on Public Expenditures on Education
Share of Population
Aged 29 and Under
Unemployment
Trade Openness
GDP per Capita
Veto Points
Voter Turnout
Women's Labor
Force Participation
Right Government
Christian Dem.
Government
Left Government
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
Size of Effect
Note: Based on results for Model III in Table 4.6 and assumes a two standard deviation shift in each variable.
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Figure 4.2: Relative Effects of Explanatory Variables on Tertiary Share of Public Expendi-
tures on Education
Share of Population
Aged 15−29
Unemployment
Trade Openness
GDP per Capita
Veto Points
Voter Turnout
Women's Labor
Force Participation
Right Government
Christian Dem.
Government
Left Government
0 1 2 3 4 5
Size of Effect
Note: Based on results for Model III for tertiary education in Table 4.7 and assumes a two standard deviation
shift in each variable.
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Figure 4.3: Relative Effects of Explanatory Variables on Public Expenditures Per Student
at Preprimary, Primary, and Secondary Levels
Share of Population
Aged 19 and Under
Unemployment
Trade Openness
GDP per Capita
Veto Points
Voter Turnout
Women's Labor
Force Participation
Right Government
Christian Dem.
Government
Left Government
−2 0 2 4
Size of Effect
Note: Based on results for Model III for preprimary, primary, and secondary education in Table 4.8 and
assumes a two standard deviation shift in each variable.
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Figure 4.4: Relative Effects of Explanatory Variables on Public Expenditures Per Student
at Tertiary Level
Share of Population
Aged 15−29
Unemployment
Trade Openness
GDP per Capita
Veto Points
Voter Turnout
Women's Labor
Force Participation
Right Government
Christian Dem.
Government
Left Government
−20 −10 0 10
Size of Effect
Note: Based on results for Model III for tertiary education in Table 4.8 and assumes a two standard deviation
shift in each variable.
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Figure 4.5: Relative Effects of Explanatory Variables on Enrollment Rate at Preprimary,
Primary, and Secondary Levels
Share of Population
Aged 5−19
Unemployment
Trade Openness
GDP per Capita
Veto Points
Voter Turnout
Women's Labor
Force Participation
Right Government
Christian Dem.
Government
Left Government
0 10 20 30 40
Size of Effect
Note: Based on results for Model II for preprimary, primary, and secondary education in Table 4.9 and
assumes a two standard deviation shift in each variable.
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Figure 4.6: Relative Effects of Explanatory Variables on Enrollment Rate at Tertiary Level
Share of Population
Aged 15−29
Unemployment
Trade Openness
GDP per Capita
Veto Points
Voter Turnout
Women's Labor
Force Participation
Right Government
Christian Dem.
Government
Left Government
0 20 40
Size of Effect
Note: Based on results for Model I for tertiary education in Table 4.9 and assumes a two standard deviation
shift in each variable.
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5 CONCLUSION
This dissertation set out to explore why affluent countries in Europe, North American,
and Oceania have adopted different approaches to educating their citizens. Even though
the provision of extensive and generous mass education has become a hallmark of these ad-
vanced capitalist societies, they have followed remarkably different paths in reaching this
milestone, and they continue to exhibit significant variation in how they support and struc-
ture their education systems. This variation is particularly evident when one compares the
evolution of education systems in Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. Once the clear leader in the provision of general education, the German education
system is now best known for its highly developed system of apprenticeship-based voca-
tional training. The Swedish education system also provides extensive vocational training –
though typically through schools – but its most distinctive feature has become its high level
of public investment in education across the entire life course. While the American educa-
tion system was once recognized as a global pioneer in mass-oriented secondary education,
it now distinguishes itself by strongly emphasizing tertiary education. Unlike these three
other cases, the British education system has never been viewed as a major innovator in
mass education; rather, it has been deemed noteworthy for its historically underdeveloped
and highly stratified education system. As these four experiences show, education systems
have undergone significant change and experienced notable divergences, particularly over
the past century.
Throughout this dissertation, it has been shown that distributional politics underlie
many of the long-run divergences observed among the education systems of advanced
capitalist societies. Ever since the idea of mass education gained a foothold in modern
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politics, it has been the object of contestation between conservative elites and progressive
reformers. Both of these sides have long recognized that education is a key determinant of
economic success and social status in modern societies, and consequently they have waged
many battles over how education is to be distributed. Given their central roles in distribut-
ing education to new generations, education systems and their institutional designs have
attracted significant attention from both sides of this struggle over education. To preserve
their high levels of economic success and social status, elites have pushed for the construc-
tion of highly segmented education systems that restrict educational access for the masses.
By contrast, reformers have advocated for the development of broadly inclusive education
systems that encourage all segments of society to maximize their educational potential.
The balance of power between these two competing sides has largely determined whether
education has become more segmented or integrated over time.
5.1 Findings
These struggles over education and the ways in which it is structured have taken many
different forms. This dissertation has focused on two sets of political struggles that left
extensive and lasting imprints on the education systems found in affluent societies, namely
the struggles over the development of mass education at the secondary level and the strug-
gles over the development of mass education at the tertiary level. Although these two sets
of struggles occurred in different historical contexts, both of them were primarily driven by
concerns over the distribution of education.
Chapters 2 and 3 showed that variations in the prewar political struggles over secondary
education were responsible for the emergence of different mixes of general education and
vocational training. Using statistical techniques to analyze a new set of data on education
systems covering 17 countries for the period from 1880 to 1939, Chapter 2 found that these
variations stemmed from the interaction of two institutional factors: the structure of state
authority over general education and the strength of coordination legacies in vocational
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training. In its comparative historical analysis of educational development in Germany,
Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States during the nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries, Chapter 3 revealed that these two institutional factors had strongly shaped
the nature and success of the strategies employed by elites and reformers in their struggles
over secondary education.
The combined results of Chapter 2 and 3 provided substantial support for a new theory
for the emergence of distinct education-training regimes at the secondary level. According
to this theory, cross-national differences in educational authority and training legacies gave
rise to different political logics in the development of secondary education. In societies
where educational authority was highly dispersed, conservative elites attempted to redi-
rect pressures for educational expansion by promoting vocational training as a substitute
for general education. These diversionary efforts were only successful, however, in en-
vironments where preindustrial guilds had left strong traditions of non-state coordination
in training. Where educational authority was highly centralized, conservative elites were
less aggressive in establishing programs of vocational education for the working masses, as
they could stall or veto major educational reforms with democratizing effects. Yet, if strong
legacies of coordinated training existed, reform-minded actors found it possible to establish
school-based models of vocational training that were eventually adopted and propagated by
state authorities.
As seen in both Chapters 2 and 3, these varying political logics gave rise to four types of
education-training regimes at the secondary level. In some European countries, like Ger-
many, where conservative elites successfully revived guild-based traditions of vocational
training, educational expansion was largely confined to apprenticeship-based programs.
In other European countries, such as Sweden and the United Kingdom, where conserva-
tive forces adopted more defensive approaches to educational reform, restrained growth
occurred in general education. However, those countries among this group that inherited
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strong traditions of coordinated training also experienced some expansion in vocational
training, particularly the school-based variant. In the United States and other Anglo-settler
countries, where conservative elites could not easily steer education reform from above
and legacies of non-market coordination in vocational training were weak, general educa-
tion expanded unevenly but rapidly.
Chapter 4 revealed that postwar political struggles over education were responsible
for the emergence of different institutional configurations involving tertiary education and
lower levels of education. In defining these configurations, this chapter considered three
different dimension of education, namely generosity, distribution, and coverage. Focusing
on these three dimensions, Chapter 4 used statistical techniques to analyze another new
set of data on education systems covering the same 17 countries as before, but for the
early postwar period from 1950 to 1985. Based on this series of analyzes, the chapter
determined that variations in education along these dimensions were likely the product
of cross-national differences in partisan government participation and constitutional veto
points. In particular, this chapter showed that left government participation and, to a lesser
extent, Christian democratic government participation were associated with higher levels
of generosity in education, both overall and across different levels. At the same time,
the chapter found that right government involvement and strong veto points were strong
predictors of distributional arrangements in education that were skewed toward tertiary
education. Finally, the study showed that left government participation was associated
with higher enrollment rates across all levels of education. These varying trends gave rise
to many different patterns of v
5.2 Implications
What broader lessons do these findings offer for politics at large? While there is always
some risk in making broad generalizations based on the results of one research project,
three points stand out most clearly from this dissertation.
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First, to explain the long-term development of education systems, it is necessary to con-
sider how the different types and levels of education found in these systems are politically
related. Although functional demands, such as the increasing need for skilled workers,
have certainly spurred the development of education systems over the past two centuries,
politics have often determined how these functional pressures have been translated into
institutional outcomes. These politics have, in turn, been heavily shaped by existing distri-
butional patterns in education.
Second, the impact of constitutional structures on the development of education and
other forms of social policy is not necessarily fixed across time. While many studies have
found federalism, bicameralism, and other constitutional structures to be inimial to the
development generous and universal welfare entitlements, it should not be assumed that
this relationship holds in every context. As this dissertation shows, there are instances
where the dispersion of authority in policy-making has encouraged the growth of such
entitlements and limited the capacity of powerful minority interests to intervene. Based
on the patterns of educational development examined in this dissertation, it appears that
constitutional structures are most likely to have protective effects when a social policy is
relatively inexpensive to provide and does not benefit much from economies of scale. The
high school movements was able to expand rapidly across many areas of the United States
because early high schools required minimal amounts of public investment. As education
has become a more resource-intensive service, however, the benefits of dispersed authority
have been overwhelmed by new costs.
Third, when the types and levels of education systems are taken together with an un-
derstanding that education and other social policy vary across time, we can recognize a
broader view in which there are five worlds of education. This dissertation provides the
theory, methods, and framework for identifying those five worlds and provides a launch-
ing point for future studies of the development of education systems in advanced capitalist
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socities.
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A APPENDIX A: MEASURES FOR OUTCOME VARIABLES, 1880–1939
As emphasized before, one of the main contributions of this dissertation is its use of a
new set of cross-national data capturing the early development of education and training at
the secondary level. Prior research on this subject has produced many inferences about the
institutional differences found between advanced capitalist societies in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, but these inferences have mostly been made based on the
findings of narrow empirical analyses. By analyzing a broad set of cross-section time-series
indicators on education and training, this dissertation has been able to produce observations
and explanations that are, at least in theory, more generalizable and less conjectural.
Of course, the validity of these new observations and explanations is dependent on
the quality of the new data upon which they are based. As is the case for each step of
the scientific process, data collection is inherently vulnerable to error. This is particularly
true when data collection involves the construction of new quantitative measures, such
as those employed in this dissertation to operationalize the institutional development of
general education and vocational training at the secondary level. Devising measures for
these phenomena requires many steps, moving from general theory to specific coding, and
each step entails a number of decisions. Small changes in these decisions can potentially
produce large differences in the final scorings of institutional variables, so care must be
taken at each point in this process.
The purpose of this appendix is to describe the approaches used in constructing the
three measures of education and training that are analyzed as outcome variables in Chapter
2. Two of these measures are designed to capture the development of vocational training
while the third is used to assess the expansions of general education. This appendix dis-
cusses the conceptual foundation of these measures, lays out their core dimensions, and
summarizes the ways in which these dimensions have been operationalized. In tackling
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these interdependent steps, the overriding objective of this data generation process has been
to create schemes that validly capture the institutional variation in secondary education for
a large swath of space and time.
A.1 Concept
The main phenomenon examined in Chapter 2 is the institutional composition of sec-
ondary education. As education became a more prominent endeavor in human society,
a wide range of methods and rules were created to make it a more orderly and uniform
process and to ensure that it reached particular groups of people. This formalization of ed-
ucation became increasingly visible as more resources – buildings, personnel, equipment,
etc. – were dedicated to this social process. Moreover, as part of this formalization, distinct
types, or levels, of education were established to serve different purposes and populations.
One of these levels was secondary education, which could, to some degree, be found in all
of the more developed societies of the world by the onset of the nineteenth century.
Although its exact form varies from society to society, secondary education does have a
few features that are common to all societies. In the most basic sense, it is the stage of edu-
cation that lies in between elementary (primary) education and higher (tertiary) education.
Secondary education is distinguished from primary education by its stronger emphasis on
specialized learning. Instruction in secondary education is usually organized around dis-
tinct subjects or courses and it is typically provided by teachers with subject-specific train-
ing. Unlike in tertiary education, however, the subject-based instruction associated with
secondary education is not expected to produce extensive mastery of covered subjects. In-
stead, secondary education is meant to prepare students for either direct entry into work
life or additional education at the tertiary level. Given its position in the educational ladder,
secondary education is generally provided to older adolescents and young adults – those in
their second decade of life.
Secondary education can also be divided into to two basic types – vocational training
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and general education – based on the aims and content of particular programs. Vocational
training programs are structured to prepare students for specific occupations and trades, and
thus they tend to focus on the acquisition of skills that have direct applications in the labor
market. General education programs, by contrast, are designed to give students a basic set
of skills that are useful for continued learning in a variety of different settings – not just
one particular work environment. Although both of these types of secondary education can
lead to higher educational levels, vocational training tends to have more terminal routes
than general education, which means that vocational-training students are likely to enter
the labor force sooner than their general-education counterparts. General education at the
secondary often represents the most direct path to higher education.
A further distinction can be made between programs in secondary education in terms
of how they deliver instruction to students, with some programs emphasizing firm-based
instruction and others focusing on school-based instruction. In the firm-based approach,
students are educated through their involvement in work activities at real businesses and
other economic organizations. The nature and content of learning that occurs in this envi-
ronment is mostly driven by economic considerations, such as the skills need to perform
certain productive tasks. In the school-based approach, students are educated through their
participation in more theoretical and abstract lessons provided by schools and other similar
institutions. Learning in this school-based setting is guided by a wide range of factors that
often extend beyond economic practicalities. When this is the case, schools are not simply
designed to produce new cohorts of workers, but also new cohorts of citizens, scholars, and
other non-economic actors.
Combining these two distinguishing features – type and delivery – one can identify
three different forms of secondary education: firm-based vocational training, school-based
vocational training, and school-based general education. Firm-based vocational training at
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the secondary level is usually associated with apprenticeships, whereas school-based voca-
tional training is typically provided in freestanding technical schools or in distinct tracks
of integrated schools. School-based general education, which is found in all examined
societies, constitutes the default form of secondary education.
A.2 Dimensions
To create valid measures of abstract concepts, it is usually necessary to break the con-
cepts down into smaller parts, or dimensions. If measures are meant to connect concepts
with reality, than it is necessary to identify ways to draw connections from the general to
the specific. By splitting a concept into smaller pieces, it becomes more feasible to isolate
these connections and make better sense of them. Once these individual connections have
been established, one is on firmer ground to draw broader links between specified concepts
and the real phenomena they are purported to represent.
Although there is no standard method for selecting the dimensions for this process of
moving from abstraction to reality, a set of dimensions should satisfy three basic criteria
(De Leeuw 2005). First, the aggregate of the individual dimensions should closely reflect
the meaning of the specified concept. While it is often useful to decompose a concept into
smaller pieces, efforts should be made to ensure that this process does not significantly dis-
tort the meaning of the abstract concept being considered. Second, the dimensions should
be more concrete than the concept they are supposed to represent. As pointed out before,
the aim of this decomposition strategy is to move down the ladder of abstraction; so indi-
vidual dimensions should lie closer to reality. Third, the dimensions are relatively simple
and do not have many dimensions of their own. Otherwise, it can be difficult to estimate
these dimensions in a meaningful and consistent manner because there are two many mov-
ing parts. In sum, these three criteria offer benchmarks against which the quality of a set of
dimensions can be evaluated.
With these criteria in mind, three different dimensions have been devised to capture the
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institutional development of secondary education in its various forms: coverage, formality,
and intensity. These dimensions are briefly defined below (see also Tables A.1 and A.2).
• Coverage represents the extent to which a particular type of education system serves
a relevant subgroup in a given society. As an education system develops, it is likely
to broaden its reach across society and serve a large share of the population. When
it becomes accessible to nearly all members of the relevant segments of society, then
this education system is usually considered to be a mass system.
• Formality describes the degree to which a given type of education system offers
meaningful instruction to its target population. As discussed above, education tends
to become more formal as its scale increases. The establishment of dedicated schools
and training arrangements is often tied to or gives rise to efforts to improve the uni-
formity and standards of education.
• Intensity refers to the level of effort that relevant elements of a society devote to
building and maintaining a particular type of education system. An education system
can be expected to have a greater impact on human development as more resources
are put into it. Participation in education systems should also increase as education
systems become more established and better supported. Therefore, an education
system is not likely to reach mass status unless it receives significant backing from a
major public or private group.
Each of these dimensions captures a different yet important way in which an education
system can develop over time. Therefore, when the dimensions are aggregated together,
they should provide a valid representation of how a particular form of secondary education
has evolved, institutionally speaking, over time.
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A.3 Indicators
The selected dimensions outlined above are operationalized using a number of different
indicators. The purpose of an indicator is to convert a dimension into a form that can easily
be estimated using available empirical evidence. An indicator achieves this aim by pro-
viding a set of rules for gathering relevant information and summarizing this information.
An essential feature of an indicator is that can summarize information about an object in a
way that is inferential (Tal 2013). Given these characteristics then, the indicators presented
here are meant to link secondary education, broken down by type and dimension, to institu-
tional variation that can be readily estimated. Therefore, in the movement from the abstract
to the concrete in a concept like secondary education, choosing indicators represents the
final step.
Given that three different forms of secondary education are assessed in this dissertation,
separate sets of indicators must be devised for each of these forms. Firm-based vocational
training and school-based vocational training are treated similarly in this process, so most
of their indicators are similarly structured. For both of these forms of education, the indi-
cators are aggregated to create composite indexes. For general education, however, only
one indicator – an enrollment rate – is used. The details of these indicators and how they
were devised are discussed into separate sections, one focus on vocational training and the
other on general education.
A.4 Vocational Training Indexes
The indicators used to operationalize the three dimensions of each form of vocational
training are presented in Tables 1 and 2. These indicators are designed to be as concrete
as possible given the data that are available to estimate them. Each indicator is estimated
using a limited number of intervals, which adhere to the following principles.
First, each interval contains a set of necessary and sufficient conditions that must be
satisfied to receive a particular score. Second, the intervals are cumulative, meaning that
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each interval has attributes that build on those contained in the preceding interval. Third,
to greatest extent possible, the attributes of each interval have been made binary to reduce
ambiguity in the judgment process. Fourth, the intervals have equidistant spacing, which
means that a one-unit shift on one dimension is equivalent to a one-unit shift on another
dimension. Overall, these principles help ensure that the indicators are reliably estimated.
After these indicators are properly assessed, the score are used to derive indexes of institu-
tional development for the two respective form of vocational training. Each index is simply
the sum of the scores for the three dimensions; with each dimension being weighted the
same. Given that the indicator for each dimension ranges from 0 to 2 and there are three
dimensions, the composite index ranges from 0 to 6 with half-point increments. This index
serves
A.4.1 Scoring
The process of scoring cases involves collecting and analyzing information to assign
the cases numerical values. Although the indexes have been designed to reduce ambiguities
and enhance reliability, the need for some judgments remains unavoidable. When specific
judgments are required, it is important to be open and transparent about the approaches and
rationales used to make these judgments. The steps of this scoring process are as follows:
• Gather and interpret primary sources. The first step is to gather publicly available
sources that contain information relevant to the indicators discussed above. For the
most part, this involves finding and examining legal records to determine when cer-
tain institutional features came into existence and whether they were later modified or
eliminated. Given the limited resources of this research project, this form of data col-
lection remains fairly limited. Although some legal records from the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries have found their way on to the internet, most continue
to reside in print archives scattered around the globe. At the same time, the validity
of these sources is sometimes questionable – nineteenth-century record keeping was
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hardly free of errors and biases. Consequently, it can require significant time and ex-
pertise to interpret these particular sources and draw definitive conclusions. For these
reason, primary sources have mostly been used to identify the major legal milestone
in the development of the firm-based and school-based forms of training.
• Locate and consult secondary sources. The second step is to engage the secondary
literature to see what information other researchers have found and how they have
interpreted it. Secondary accounts of the development of training put together by his-
torians and other scholars represent the most accessible sources on this subject. For
the larger societies, such as France, Germany, and the United States, many schol-
arly works have produced on this subject. Even for smaller societies, such as the
Netherlands and Sweden, there are some books and dissertations that examine the
emergence and evolution of vocational training during this formative period around
the onset of the twentieth century. Where possible, enrollment and financial figures
are used to make and verify the estimates for the scope and provision dimensions,
respectively.
• Address ambiguities and gaps. The third step is to deal with the cases that have gray
areas or missing information.
• Adjudicate scores. The fourth step is to check and adjust scores to maximize the
integrity of the entire dataset.
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Table A.1: Scoring Scheme for Firm-Based Vocational Training
Coverage – Extent to which training is provided on a universal basis.
2.0 = Training is provided in essentially all parts of the country and covers most major
economic actors (usually backed by a national legal framework).
1.5 = Training is provided in most parts (i.e. localities and regions) of the country and covers
most major economic sectors (industry, construction, and others).
1.0 = Training is provided in many localities that are spread across many different types of
geographical areas (i.e. regions, urban and rural, etc.) and covers some economic sectors
(industry and construction).
0.5 = Training is provided in many localities, but these localities are concentrated in a few
regions or just urban areas (or rural areas) – limited to a few economic sectors.
0.0 = Training is non-existent or limited to some localities and a handful of occupations
sectors (e.g. construction trades).
Formality – Extent to which training emphasizes the acquisition of meaningful skills.
2.0 = Training is clearly defined, highly standardized, and strongly coordinated – meets all
four criteria listed below.
1.5 = Training Is well defined and highly standardized and/or coordinated – meet d) and two
of a), b), and c).
1.0 = Training Is well defined and moderately standardized and coordinated – meet d) and one
of a), b), and c).
0.5 = Training is largely vocational in nature, but not standardized – meet only d).
0.0 = Training is mostly improvised and varies significantly from one instance to another –
none of the four criteria are fully met. Criteria: a) standardized curriculum, b) professional
instructors (trained and certified masters), c) formal certification process, and d) emphasis
on acquisition of occupations-specific skills (50%+ of time) – not just used as cheap labor.
Intensity – Extent to which training is intensive, both in terms of time and resources.
Time
1.0 = Training is usually provided on a full-time basis in well-established apprenticeship (20
or more hours per week)
0.5 = Training is usually provided on a part-time basis (less than 20 hours per week), and it is
mostly delivered through formal apprenticeships.
0.0 = Training is provided on a part-time basis or more sporadically, and it is mostly delivered
in informal arrangements.
Resources
1.0 = Firms are principal financier of training
0.5 = Firms are one of several major financiers of training
0.0 = Firms are not significantly in funding training
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Table A.2: Scoring Scheme for School-Based Vocational Training
Coverage – Extent to which training is provided on a universal basis.
2.0 = Training is provided in essentially all parts of the country (usually backed by a national
policy framework).
1.5 = Training is provided in most parts (i.e. localities and regions) of the country.
1.0 = Training is provided in many localities that are spread across many different types of
geographical areas (i.e. regions, urban and rural, etc.).
0.5 = Training is provided in many localities, but these localities are concentrated in a few
regions or just urban areas (or rural areas).
0.0 = Training is non-existent or limited to some localities.
Formality – Extent to which training emphasizes the acquisition of meaningful skills.
2.0 = Training is clearly defined, highly standardized, and strongly coordinated – meets all
four criteria listed below.
1.5 = Training Is well defined and highly standardized and/or coordinated – meet d) and two
of a), b), and c).
1.0 = Training Is well defined and moderately standardized and coordinated – meet d) and one
of a), b), and c).
0.5 = Training is largely vocational in nature, but not standardized – meet only d).
0.0 = Training is mostly improvised and varies significantly from one instance to another –
none of the four criteria are fully met. Criteria: a) standardized curriculum, b) professional
instructors (trained and certified), c) formal certification process, and d) emphasis on
acquisition of occupations-specific skills (50%+ of time).
Intensity – Extent to which training is intensive, both in terms of time and resources.
Time
1.0 = Training is usually provided on a full-time basis in well-established schools (20 or more
hours per week).
0.5 = Training is usually provided on a part-time basis (less than 20 hours per week), and it is
mostly delivered through dedicated schools.
0.0 = Training is provided on a part-time basis or more sporadically, and it is mostly delivered
in informal school settings.
Resources
1.0 = State is principal financier of training.
0.5 = State is one of several major financiers of training.
0.0 = State is not significantly in funding training.
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B APPENDIX B: MEASURES FOR EXPLANATORY VARIABLES, 1880–1939
This appendix provides a more detailed overview of the measures used to operationalize
the explanatory variables in the analyses of education-training regime development (see
Chapter 2). For each measure, there is an entry containing a description of the measure, a
list of its sources, and a breakdown of its historical coverage by country.
Table B.1: Measures for Explanatory Variables, 1880–1939
Political Mobilization
Polity Score
The level of democracy in a political system, measured as a composite index. The main elements
of this index include the degrees to which chief executives are elected and constrained and the
levels of competition, openness, and participation in elections. The values of this measure range
from –10 (strongly autocratic) to 10 (strongly democratic), with 0 representing anocracy.
Source: POLITY IV Project (variable POLITY2) (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2011).
Coverage: 1880–1939 for Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States
(missing 1914, 1939 for Belgium); 1901–1939 for Australia; 1919–1939 for Finland; and
1922–1939 for Ireland.
Liberal–Socialist Government
The presence of a liberal or socialist head of government, measured as a binary outcome. The two
possible values for this measure are: 0 = conservative, Catholic/Christian democratic, fascist, or
other (typically monarch–appointed) head of government; 1 = liberal or socialist head of
government.
Source: Ansell and Lindvall 2013.
Coverage: 1880–1939 for Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States;
1901–1939 for Australia; 1918–1939 for Finland; and 1919–1939 for Ireland.
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Table B.1: Measures for Explanatory Variables, 1880–1939 (continued)
Union Density
The share of labor force participants who are trade union members, expressed as a percentage. The
membership totals used in computing this ratio are largely based on gross figures, which do not
exclude retired and inactive union members. Net figures are employed for France and the
Netherlands, as there are no gross membership series available for these two countries.
Sources: Trade Union Membership – Bain and Price 1980; Visser 1989, 1994; Crouch 1993. Labor
Force Size – Bain and Price 1980; Flora, Kraus, and Pfeening 1987; Visser 1989.
Coverage: 1880–1939 for Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States;
1901–1939 for Australia; 1919–1939 for Finland; and 1922–1939 for Ireland.
Social Cleavages
The extent to which social (i.e. non-economic) cleavages were present at the beginning of the
twentieth century, measured as a composite index. The main elements of this index include the
presence and strength of religious, ethno–linguistic/cultural, and urban–rural cleavages. The values
of this measure range from 1 to 3 with 0.5 increments.
Source: Martin and Swank 2012.
Coverage: 1880–1939 for Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States;
1901–1939 for Australia; 1918–1940 for Finland; and 1919–1940 for Ireland.
Economic Development
GDP per Capita
The gross domestic product per capita, expressed in 1990 international (Geary-Khamis) dollars
(PPP-adjusted, constant prices).
Source: Maddison 2010.
Coverage: 1880–1939 for Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States;
1901–1939 for Australia; 1918–1939 for Finland; and 1919–1939 for Ireland.
Share of GDP from Industry
The share of the gross domestic product attributable to domestic industrial production, expressed
as a percentage. The economic sectors associated with industrial production include:
Sources: Mitchell 2007b for Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway, and United
Kingdom; Australia, Haig 2001; Austria, Schulze 2000; Belgium, Smits, Woltjer, and Ma 2009;
Canada, Urquhart 1986 (for 1870–1926) and Leacy, Urquhart, and Buckley 1983 (for 1927–1940);
Finland, Hjerppe 1989; Netherlands, Smits, Woltjer, and Ma 2009; Sweden, Scho¨n and Krantz
2012; Switzerland, Ritzmann 2013 and Lechner et al. 2013; United States, Johnston and
Williamson 2012
Coverage: 1880–1940 for Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States;
1901–1939 for Australia; 1918–1939 for Finland; and 1919–1939 for Ireland.167
Table B.1: Measures for Explanatory Variables, 1880–1939 (continued)
Share of GDP from Industry
The share of the gross domestic product attributable to domestic industrial production, expressed
as a percentage. The economic sectors associated with industrial production include:
Sources: MItchell 2007c for Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway, and United
Kingdom; Australia, Haig 2001; Austria, Schulze 2000; Belgium, Smits, Woltjer, and Ma 2009;
Canada, Urquhart 1986 (for 1870–1926) and Leacy, Urquhart, and Buckley 1983 (for 1927–1940);
Finland, Hjerppe 1989; Netherlands, Smits, Woltjer, and Ma 2009; Sweden,Scho¨n and Krantz
2012; Switzerland, Ritzmann 2013 and Lechner et al. 2013; United States, Johnston and
Williamson 2012.
Coverage: 1880–1940 for Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States;
1901–1939 for Australia; 1918–1939 for Finland; and 1919–1939 for Ireland.
Trade Openness
The level of external trade as a share of economic output, expressed as a percentage (all figures at
current prices). This measure is calculated by dividing the sum of imports and exports by the gross
domestic product (i.e. (IM + EX)/GDP).
Sources: Imports and Exports – Mitchell 2007a,b; MItchell 2007c for all countries except: Canada,
Urquhart 1986 (for 1870–1926) and Leacy, Urquhart, and Buckley 1983 (for 1927–1939); Finland,
Hjerppe 1989; Italy, Baffigi 2011; Sweden, Scho¨n and Krantz 2012. GDP – Australia, Hutchinson
2012; Austria, Schulze 2000 and Maddison 1991 (for 1870–1913) and MItchell 2007c (for
1924–1937); Belgium, Smits, Woltjer, and Ma 2009; Canada, Urquhart 1986 (for 1880–1926) and
Leacy, Urquhart, and Buckley 1983 (for 1927–1940); Denmark, MItchell 2007c; Finland, Hjerppe
1989; France, ?; Germany, Flandreau and Zumer 2010 (for 1880–1913) and Bordo et al. 2001 (for
1914–1938); Ireland, MItchell 2007c; Italy, Baffigi 2011; Netherlands, Smits, Woltjer, and Ma
2009; New Zealand, New Zealand Long–Term Data Series 2013; Norway, Grytten 2004; Sweden,
Scho¨n and Krantz 2012; Switzerland, Halbeisen et al. 2013 (for 1880–1913) and Bordo et al 2001
(for 1914–1940); United Kingdom, Hills, Thomas, and Dimsdale 2010; United States, MItchell
2007c (for 1880–1888) (GNP), Sutch 2006a (for 1889–1929), and Sutch (2006b) (for 1930–1939).
Coverage: 1880–1939 for Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy,
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States (some missingness for Austria,
Belgium, Germany, 1901–1939 for Australia; 1918–1939 for Finland; 1924–1939 for Ireland; and
1885–1939 for Switzerland missing for New Zealand.
Territorial Area
The total territorial area, measured in square kilometers.
Source: Cross–National Time Series Data Archive (Wilson 2012).
Coverage: 1880–1939 for Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States;
1901–1939 for Australia; 1919–1939 for Finland; and 1922–1939 for Ireland.
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Table B.1: Measures for Explanatory Variables, 1880–1939 (continued)
Control
Share of Population Aged 5–19
The share of the total population aged 5–19, expressed as a percentage.
Source: Human Mortality Database (Wilmoth, Shkolnikov, and Barbier 2013); Mitchell 2007a,b;
MItchell 2007c.
Coverage: 1880–1939 for Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States;
1901–1939 for Australia; 1919–1939 for Finland; and 1926–1939 for Ireland.
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C APPENDIX C: MEASURES FOR ALL VARIABLES, 1950–1985
This appendix provides a more detailed overview of the measures used to operationalize
all of the variables in the analyses of educational generosity, distribution, and coverage in
the postwar era (see Chapter 4). For each measure, there is an entry containing a description
of the measure, a list of its sources, and a breakdown of its historical coverage by country.
Table C.1: Measures for All Variables, 1950–1985
Educational Generosity
Public Expenditures on Education
Public expenditures on education (all levels), as a percentage of GDP.
Sources: Expenditures – UNESCO 1963–1990, 2013; Wilmoth, Shkolnikov, and Barbier 2013.
GDP – Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer 2013.
Coverage: 1950–1985 for all countries.
Educational Distribution
Share of Public Expenditures on Education Allocated to the PPS Levels
Share of public expenditures on education devoted to the preprimary, primary, and secondary
levels, expressed as a percentage. The sum of this variable and the one following it is 100 percent.
Source: UNESCO 1963–1990
Coverage: 1950–1985 for all countries.
Share of Public Expenditures on Education Allocated to the Tertiary Level
Share of public expenditures on education devoted to the tertiary level, expressed as a percentage.
The sum of this variable and the one preceding it is 100 percent.
Source: UNESCO 1963–1990.
Coverage: 1950–1985 for all countries.
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Table C.1: Measures for All Variables, 1950–1985 (continued)
Public Expenditures on Education per Student at the PPS Levels
Public expenditures on preprimary, primary, and secondary (PPS) education divided by the number
of students enrolled at these educational levels as a percentage of GDP per capita, all at current
prices (final figure is a percentage).
Sources: Expenditures and Enrollment – UNESCO 1963–1990, 2013; Wilmoth, Shkolnikov, and
Barbier 2013. GDP – Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer 2013.
Coverage: 1960–1985 for all countries.
Public Expenditures on Education per Student at the Tertiary Level
Public expenditures on tertiary education divided by the number of students enrolled at this
educational level as a percentage of GDP per capita, all at current prices (final figure is a
percentage).
Sources: Expenditures and Enrollment – UNESCO 1963–1990, 2013; Wilmoth, Shkolnikov, and
Barbier 2013. GDP – Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer 2013.
Coverage: 1960–1985 for all countries.
Educational Coverage
Enrollment Rate at the PPS Levels
Number of students in preprimary, primary, and secondary (PPS) education as a percentage of the
relevant school-age population (ages 0–19).
Sources: UNESCO 1963–1990, 2013; Wilmoth, Shkolnikov, and Barbier 2013
Coverage: 1950–1985 for all countries.
Enrollment Rate at the Tertiary Level
Number of students in tertiary education as a percentage of the relevant school-age population
(ages 15–29).
Sources: UNESCO 1963–1990, 2013; Wilmoth, Shkolnikov, and Barbier 2013
Coverage: 1950–1985 for all countries.
Political Agency
Left Government
The cumulative sum of parliamentary seat shares for left parties in government from 1946 to the
year of observation. For example, the cumulative score for Australia in 1950 is equal to the seat
shares of left parties in government for 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949, and 1950.
Source: Comparative Welfare States Dataset (Brady, Huber, and Stephens 2014)
Coverage: 1950–1985 for all countries.
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Table C.1: Measures for All Variables, 1950–1985 (continued)
Christian Democratic Government
The cumulative sum of parliamentary seat shares for Christian democratic parties in government
from 1946 to the year of observation. All center and right parties with Christian roots (Protestant
or Catholic) are considered Christian democratic.
Source: Comparative Welfare States Dataset (Brady, Huber, and Stephens 2014)
Coverage: 1950–1985 for all countries.
Right Government
The cumulative sum of parliamentary seat shares for secular right parties in government from 1946
to the year of observation.
Source: Comparative Welfare States Dataset (Brady, Huber, and Stephens 2014)
Coverage: 1950–1985 for all countries.
Women’ s Labor Force Participation
The share of women aged 15–64 in the labor force, measured as a percentage.
Source: Comparative Welfare States Dataset (Brady, Huber, and Stephens 2014).
Coverage: 1950–1985 for all countries except Denmark (missing 1950–1954), France (missing
1950–1954), and the Netherlands (missing 1950–1954).
Voter Turnout
The total number of votes cast (valid or invalid) in the most recent election divided by the number
of people registered for the election, expressed as a percentage.
Sources: Comparative Welfare States Dataset (Brady, Huber, and Stephens 2014); Mackie and
Rose 1991.
Coverage: 1950–1985 for all countries.
Measures of Political Institutions
Regional Authority
The level of authority that regional governments have, measured using a composite index. This
index capture both the strength of regional self-rule and the degree to which authority is shared
between central and regional governments. The values of this index range from 0 (no regional
authority) to 37 (strong regional authority).
Source: Hooghe, Marks, and Schakel 2010.
Coverage: 1950–1985 for all countries except Austria (missing 1950–1954)
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Table C.1: Measures for All Variables, 1950–1985 (continued)
Economic Development
Veto Points
The degree to which policy changes can be blocked or stalled by minority interests, measured as a
composite index. The index is constructed by adding the scores for measures of federalism,
presidentialism, bicameralism, and the use of national referendums. The values of this index range
from 0 (no veto points) to 6 (strong veto points).
Source: Comparative Welfare States Dataset (Brady, Huber, and Stephens 2014)
Coverage: 1950–1985 for all countries.
GDP per Capita
The real gross domestic product per capita (expenditure-side method), expressed in 2005
international dollars.
Sources: Comparative Welfare States Dataset (Brady, Huber, and Stephens 2014); Penn World
Table 8.0 (Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer 2013).
Coverage: 1950–1985 for all countries.
Trade Openness
The level of external trade as a share of economic output, expressed as percentage (all figures at
current prices). This measure is calculated by dividing the sum of imports and exports by the gross
domestic product (i.e. (IM + EX)/GDP).
Sources: Comparative Welfare States Dataset (Brady, Huber, and Stephens 2014); Penn World
Table 8.0 (Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer 2013).
Coverage: 1950–1985 for all countries.
Education-Training Regimes
Regime Type at Secondary Level
Type of education-training regime at the secondary level for the prewar period (1880–1939): 0 =
system with limited general education and no meaningful vocational training; 1 = system with
modest general education and highly developed school-based vocational training; 2 = system with
modest general education and highly developed firm-based vocational training; 3 = system with
highly developed general education and no meaningful vocational training.
Sources: Author created.
Coverage: 1950–1985 for all countries.
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Table C.1: Measures for All Variables, 1950–1985 (continued)
Controls
Military Expenditures
Military expenditures as a percentage of GDP.
Sources: Comparative Welfare States Dataset (Brady, Huber, and Stephens 2014); Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI 1975–2003, 2013).
Coverage: 1950–1985 for all countries.
Unemployment
Harmonized unemployment rate, defined as the number of unemployed persons as a percentage of
the civilian labour force.
Sources: Comparative Welfare States Dataset (Brady, Huber, and Stephens 2014); OECD 1999,
2002, 2003, 2013a.
Coverage: 1950–1985 for all countries except Finland (missing 1950–1955), France (missing
1950–1955), and New Zealand (missing 1950–1951), and Switzerland (missing 1950–1954).
Inflation
Inflation rate, defined as the percentage change in consumer prices from the prior year to the
current year.
Sources: Comparative Welfare States Dataset (Brady, Huber, and Stephens 2014), OECD 2013b.
Coverage: 1950–1985 for all countries.
Shares of Population Aged 5–19, 15–29, 19 and Under, and 29 and Under
The share of the total population aged 5-19, 15-29, 19 and under, or 29 and under, expressed as a
percentage.
Sources: OECD 2012 and Human Mortality Database (Wilmoth, Shkolnikov, and Barbier 2013)
for West Germany.
Coverage: 1950–1985 for all countries.
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